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Introduction
If a man is killed in Paris, it is a murder; the throats of fifty thousand people
are cut in the East, and it is a question.
Victor Hugo1
During World War I, as the rest of the world looked on, the Ottoman
Empire carried out one of the largest genocides in the world's history,
slaughtering huge portions of its minority Armenian population. The
Armenian genocide followed decades of persecution by the Ottomans
and came only after two similar but smaller round of massacres in the
1894-96 and 1909 periods had resulted in two hundred thousand
Armenians deaths. In all, over one million Armenians were put to death.
The European Powers, who defeated the Turks time and again on the
battlefield, were unable or unwilling to prevent this slaughter. Even
worse, they failed to secure punishment of the perpetrators following
World War I. The events of that time have subsequently slipped into the
1. Quoted in Peterson, 61 CATHOLIC WORLD 665, 667 (1895).
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shadows of world history,2 thus gaining the title "the forgotten geno-
cide."' 3 To this day, Turkey denies the genocidal intent of these mass
murders.
4
Over the past seventy years, the Armenian nation has struggled to
have the history of the Armenian genocide brought to light. Despite the
scope of the slaughter, however, the international community has only
recently recognized the genocide officially. In April 1984, a group of
public figures (including three Nobel Prize laureates, among whom was
the late international jurist Sean McBride) conducted "People's Tribu-
nal" hearings on the Armenian genocide and adjudged it to be a crime
without statutory limitations. 5 In August 1985, the U.N. Subcommis-
sion on Human Rights, which had been deadlocked for over fourteen
years, took note, by a 14-1 vote (with 4 abstentions), of the historical fact
of the Armenian genocide. 6 Its parent body, the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, followed suit the next year.7 Finally, in June of 1987, the
European Parliament declared the Turkish massacres of World War I to
be a crime of genocide under the U.N. Convention on Genocide, 8 and
stipulated that Turkey must recognize the genocide before the Parlia-
ment would favorably consider Turkey's application for membership in
that body. The European Parliament labelled Turkey's refusal to do so
2. A prominent expert on genocide describes these shadows as "the United Nations mem-
ory hole." L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 219 (1981).
3. D. BOYAJIAN, ARMENIA: THE CASE OF A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE (1972); Housepian,
The Unremembered Genocide, 42 COMMENTARY 55-61 (Sept. 1966) (published as a pamphlet).
4. See, e.g., K. GORtiN, ERMENI DosYAsi (1983) (reversing victim-perpetrator roles in
Armenian conflict and denying Turkish genocidal intent); K. GORON, THE ARMENIAN FILE:
THE MYTH OF INNOCENCE EXPOSED (1985) (English translation of preceding); §. OREL & S.
YUCA, ERMENILERCE TALT PA§A'YA ATFEDILEN TELEGRAFLARIN GERgEK YOZO (The
Real Nature of the Telegrams Attributed to Talat Pasa by the Armenians) (1983) (denying
authenticity of telegrams reflecting central planning of Armenian massacres); N. OZKAYA, LE
PEUPLE ARMENIEN ET LES TENTATIVES DE RENDRE EN SERVITUDE LE PEUPLE TURC (The
Armenian People and the Attempts to Subjugate the Turkish People) (1971) (blaming Arme-
nian revolutionaries for massacres of Armenians preceding and attending genocide).
5. PERMANENT PEOPLES' TRIBUNAL, A CRIME OF SILENCE: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
(1985).
6. U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities (38th sess.) (Item 57) at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/
SR.36 (1985) (summary record of 36th meeting, Aug. 29, 1985).
7. It is significant that Whitaker, author of the report that the Subcommision based its
finding on and a British expert-member of the Subcommission renowned for his judiciousness,
took eight years to research the matter. See Whitaker, Revised and updated report on the
question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 38 U.N. ESCOR Comm. on
Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
(Agenda Item 4), at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985). In a revised and updated
report Whitaker made some corrections at the end of the Subcommission's deliberations; e.g.,
in note 13, he changed "1 million" to "40%." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6/Corr.l
(1985).




an "insurmountable obstacle[ ] to consideration of the possibility of Tur-
key's accession to the [European] Community." 9
The relatively low impact of the genocidal killing of one million
Armenians on modem public consciousness raises serious questions
about the ability of the international community to prevent or punish
acts of genocide. Many see the lack of action following the Armenian
genocide as an important precedent for the subsequent Jewish Holocaust
of World War II. Indeed, it has been reported that, in trying to. reassure
doubters of the desirability and viability of his genocidal schemes, Hitler
stated, "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armeni-
ans?"' 0 This connection was raised repeatedly during the U.S. Senate's
consideration of the U.N. Convention on Genocide, which the United
States ratified on February 19, 1986. A score of Senators, most notably
Senators Doyle, Boschwitz, Proxmire, Lugar, Levin, Lautenberg, Riegle,
Kerry, and Wilson, emphasized the historical precedent of the Armenian
case and pointed to the enormous suffering of the Jewish Holocaust that
resulted from humanity's disregard of the Armenians' fate."
The failures that preceded and followed the Armenian genocide carry
important lessons for present-day international scholars and lawyers
seeking to outlaw genocide. While the post-World War II trials in Nu-
remberg have shaped much of the current thought on the prevention and
9. Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question, EUR. PARL. RESOLUTION
Doc. A2-33/87, No. 10 (Armenian Question), at 31 (1987). The chronology of the treatment
of the Armenian Question in the European Parliament, along with the text (comprising 15
points) is in THlE ARMENIAN WEEKLY (Boston), June 27, 1985, at 5; THE ARMENIAN MIR-
ROR SPECTATOR (Boston), July 18, 1987. at 3.
10. K. BARDAK.IIAN, HITLER AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 6 (1985).
11. 132 CONG. REC. S1355-80 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). This historical evidence should be
born in mind in considering the recent legislation enacted in the United States that criminal-
izes genocide under domestic law. In November 1987, a bill was introduced in the Senate by
Senators Joseph Biden, William Proxmire, and Howard Metzenbaum, creating a new Federal
crime of genocide or attempted genocide. President Reagan signed the bill into law on No-
vember 4, 1988. Genocide and attempted genocide is now punishable by imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or both. These provisions apply
only to nationals of the United States or to an offense committed within U.S. borders.
J. Griffin, Chairman, Section of International Law and Practice, and J.F. Murphy, Chair-
man, Committee on United Nations Activities Section of International Law and Practice,
American Bar Association, made the following statement on February'19, 1988, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the bill:
As familiar as are the historic examples of genocide against the Armenians and the Jews,
genocide is a contemporary crime of shocking magnitude, and we must prepare ourselves
to fight it- ..What is left to do is, somewhat surprisingly, quite simple: The interna-
tional crime of genocide must be made part of the criminal law of the United States. In a
word, we must formally recognize that which even the few opponents of the treaty must
surely concede-that in the United States, as in the world, genocide is a crime...
•. •This is good legislation which should have been the law of our land 40 years ago.
We pledge our support to make it the law now.
Statement of J. Griffin and J.F. Murphy, at 4-5, 7 (unpublished material on file with author).
Yale Journal of International Law
punishment of genocide, the trials resulted from a set of conditions that
will rarely arise. Following World War II, Germany was forced to sur-
render unconditionally to the Allied forces. The Allies subsequently ran
the German government, eliminating any claim of sovereignty that Ger-
many otherwise could have asserted. Furthermore, seeking retributive
justice against the Nazis promoted the Allies' self-interests, since much
of the Nazi persecution was directed at the Allies' own nationals under
German occupation.
Unfortunately, none of these factors were present during or after the
slaughter of the Armenians. Although the European Powers did pursue
a strategy of "humanitarian intervention" in Ottoman Turkey during the
years leading up to World War I, and they instituted the concept of
"crimes against humanity" in 1915 in response to the unfolding geno-
cide, the Powers never shared the unity of interests that they had follow-
ing World War II. Most harmful to the Armenians was the lack of a
powerful state to champion their cause; thus, the victors of 1918 willingly
dropped their humanitarian concerns in exchange for enhanced favor
with the Kemalist regime that was gaining control of Turkey. In addi-
tion, the Allies allowed the Turks to maintain their own government fol-
lowing their defeat in the war. As a result, the Turkish government
blocked efforts by the Allies to punish the perpetrators of the genocide by
asserting its sovereign rights. While it is difficult to determine for cer-
tain, the recent history of killings in Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Ethio-
pia indicate that the ineffective efforts at genocide prevention preceding
World War I and the frustrated efforts at punishment following it are
more likely to be the norm than are the Nuremberg trials.
The truth is that the U.N. Convention on Genocide's classification of
genocide as a crime under international law, while a positive step, begs
the ultimate question of enforcement. Similarly, although the Nurem-
berg trials stand as a promising example of international cooperation in
punishing acts of genocide, one cannot rely on such a complete conver-
gence of interests arising in every case. This paper examines the unhappy
history of the Armenian genocide; perhaps by studying the failures as
well as the successes of the past, it may be possible to better understand
and thus resolve the difficulties in preventing genocide.
There are three main lessons that emerge from the events surrounding
the Armenian genocide. First, nations generally will not be able, and
thus cannot be expected, to effectively police or punish themselves. The
post-World War I trials in Turkey, as well those in Germany, reveal the
futility of trusting domestic processes to obtain retribution for state-sanc-




ble in that they documented the crime of organized mass murder against
the Armenians. These trials, however, resulted in only a small number of
convictions under Turkish penal law. The political upheaval attending
Turkey's response to military defeat impaired, and ultimately destroyed,
the judicial proceedings' effectiveness. The Kemalist regime that eventu-
ally gained power in post-war Turkey successfully relied on principles of
national sovereignty to reject the authority of the European Powers to
intervene in the trials. Further, the Kemalists weakened European re-
solve in this area by manipulating the political tensions that divided the
Allies. In Turkey, the rise of nationalist feelings following the Kemalists'
emergence conflicted with the purposes behind the prosecution of the
accused war criminals. The Turkish government and people were un-
willing to accept the stigma of collective guilt that was implied in these
trials.
A second lesson emerging from the Armenian genocide is that groups
of international actors cannot prevent or punish genocidal acts by an-
other state when they do not remain cohesive and unequivocally commit-
ted to such ends. In World War I, the Allied Powers decisively defeated
the Turkish forces. Further, through their May 24, 1915 declaration ex-
pressing their intent to punish the perpetrators of the genocide, England,
France, and Russia provided a basis for international jurisdiction over
the genocidal acts of the Ittihad government of Turkey. The Allied pow-
ers, however, were still unable to secure retribution for the genocide. In-
stead, their efforts floundered on political divisions between the countries
and an inability, or an unwillingness, to usurp the Ottomans' sovereign
right to punish their own people for acts committed against Ottoman
subjects on Ottoman soil. 12 This failure is not surprising. The interna-
12. When the Paris Peace Conference convened in January 1919, the first item on the
agenda was the matter of punishing war crimes. For this purpose, the Allies created the Com-
mission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties.
Citing Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (opinion of Marshall,
C.J.), the two American representatives, Secretary of State Robert Lansing (the Commission's
chairman) and James Scott, a leading international law scholar, objected to the projected trial
of the German Kaiser by the victorious allies. Arguing that such a trial would imply a measure
of "responsibility hitherto unknown to municipal or international law, for which no precedents
are to be found in the modem practice of nations," Lansing and Scott denied the Allies the
right of "legal penalties" while conceding them the right to impose "political sanctions."
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR: REPORT OF THE MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REPORTS OF THE AMERI-
CAN AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE CONFER-
ENCE OF PARIS, 1919, Pamphlet No. 32 [hereinafter VIOLATIONS]. The dissenting opinions
are at pp. 58-79.
By the same token, the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians was excluded from the
category of "war crimes" to be prosecuted and punished by the Allies. As Willis put it:
Not until 1948 would genocide... be clearly defined as an international crime, and in
1919 adherence to time-honored notions of sovereignty placed limitations upon the scope
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tional system, including the United Nations, often countenances acts of
sovereign nations that extend to instances of organized violence and mass
murder. Noted international law scholar Kuper has explicitly addressed
this problem:
[T]he United Nations remains highly protective of state sovereignty, even
where there is overwhelming evidence, not simply of minor violations, but
of widespread murder and genocidal massacre. It is no wonder that it may
seem to be a conspiracy of governments to deprive their people of their
rights. 13
The final, and perhaps most daunting, lesson of the Armenian geno-
cide is that when international actors intervene in response to persecu-
tions in another state without firm coordination and commitment, any
actions they take may actually do more harm than good. Through their
humanitarian intervention in Turkish affairs during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the European Powers were able to force
the Ottoman government to adopt a number of statutory provisions en-
suring equal rights for non-Muslim minorities (such as the Armenians).
These statutes raised the national consciousness of the Armenian popula-
tion, who began to press for the actual implementation of these reforms.
Unfortunately, the Ottomans had no intention of enforcing these stat-
utes; they had adopted them merely to appease the Europeans. The Eu-
ropean Powers were willing to accept the statutes at face value and never
truly attempted to force Ottoman compliance; nor did they offer the
Armenians the military or political support that they would need to actu-
ally acquire these statutory rights. The Muslim majority in Ottoman
of traditional laws and customs of war. The Hague conventions... [did not deal] with a
state's treatment of its own citizens .... From this perspective, Turkish action against
Armenians was an internal matter, not subject to the jurisdiction of another government.
J. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR
CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 157 (1982).
Yet as Secretary of State during the war, Lansing did sanction a degree of intervention
which he felt the brutality of the Turkish measures against the Armenians justified. In a Nov.
21, 1916 letter to President Wilson, Lansing granted the "more or less justifiable" right of the
Turkish government to deport the Armenians, in so far as they lived "within the zone of
military operations." But, he added: "It was not to my mind the deportation which was
objectionable but the horrible brutality which attended its execution. It is one of the blackest
pages in the history of this war, and I think that we were fully justified in intervening as we did
in behalf of the wretched people, even though they were Turkish subjects." RG (L) 59,
763.72115/2631c; L. at 42-43. As far as it is known, only once did William Jennings Bryan,
Lansing's predecessor, issue explicit instructions to Ambassador Morgenthau in Turkey "to
secure from Turkish Government order to civil and military officials throughout Palestine and
Syria that they will be held personally responsible for lives and property of Jews and Christians
in case of massacre and looting. This is required immediately." The occasion for this instruc-
tion was the rising tide of anti-Semitism in Syria and Palestine and the concomitant apprehen-
sion of organized pogroms during the war. RG (S) 59, 367.116/309a; S. at 979.





Turkey, who had long viewed the Armenians and other non-Muslims as
"tolerated infidels," seized upon the new Armenian nationalism as an
excuse to rid themselves of the "Armenian problem." Thus, the humani-
tarian intervention of the Europeans, however benign in its intentions,
created the conditions that ultimately led to the genocide.
In the first section, I will examine the Islamic tenets that shaped the
Ottoman society and show how these religious beliefs led the Turks to
subvert the European efforts at humanitarian intervention, both in gen-
eral and in the specific case of the Armenians. In the second section, the
implementation and execution of the Armenian genocide by the It-
tihadist regime in Turkey under the cover of World War I will be dis-
cussed. Next, in Section III, I will look at the efforts at retribution, both
internationally and domestically, and detail the divisions within the Eu-
ropean Powers and the nationalistic pressures within Turkey that
doomed these efforts to failure. This paper will conclude by considering
the lessons that the history of the Armenian genocide has for modern
efforts at outlawing such acts of mass murder in the future.
There is one last vital aspect of this paper that must not be overlooked.
For over seventy years, the massacre of the Armenian people has been
"the forgotten genocide." Many of the facts that are discussed in this
paper have never before been published.' 4 Incrediby, the Turkish gov-
ernment still denies that these massacres occurred. More than one mil-
lion Armenian men, women, and children were methodically and
.deliberately murdered in Ottoman Turkey. It is time, at last, that the
world hear their cries.
14. It is important to emphasize that much of the documentation for this paper comes
from within Ottoman-Turkey and her allies during World War II, Germany and Austria.
Specifically, these sources include:
1. Secret and top secret Ottoman-Turkish state documents, every one of which was au-
thenticated by ministerial officials before being introduced in the Turkish Court Martial
Proceedings.
2. The preponderance of German and Austrian documents anticipating and corroborat-
ing the findings of the Turkish Military Tribunal. The importance of these documents
cannot be overemphasized. Germany and Austria were the political and military allies of
Turkey during World War I. Their representatives' confidential reports composed during
and after the Armenian massacre reveal the enormity of the crime.
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I. Humanitarian Intervention by the Powers: A Historical
Perspective
A. Islamic Sacred Law as a Matrix of Ottoman Legal Order and
Nationality Conflicts
As a first step toward a full analysis of the Armenian Genocide, it is
essential to see the events leading up to and following the genocide within
the context of the Islamic culture of Ottoman Turkey and the common
law principles that were derived from this culture. Islamic tenets heavily
influenced the growth of the Ottoman Empire. Although Islam is a reli-
gious creed, it is also a way of life for its followers, transcending the
boundaries of faith to permeate the social and political fabric of a nation.
Islam's bent for divisiveness, exclusivity and superiority, which over-
whelms its nominal tolerance of other religions, is therefore vital to an
understanding of a Muslim-dominated, multi-ethnic system such as Otto-
man Turkey.
The Islamic character of Ottoman theocracy was a fundamental factor
in the Ottoman state's legal organization. The Sultan, who exercised
supreme political power, also carried the title of Khalif (meaning Succes-
sor to Mohammed) and thereby served as the supreme protector of Is-
lam. Thus, the Sultan-Khalif was entrusted with protecting the canon
law of Islam, called the yeriat, meaning revelation (of the laws of God as
articulated by the prophet Mohammed). The 4eriat comprised not only
religious precepts, but a fixed and infallible doctrine of duties, including
regulations of a juridical and political nature, whose prescriptions and
proscriptions were restricted to the territorial jurisdiction of the State.
These Islamic doctrines embraced by the Ottoman state circumscribed
the status of non-Muslims within its jurisdiction. The Ottoman system
was not merely a theocracy but a subjugative political organization based
on the principle of fixed superordination and subordination governing
the legal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, and entailing so-
cial and political disabilities for the latter.' 5 The Koran, the centerpiece
of the yeriat, embodies some 260 verses, most of them uttered by Mo-
hammed in Mecca, enjoining the faithful to wage cihad, holy war,
against the "disbelievers," e.g., those who do not profess the "true faith"
(hakk din), and to "massacre" (kital) them.' 6 Moreover, the verse "Let
15. BAT YE'OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM 48, 49, 62, 67, 70,
76, 84, 89, 108, 140-41, 143, 154-56; Doc. No. 52, The Armenians, 281-88; Doc. No. 53,
Obstacles to Christian Emancipation 289-90, Jacques Ellul's Preface 26-33 (D. Maisel, P. Fen-
ton, D. Littman trans. 1985) (Bat Ye'or is the pseudonym of Y. Masriya).
16. Koran ch. 47, verse 4; ch. 9, verse 124; ch. 2, verse 211; ch. 3, verses 8, 68, 135; ch. 8,




there be no violence in religion" 17 is superseded and thus cancelled (men-
suh) by Mohammed's command to "wage war against the unbelievers
and be severe unto them."1 8 The verse that has specific relevance for the
religious determination of the legal and political status of non-Muslims
whose lands have been conquered by the invading Islamic warriors has
this command: "Fight against them... until they pay tribute (ciziye) by
right of subjection, and they be reduced low." 19 This stipulation is the
fundamental prerequisite "to ending warfare and introducing terms of
clemency.
The Ottoman Empire's Islamic doctrines and traditions, reinforced by
the martial institutions of the State, resulted in the emergence of princi-
ples of common law which held sway throughout the history of the Otto-
man socio-political system. The Sultan-Khalif's newly incorporated
non-Muslim subjects were required to enter into a quasi-legal contract,
the Akd Zimmet, whereby the ruler guaranteed the "safeguard" (ismet)
of their persons, their civil and religious liberties, and, conditionally,
their properties, in exchange for the payment of poll and land taxes, and
acquiescence to a set of social and legal disabilities. These contracts
marked the initiation of a customary law in the Ottoman system that
regulated the unequal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ot-
toman common law thus created the status of "tolerated infidels [rele-
gated to] a caste inferior to that of their fellow Moslem subjects."' 20 The
Turkish scholar N. Berkes further pointed out that the intractability of
this status was a condition of the yeriat which "could not admit of [non-
Muslim] equality in matters over which it ruled. [Even the subsequent
secular laws based on] the concept of Kanun (law) did not imply legal
equality among Muslims and non-Muslims." 21
This principle of Ottomon common law created a political dichotomy
of superordinate and subordinate status. The Muslims, belonging to the
umma, the politically organized community of believers, were entitled to
remain the nation of overlords. Non-Muslims were relegated to the sta-
tus of tolerated infidels. These twin categories helped perpetuate the di-
visions between the two religious communities, thereby embedding
conflict into the societal structure. Moreover, the split transcended the
political power struggle occurring in Ottoman Turkey during this time
period. Even when the Young Turk Ittihadists succeeded Sultan Abdul
17. Id. ch. 2, verse 257.
18. Id. ch. 9, verse 74.
19. Id. ch. 9, verse 29.
20. 1:2 H. GIBB & H. BOWEN, ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE WEST 208 (1962).
21. N. BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 94 (1964).
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Hamit into power in 1908, they reaffirmed the principle of the ruling
nation (milleti hakime). While promising liberty, justice and equality for
all Ottoman subjects, they vowed to preserve the superordinate-
subordinate dichotomy. That vow was publicly proclaimed through
Tanin, the official publication of the Ittihad party. Hiiseyin Cahid, its
editor, declared in an editorial that irrespective of the final outcome of
the nationality conflict in Turkey, "the Turkish nation is and will remain
the ruling nation.
' '22
The Ittihad's adherence to the ruling nation principle is particularly
noteworthy because the Ittihad were not followers of the tenets of Islam.
While the Ittihad continued to run the state largely as a theocracy, its
leaders were personally atheists and agnostics. 23 These leaders, however,
recognized the pervasive influence of Islam in the country and resolved
to exploit it in their plans to eliminate the sources of domestic nationality
conflicts. The Ittihad's actions reveal a central truth of the use of polit-
ical power within Ottoman Turkey: actual power or influence within the
Ottoman Empire could only exist to the extent that it recognized and
incorporated the tenets of Islam. These tenets embodied an inherent
resistance to change, rendering the specter of innovation threatening, and
thus unnacceptable, to Muslim subjects.2 4
B. European Efforts at Humanitarian Intervention and Its Subversion
Under the Islamic Common Law Principles of the Turks
The European Powers' "humanitarian intervention" efforts in Otto-
man Turkey severely clashed with the fundamental facts of Turkish poli-
tics. Derived from entrenched customs of long standing (adet), the
Islamic common law principle of a ruling nation within the state directly
conflicted with the egalitarian principles of European public law. While
the European Powers succeeded in imposing their legal principles on for-
22. TANIN (Istanbul), Oct. 25, 1908.
23. Mardin described this irreligiousness as follows: "Distrust added to disgust was their
attitude toward institutional Islam... [yet they saw fit to develop] a manipulative instrumental
attitude toward religion." Mardin, Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution, 2 INT'L J.
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 207-08 (1971). Morgenthau confirms this view from his personal con-
tacts with these leaders. "I can personally testify that he [Talat] cared nothing for Mohamme-
danism for, like most of the leaders of his party, he scoffed at all religions. 'I hate all priests,
rabbis and hodjas,' he once told me... Practically all of them were atheists." H. MORGEN-
THAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY 20, 323 (1918). An American-educated Turk-
ish sociologist added, "Religion was used [by Ittihad] as a basis of agitation to secure
popularity." A. YALMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN TURKEY AS MEASURED BY ITS
PRESS 100 (1914).
24. As Leon Festinger stated in his general theory of cognitive dissonance, the existence of
an opposing set of beliefs makes the individual less certain of his own beliefs. That individual
then acts on his own beliefs more strongly in order to compensate for his uncertainty. L.




mal Turkish law, continued Turkish adherence to the underlying Islamic
common law subverted the Europeans' efforts. Only a unified and force-
ful effort by the European Powers could have overcome the inherent
resistance to change within the Islamic culture of Ottoman Turkey. Un-
fortunately, the Armenian genocide reveals the difficulties in uniting
groups of states for effective humanitarian intervention. Specifically, the
Armenian Genocide shows that international intervention is unlikely to
be successful unless it is either committed to an overriding goal strong
enough to counter the entrenched culture of the offending nation state, or
is carried out by member-states who are acting to protect their own na-
tionals subject to the offending state's genocidal acts.
1. Humanitarian Intervention in Ottoman Turkey
a. The origins of humanitarian intervention
The reign of Catherine the Great in Russia (1762-1796) coincided with
the advent of a period of active European concern for the fate of a host of
Christian nationalities ruled by the Ottoman State. In the Treaty of
Kijqijk Kaynarca (July 21, 1774),25 resulting from Catherine the Great's
victorious wars against Turkey from 1768 to 1774, article 7 conceded to
the Russians a right to intercede on behalf of all Russian Orthodox
Church members and, by extension, all Orthodox subjects (such as
Greeks and Bulgarians). Pursuant to article 16 of the same treaty, Mol-
davia, Wallachia, and Serbia became the immediate and direct benefi-
ciaries of this concession. 26 Between 1774-1856, "Russia exercised in
Turkey a veritable right of humanitarian intervention, albeit limited, to
the protection of Orthodox Christians. '27 Thus began a custom in inter-
national law that has been termed l'intervention d'humanitd.
b. European intervention on behalf of Greece
During the Greek War of Independence (1821- 1830), a series of exter-
nal attempts to end the war developed this theme of "humanit." Eng-
land and Russia cooperated to secure limited autonomy for Greece under
25. The English text of the treaty is in 1 J. HUREWITZ, DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND
MIDDLE EAST, A DOCUMENTARY RECORD: 1535-1914 54-61 (1956). The French text is in A.
SCHOPOFF, LES RIFORMES ET LA PROTECTION DES CHRITIENS EN TURQUIE 1673-1904 12-
13 (1904).
26. See Mandelstam, Das Armenische Problem im Lichte des V'lker-und Menschenrechts,
12 INSTITUT FOR INTERNATIONAL ES RECHT AN DER UNIV. KIEL [Lecture Series and
Monographs] 15 (1931).
27. A. MANDELSTAM, LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS ET LES PUISSANCES DEVANT LE
PROBLIME ARMtNIEN 6 (1926) [Special edition of Revue G6nrale de Droit Intnl.
Publ.](emphasis in original).
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Turkish suzerainty. 28 This action was followed in 1827 by the Treaty of
London,29 in which France joined England and Russia in a resolution
warning Turkey to stop hostilities lest the three Powers proceed to aid
Greece militarily. The Preamble of the London Treaty asserted that this
effort was intended to serve the interests of peace in Europe, but also to
reflect un sentiment d'humanitdia° While article 5 stated that the con-
tracting parties sought no territorial advantages, 31 Turkey's refusal to
comply with a subsequent demand for an armistice led to a new war with
Russia and to substantial losses of territory in Asiatic and European Tur-
key. The war ended in 1830 with the complete independence of Greece.
The Note of April 8, 1830, in which England, France, and Russia in-
formed the Ottoman government of their decision to grant Greece inde-
pendence, contained a reiteration of their desire to "fulfill an imperative
duty of humanity in putting an end to the troubles which were devastat-
ing these unhappy countries ... and in even consolidating the existence
of the Ottoman Empire."' 32 These purportedly "humanitarian interven-
tions" were pivotal in ushering in Turkey's Charter, comprising the twin
Tanzimat (reordering) reforms, instituted through the 1839 Act of
Giilhane and the 1856 Reform Act.33 By recognizing for the first time
the principle of the equality of non-Muslims, the Act of Giilhane had an
almost revolutionary thrust. Yet the decree remained, for all intents and
purposes, "a dead letter."' 34 This pattern was to be repeated in the
future.
c. The 1856 Reform Act
Toward the end of the Crimean War (1853-1856), which the Turks
had precipitated, the Powers informed Turkey that as one precondition
for peace it had to issue, of her own free will (proprio motu), a sequel to
the Act of Giilhane. 35 Turkey promptly responded with the second Ot-
toman Reform Act of February 18, 1856, which not only reaffirmed the
provisions of its predecessor, but forbade discrimination against and deg-
28. This objective was accomplished with the St. Petersburg Protocol of 1826. 2 G.
NORADOUNGHIAN, RECUEIL D'AcTEs INTERNATIONAUX DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN Doc. No.
37 (1900).
29. Id. at 130-34. This treaty was signed on July 6, 1827.
30. Id. at 131.
31. Id. at 132.
32. Id. at 186 (London Protocol of February 3, 1830).
33. See infra note 36.
34. 1 E. ENGELHARDT, LA TURQUIE ET LE TANZIMAT OU HISTOIRE DES RFORMES
DANS L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN 142 (1882).
35. M. ROLIN-JAEQUEMYNS, ARMENIA, THE ARMENIANS, AND THE TREATIES v (1891).
This work is a revised version of two articles originally published in Revue de Droit Interna-
tional et de Ligislation Comparde, the organ of the Belgian Institute of International Law,
dated 1887 and 1889. No translator is indicated.
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radation of non-Muslims. 36 Satisfied with the new legislation, the Pow-
ers met at the Congress of Paris in February and March of 1856 and
issued the Paris Treaty of March 30, 1856. 37 In this treaty, Russia gave
up separate claims to a protectorate over the Christians in Turkey, and
the Powers expressed appreciation for the new Ottoman Reform Act in
article 9.38
Religious fundamentalists and secular nationalists in Turkey, however,
rejected the 1856 Reform Act. The Turkish people rejected both the idea
of equality for non-Muslims and the influence of European powers inter-
vening on behalf of the Christian nationalities. 39 The success of Islam
"in integrating the political life of its adherents" 40 faced a major threat.
d. Massacre of Christian Maronites
As the Powers continued to admonish and pressure the Porte (the seat
of Ottoman government), the incompatibility of Western law and Islamic
religion erupted in a major international incident which prompted mili-
tary intervention by the Powers. In 1860, the Muslim Druzes initiated a
wholesale massacre of Christian Maronites in Syria and Lebanon, then
part of the Ottoman Empire.4 1 The Powers intervened, describing their
actions as humanitarian in the August 3, 1860, Protocol of Paris. This
intervention immediately produced the autonomy of Lebanon as formu-
36. For the English texts of both acts see 1 J. HUREWITZ, supra note 25, at 113-16 (1839
Giilhane Act), 149-53 (1856 Act). See also F. BAILEY, BRITISH POLICY AND THE TURKISH
REFORM MOVEMENT: A STUDY IN ANGLO-TURKISH RELATIONS 1826-1853 at 277-79 (Act
of Giilhane), 287-91 (1856 Reform Act) (1970). For the French texts of same see G.
NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 28, at 288-90 (1839 Act); 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, RECUEIL
D'ACTES INTERNATIONAUX DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN 83-88 (1902) (1856 Act).
37. The English text of the Paris Treaty is in J. HUREWITZ, supra note 25, at 153-56; the
French text is in 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36, at 70-79.
38. 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36, at 74.
39. Statutory laws were inimical to "a number of practices derived from the ,eriat and
perpetuated through the millet system [of religiously defined nationalities]," and the problem
was compounded by "the intervention of the powers on behalf of the millets..." N. BERKES,
supra note 21, at 147. As Davison asserted, "large parts of [the 1856 Edict] had been dictated
by the British, French and Austrian ambassadors." Davison, Turkish Attitudes Concerning
Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century, 59 AM. HIST. REV. 857 (1954). Ac-
cording to a Turkish historian, the people lamented: "We have lost today our sacred national
right which our ancestors had won with their blood. The Islamic nation that was the ruling
nation (nilleti hakime) has been divested of this right. This is a day for weeping and mourn-
ing for the Islamic people." I A. CEVDET infra note 75, at 68.
40. M. WATT, ISLAM AND THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIETY 174 (1961).
41. Having received a mandate from the other Powers, a French expeditionary force of
6,000 (half of the total combined European force) restored order and induced the Turkish
authorities to exact punishment from the ringleaders of the atrocities. Those involved in the
Damascus massacre were hanged by the Grand Vezir Fuad Papa. FO 371/2488/51010 (min-
utes of French and British diplomats recounting the events in Apr. 1915).
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lated in the Rdglement of June 9, 1861, and provided for the appointment
of a Christian Governor-General.
42
The Agreement between the European Powers and Turkey outlining
the intervention in Lebanon was termed Protocols pour le rdtablissment
de la tranquilitd en Syrie et la protection des Chrdtiens, thus combining
the quest for "order" with that of "protecting the Christians" against
massacre.43 This formula conformed with the first paragraph of article 9
of the Paris Peace Treaty, but it was at odds with the second paragraph
of that article, which prohibited interference in the internal affairs of
Turkey ("soit collectivement, soit siparement"), involving the "Sultan's
relationships with his subjects" and his provincial administration.
44
e. The Cretan and Balkan insurrections
The 1866-1868 Cretan insurrection elicited another instance of Euro-
pean intervention. Their action took the form of an 1867 inquiry con-
ducted by the Consuls of France, England, Austria, and Russia
examining Turkey's failure to fulfill its 1856 Reform Act commitments.
Following this failed insurrection, the Balkan nationalities erupted into
open rebellion.
In July 1875, the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina rose against Otto-
man rule. On December 30, 1875, the Austrian Chancellor Andrassy
proposed to the signatories of the Paris Peace Treaty the formation of a
Muslim-Christian Commission to enforce the reforms, especially the pro-
viso on the equality before the law of Muslims and Christians alike, and
to supervise their implementation. 45 The Sultan again acceded on Feb-
ruary 13, 1876. As the bloodshed continued unabated, however, the
Powers (with the exception of England which declined to join due to
resentment over not being initially consulted) issued the Berlin Memo-
randum of May 13, 1876, an extension of the previous Andrassy Note.
42. 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36, at 144-49 (Rdglement).
43. Id. at 125 (French text of Protocol).
44. The text of article 9 states:
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, having in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his
subjects, issued a firman which, while ameliorating their condition, without distinction of
religion or of race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian populations of
his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in this respect, has
resolved to communicate to the contracting parties the said firman, emanating spontane-
ously from his sovereign will. The contracting Powers recognize the high value of this
communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot in any case give the right to the
said Powers to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty
the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his Empire.
J. HUREWITZ, supra note 25, at 154. For the original French text of the article see G.
NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36, at 74.
45. E. ENGELHARDT, supra note 34, at 145-48. For the full text in French see A. Sci-o-
POFF, supra note 25, at 179-80. For the English text see 4 E. HERTSLET, THE MAP OF Eu-




The memorandum asked Turkey to agree to an armistice, to grant the
Christians the right to keep their arms, and to recognize the principle of
supervision of the reforms by the consuls of these Powers.
f. The Midhat Constitution
To forestall European control of the implementation of reforms, Otto-
man Turkey adopted the Midhat Constitution. 46 The document's liberal
provisions improved upon the preceding Reform Acts. Article 8 pro-
claimed the common citizenship of all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of
religion.47 Article 9 guaranteed their individual liberty. 48 Article 17 pro-
claimed their equality before the law, and their rights and duties "with-
out prejudice to religion."'49 The Constitution, however, still deferred to
the primacy of Islam. Article 4 designated the Sultan as the protector of
Islam in his capacity as Khalif 50 Article 5 declared that "His majesty
the Sultan is irresponsible: His person is sacred." 51 Article 11, more-
over, while granting "religious privileges" to the other faiths in the Em-
pire, asserted that "Islamism is the religion of the State."
'52
Neither these new constitutionally-guaranteed rights, nor "the privi-
leges" of article 11 purporting to enshrine the Islamic spirit of toleration
of other faiths mitigated the real legal and political disabilities of the non-
Muslims, however. The Sultan-Khalif himself obstructed the task of im-
plementation.5 3 In addition, one of the high priests of modern Turkish
nationalism, Tekin Alp, repudiated the Turkish claim of having granted
to the non-Muslim communities, especially the Armenians, privileges of
religious autonomy, defining article 11 as "the high separation wall," in-
tended to sustain the segregation and exclusion of the non-Muslims.
54
French international law scholar Engelhardt, in his renowned study on
reforms in nineteenth-century Turkey, similarly rejected the notion of
"privilege," substituting for it the entrenched practice of "separation, af-
forded by reasons of state, religious antagonism," and reinforced by
46. OTTOMAN CONST. (Midhat), reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (Supp. 1908). The
French text of the Constitution is in A. SCHOPOFF, supra note 25, at 192.
47. OTTOMAN CONST. at 367.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 369.
50. Id. at 367.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 368.
53. In his book dealing with these obstructions, the son of Midhat Papa focuses on the
Sultan's inveterate aversion to any plan to end segregation, prejudice and discrimination prac-
ticed on religious grounds. See A. MIDHAT, THE LIFE OF MIDHAT PASHA 108, 141-42
(1903).
54. T. ALP, TORKISMUS UND PANTORKISMUS 89 (1915). It should be noted that the word
*intiyaz" inserted in article 11 of the Ottoman constitution, while denoting "privilege," also
connotes the idea of "separation" or "distinctness" in a more learned diction.
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"Muslim disdain" for other religions. 5  This obstruction was nowhere
more manifest than in the administration of justice in the provinces. Par-
ticularly instructive among the dozen British Blue Books covering the
1879-1881 period,56 is Turkey No. 8 (1881), in which the British Foreign
Office (in its Reports on the Administration of Justice in the Civil, Crimi-
nal, and Commercial Courts in the Various Provinces of the Ottoman Em-
pire) described numerous cases involving bribery, "organized perjury,"
venal judges, and violations of the penal codes of the secular (Nizamiye)
courts at the expense of non-Muslims.
5 7
A Belgian jurist specializing in Ottoman legal affairs underscored some
of the covert objectives of the new constitution:
It appears only too clearly from this document that the actual aim of the
new charter was to postpone the time when Europe would ask the Porte for
something more than fair words and laws made for show. In other words,
those who used this fine language intended merely to prevent the interests
of the Christian nations still under Turkish rule from being formally and
explicitly put under the protection of European international law, as they
had already been implicitly placed by the Treaty of Paris.
58
The new constitution was enacted in the wake of the May 1876 insur-
rection in Bulgaria, where Turkish irregulars slaughtered an estimated
15,000-20,000 Bulgarian women and children. Known as "the Bulgarian
horrors"-59-prompting British Prime Minister Gladstone to write a
pamphlet demanding the expulsion of the Turks from Europe-these
atrocities set off the wars with the Serbians and the Montenegrins in June
and July of 1876.60 After the Ottoman Turks refused British and French
attempts to negotiate an armistice, the Turks yielded to a Russian ulti-
matum of October 30, 1876.61 The ensuing Constantinople Conference
55. 2 E. ENGELHARDT, LA TURQUIE ET LE TANZIMAT ou HISTOIRE DES R1FORMES
DANS L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN 299-300 (1884).
56. These official publications of the British Foreign Office are BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE,
BLUE BOOK, TURKEY [hereinafter BLUE BOOK, TURKEY] No. 10 (1879); id., No. 1 (1880);
id., No. 4 (1880); id., No. 7 (1880); id., No. 9 (1880); id., No. 23 (1880); id., No. 5 (1881); id.,
No. 6 (1881); id., No. 10 (1881). The Consuls reporting to London were officers of the English
Army and included Captain (later Major) Trotter, Captain (later Major) Everett, Captain
Clayton, Lieutenant (later Colonel) Chermside, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, and Captain
Steward.
57. Id., No. 8 (1881) at 57, 58, 71-72, 109-10. See the citations in M. ROLIN-JAEQUEMYNS,
supra note 35, at 45, 73-76.
58. M. ROLIN-JAEQUEMEYNS, supra note 35, at 33 (emphasis in original).
59. J. MARRIOTT, THE EASTERN QUESTION (AN HISTORICAL STUDY IN EUROPEAN DI-
PLOMACY) 318-34 (4th ed. 1958).
60. Gladstone's pamphlet stirred English public opinion; within a few days, 40,000 copies
were sold. As the French writer Maurois paraphrased the sense of the pamphlet, "... the
Turks, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity.. .there was not a criminal in Euro-
pean gaol, nor a cannibal... whose indignation would not rise at the recital of what had been
done." A. MAUROIS, DISRAELI 308 (1930).
61. For the ultimatum, see 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36, at 399.
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failed, however, to secure Turkey's consent to reforms supervised by Eu-
rope. In fact, the Turkish government's proclamation of a new constitu-
tion precisely at this time, as noted above, served to preempt this scheme
of reforms. In response to this proclamation, the Concert of Europe, led
by British Prime Minister Salisbury, warned the Turks of the dire conse-
quences of intransigence.
62
g. The London Protocol
The London Protocol of March 31, 1877,63 was the final manifestation
of Europe's relatively harmonious intervention in Ottoman internal af-
fairs on behalf of oppressed nationalities and minorities. Article 9 em-
powered the six signatories "to watch carefully" (de veiller avec soin)
64
the manner in which the Ottoman government carried out its promises.
It provided for consultation and joint action in the event that the Powers
were "once more disillusioned. ' 65 Additionally, the quest for general
peace (la paix gdndrale) was to guide their actions. The Turkish Plenipo-
tentiary rejected the Protocol as
derogatory to the Sultan's dignity and independence ... [R]ather than ac-
cede to its provisions it would be better for Turkey to face the alternative of
war, even if an unsuccessful war, expected to result in the loss of one or two
provinces... [It] was a virtual abrogation of the IXth Article of the Treaty
of Paris .... This foreign intervention... was a humiliation to which [the]
Government would not at any risk submit.
66
On April 24, exactly two weeks after Turkey formally rejected the
London Protocol, the Tsar ordered his armies to cross the frontiers to
secure by force what the unanimous efforts of the Powers could not ob-
tain by persuasion.67
62. Id. at 480. The details of the prolonged Constantinople Conference (Dec. 27, 1876-
Jan. 20, 1877), clustered around nine protocols; Id. at 400-93. See also 32 DAS STAAT-
SARCHIV Nos. 5964-71, at 15-33 (H. v. Kremer-Auenrode & P. Hirsch eds. 1877) (compilation
of 19th century German archival material) [hereinafter DAS STAATSARCHIV].
63. E. ENGELHARDT, supra note 34, at 178. For the French text of the Protocol, see G.




66. The quotation is from British Foreign Minister Derby's Apr. 9, 1877 communication
to his Charg6 in Constantinople. DAS STAATSARCHIV, supra note 62, No. 6360 at 156-57; see
also E. ENGELHARDT, supra note 34, at 179 (April 9, 1877 circular by Ottoman Foreign Min-
ister Safvet, decrying Europe's stance of "humiliating protectorship.")
67. Commenting on this resort to war, a British historian, J. Marriott, declared: "'Russia
had behaved, in face of prolonged provocation, with commendable patience and restraint, and
had shown a genuine desire to maintain the European Concert. The Turk had exhibited
throughout his usual mixture of shrewdness and obstinacy." J. MARRIOTT supra note 59, at
333.
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Defeated on both the Caucasian and the Balkan fronts in less than a
year, Turkey sued for peace and had to submit to the humiliating and
debilitating terms of the March 3, 1878 San Stefano Treaty dictated by
Russia. Led by England and Austria, the five Concert Powers objected
to their exclusion from this treaty, and impelled Russia to reconsider and
redraw the terms in a manner consistent with the provisions of articles 9
and 12 of the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty. The result was the July 13, 1878,
Treaty of Berlin through which three Christian nationalities in the
Balkans (Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro) were granted the status of
independent states, with Bulgaria gaining autonomy under Ottoman su-
zerainty. The treaty also accorded Eastern Roumelia, south of the Bal-
kan mountains, a special arrangement under the Ottoman government-
a Christian governor approved by the Powers-and projected special re-
forms for Macedonia.
68
2. The Lethal Disjunctiveness of Public Law and Common Law in
Ottoman Turkey
Although the Great Powers' recourse to humanitarian intervention
helped introduce some rules of conduct in international relations, 69 they
68. Id. at 341-46. For the English text of the Berlin Treaty, ratified in Berlin on Aug. 3,
1878, and the Ottoman ratification on Aug. 28, 1878, see Great Britain, 83 Parl. Papers 690-
705 (1878). For the selective reproduction of the minutes of the proceedings involved, see also
DAS STAATSARCHIV, supra note 62, Nos. 6766-73, at 226-81. For the text of the Treaty in
French, the original language used, see id. No. 6773, at 277-91. For the San Stefano Treaty see
id. No. 6718, at 38-48. For the text of articles 58-63 of the Treaty of Berlin, see J. HUREWITZ,
supra note 25, at 189-91. Noradounghian also includes the French text of the San Stefano
Treaty. 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36, at 509-21. Though in 1905 the Powers im-
posed upon Turkey a clause providing for European control of reforms in Macedonia, they
relinquished it following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution as a gesture of faith to the new
government.
Marriott characterized the Treaty of Berlin "as a great landmark in the history of the East-
ern Question." J. MARRIOTT, supra note 59, at 345. Mandelstam, a Russian legal scholar,
extolled the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war, producing that treaty, as "une veritable guerre
d'humnanitd," describing the clauses of the Berlin Treaty as punishment of Turkey for violating
the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty, and the Treaty itself "as one of the most signal manifesta-
tions of l'intervention collective d'humaniti" for the sake of the oppressed races of the Ottoman
Empire. As to article 62 guaranteeing "civil and political rights, public employment, free exer-
cise of the professions and industrial pursuits," irrespective of "religious differences," Mandel-
stam called that Article "a kind of charter of human rights." A. MANDELSTAM, supra note
27, at 17 & n.1, 18.
69. At the Congress of Paris, February 25 to March 30, 1856, for example, four such rules
were adopted: 1. the abolition of privateering; 2. the neutral flag covers enemy goods, save
contraband; 3. neutral goods, except contraband, are not liable to capture under an enemy flag;
4. blockade, to be binding, must be effective. See I G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1-138 (1968). When Russia repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris in the
Protocol of the March 13, 1871 London conference, the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain,
Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, and Turkey declared it as "an essential principle of
the law of the nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagement of a treaty, nor
modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of
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had little effect on the lives of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The
Powers' interventions in Ottomon Turkey were designed to obviate do-
mestic conflicts that were threatening peace in the region and thus, indi-
rectly, in all of Europe. Militant Islamic nationalism, however, deflected
the political possibilities for introducing successful legal reforms of the
Ottoman social system. Insisting on domination as their sovereign right,
the Ottoman Turks displaced the Powers' adjudicative politics through
an ideology of coercion rooted in the customs and traditions of their
society. 70
The public laws for the equality and protection of non-Muslim minori-
ties imposed upon Turkey bore a European-Christian stamp and con-
flicted with the common law principles of Ottoman society. 71 As a
result, Islamic common law principles of supremacy for Muslims invaria-
bly preempted them. To the Powers who were wondering why the re-
forms had not yet materialized, Grand Vezir Fuat Pa§a responded, "One
wouldn't know how to improvise [methods for] the reforming of cus-
toms." 72 Another Grand Vezir, Ali Pa§a, a cohort of Fuat, is reported to
have offered the following excuse: "but in what country in the world
ha[s] it been found practicable to efface in a day the effects of the habits
and traditions of ages by a simple change of the law or in the disposition
of the Government? ' 73  In explaining the reasons why the reforms
"failed," Professor Talcot Williams, the former Dean of Columbia Uni-
versity's School of Journalism, who was born and raised in Turkey,
wrote, "custom (adet) is stronger in the East than codes, courts, and the
authority, and the old customs ... [are] still strong over much of the
empire." 74
Excerpts from a Memorandum which longtime Grand Vezir Re§id
Pa§a addressed to the Sultan in the wake of the 1856 Reform Act procla-
an amicable agreement." 61 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1870-1871 1198, cited in
J. SCOTT, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 469 (2nd ed. 1922).
70. This response reveals an underlying truth of international law. As Brierly explains:
We must expand our interpretation of the term "international law." We must cease to
think of it as merely a set of principles to be applied by courts of law, and understand that
it includes the whole legal organisation of international life on the basis of peace and
order. Such an organisation must provide for the peaceful and orderly use of political, as
well as judicial, methods of adjustment. The predominant concern of international law
with particular concrete problems.. .seems to carry the corollary.. .that political methods
of adjusting awkward situations will remain... relatively more important than they are in
the state.
Brierly, Tize Rule of Law in the International Society, 7 NORDISK TIDSKRIFT FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL RET, ACTA SCANDINAVICA JURIS GENTIUM 3, 15 (1936).'
71. See supra text accompanying note 36.
72. Quoted in Davison, supra note 39, at 853.
73. BLUE BOOK, TURKEY, supra note 56, No. 16 (1877); the full text of the statement is in
BAT YE'OR, supra note 15, at 289-90.
74. T. WILLIAMS, TURKEY: A WORLD PROBLEM OF TODAY 285 (1921).
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mation reveal the subversive intent of the Ottoman government. In this
Memorandum, he admits that the real intent of the reforms was being
concealed (setr) from the public by deceptive metaphors. This process
was meant to avoid causing alarm and offending the cherished traditions
of the Muslim populace. In questioning the wisdom of granting the non-
Muslims "complete emancipation" and "perfect equality," Re§id Pa§a
underscored the complications he anticipated. He wondered whether a
600-year-old empire could transform its inner character into something
"entirely repugnant and contrary" (tamamtyla zit ve muhalij). He as-
sured the Sultan that its declared purpose notwithstanding, the text of
the Edict relies on "ingenious words" to "deceive" (Q/al), through
"vague paragraphs," those who insisted on its proclamation. 75 Thus,
while the European Powers' humanitarian intervention efforts accom-
plished some reform of Turkey's written laws, they were completely inef-
fectual in eliciting reform of actual practice.
C. The Fate of the Armenians
The interplay of European attempts to force reforms and the Turkish
resistance to cultural change set the stage for an internal Turkish re-
sponse to the escalation of the Turko-Armenian conflict. In this clash,
the disjunctiveness of public law and customary law described above de-
teriorated into a sharp conflict between the two legal domains. Taking
the series of enacted reforms seriously, the Armenians pressed for their
actual implementation as a matter of legal entitlement. The Turks, how-
ever, relied on their common law claims of traditional superordination.
One cardinal common law principle, discussed in Section A above, refers
to a rule in the Akdi Zimmet (contract with the ruled nationality) which
stipulates cessation of hostility against non-Muslim subjects following
their defeat and submission; once defeated these subjects are granted ref-
uge and protection, or dehalet. By attempting to influence Turkish na-
tional policy in their favor through the intercession of foreign Powers,
the Ottoman Turks argued, the Armenians had violated this fundamental
75. 1 A. CEVDET PA§A, TEZAKIR (Memoirs) 79 (C. Baysun ed. 1953). The significance of
these statements cannot be overestimated. Re§id is generally identified as a pioneer in the
Ottoman reform movement. He not only held the post of Prime Minister six times, but also
that of Foreign Minister three times in the 1837-1858 period. The text of the 1839 Reform
Charter is attributed to him. See F. BAILEY, supra note 36, at 186, 193, 205. Other sources
describe him as a manipulator of the Powers, given to double-talk and equivocation, with a
firm commitment to Islam and its precepts. In his famous memorandum, criticizing the abuses
of Sultan Mahmud II, who had just died, he chastised the ruler for "constantly neglecting the
law of the Prophet when on each such occasion he was required to obey it." Id. at 274. A
French chronicler of the history of Re§id's tenure in various posts portrays him as conserva-
tive, interested mainly in the status quo while pretending to pursue reforms. M. DESTR1LHES,




treaty provision, and thus, under the prevailing common law, had for-
feited their right to clemency.
The cycle of massacres preceding the World War I genocide was ratio-
nalized essentially in this fashion. In describing the scenes of the 1895
Urfa massacre and the entire 1894-1896 era of Abdul Hamit massacres,
the Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy, who was fluent in Turkish
and based his report on evidence supplied to him by local Muslims, wrote
the following:
[The perpetrators] are guided in their general action by the prescriptions of
the Sheri Law. That law prescribes that if the 'rayah' [cattle] Christian
attempts, by having recourse to foreign powers, to overstep the limits of
privileges allowed to them by their Mussulman masters, and free them-
selves from their bondage, their lives and property are to be forfeited, and
are at the mercy of the Mussulmans. To the Turkish mind the Armenians
had tried to overstep those limits by appealing to foreign powers, especially
England. They therefore considered it their religious duty and a righteous
thing to destroy and seize the lives and property of the Armenians .... 76
This reasoning is confirmed by the contemporary Israeli historian, Bat
Ye'or, as follows: the Armenian quest for reforms invalidated their
"legal status," which involved a "contract." This "breach... restored to
the umma [the Muslim community] its initial right to kill the subjugated
minority [the dhimmis], [and] seize their property . . .77
In the recourse to massacre as a method of conflict resolution, the reli-
gious tenets of the preeminent common law destroyed the public law's
efficacy. To emphasize the religious thrust of the laws, the perpetrators
performed, whenever suitable, Muslim rites while killing their victims.
In reference to Urfa, Lord Kinross, a British historian, provides the fol-
lowing example:
When a large group of young Armenians were brought before a sheikh, he
had them thrown down on their backs and held by their hands and feet.
Then, in the words of an observer, he recited verses of the Koran and 'cut
their throats after the Mecca rite of sacrificing sheep.' 78
76. FO 195/1930, folio 34/187.
77. BAT YE'OR, supra note 15, at 48, 67, 101.
78. LORD KINRoss, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES 560 (1977). The passage, more fully, is
as follows:
[The massacre's] objective, based on the convenient consideration that Armenians were
now tentatively starting to question their inferior status, was the ruthless reduction, with a
view to elimination of the Armenian Christians, and the expropriation of their lands for
the Moslem Turks. Each operation, between the bugle calls, followed a similar pattern.
First the Turkish troops came into a town for the purpose of massacre; then came the
Kurdish irregulars and tribesmen for the purpose of plunder. Finally came the holocaust,
by fire and destruction, which spread, with the pursuit of the fugitives and mopping-up
operations, throughout the lands and villages of the surrounding province. This murder-
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This lethal disjunction between public and common laws in the Otto-
man system was predicted by Grand Vezir Re§id. In the above cited
Memorandum of 1856, Re§id foresaw the possibility of "a great slaugh-
ter" (bir mukateleyi azime) in connection with efforts to establish equal-
ity through the enactment of public laws. 7
9
1. The Failure of International Intervention on Behalf of the
Armenians
Although the European powers had repeatedly forced Turkey to publi-
cally proclaim equality for its non-Muslim subjects, they were unwilling
or unable to force the Ottomans to honor such promises. As seen above,
Turkey had many opportunities to make good on its agreements, but in-
evitably failed to do so. By 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin was signed,
the Armenian Question had ceased to be a merely domestic problem for
the Ottoman Empire. Article 61 of that treaty read:
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the ame-
liorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces
inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the
Circassians and the Kurds .... It will make known periodically the steps
taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application. 80
Commenting on the significance of this clause and article 62 of the
treaty-which provided for religious liberty, civil and political rights,
and admission to the public employments, functions and honors-Rolin-
Jaequemyns asserted that the Armenians were placed "under the express
protection of international law of contract, and under the control of the
Great Powers. The natural obligations of the Turkish Government have
ous winter of 1895 thus saw the decimation of much of the Armenian population and the
devastation of their property in some twenty districts of eastern Turkey. Often the mas-
sacres were timed for a Friday, when the Moslems were in their mosques... Cruellest and
most ruinous of all were the massacres at Urfa, where the Armenian Christians numbered
a third of the total population... When the bugle blast ended the day's operations, some
three thousand refugees poured into the cathedral, hoping for sanctuary. But the next
morning-a Sunday-a fanatic mob swarmed into the church in an orgy of slaughter,
rifling its shrines with cries of "Call upon Christ to prove Himself a greater prophet than
Mohammed." Then they amassed a large pile of straw matting, which they spread over
the litter of corpses and set alight with thirty cans of petroleum. The woodwork of the
gallery where a crowd of women and children crouched, wailing with terror, caught fire,
and all perished in the flames. Punctiliously at three-thirty in the afternoon the bugle
blew once more, and the Moslem officials proceeded around the Armenian quarter to
proclaim that the massacres were over. . .the total casualties in the town, including those
slaughtered in the cathedral, amounted to eight thousand dead.
Id. at 559-60. The full account of the Urfa holocaust as personally investigated and reported
on Mar. 16, 1896, by Gerald H. Fitzmaurice, British Consul and Dragoman, is in FO 195/
1930 at 30-72 (folios 185-206).
79. 1 A. CEVDET PA§A, supra note 75.




become... as regards the Armenians, strict engagements with the States
which are parties to the Treaty .... "81 In reality, however, not only
were the Armenians denied protection, but their physicial security deteri-
orated. They suffered a string of massacres in 1894-1897. These mas-
sacres were perpetrated "at a time when the regime was hard pressed by
European powers and was afraid of external intervention .... -82 The
estimated number of victims ranged from 100,000 to 200,000.83
Three sets of circumstances accommodated the process of deteriora-
tion leading to these massacres: the subversion of public law by the
Turkish authorities, the lack of unity among the European Power to en-
sure the adherence by the Turks to the public laws, and the lack of any
national ties between the Armenians and the European Powers.
a. Continued subversion of public law
As in the case of the previous reform acts of 1839 and 1856, and the
1876 Constitution, the Berlin Treaty clauses regarding the treatment of
nationalities and minorities remained dead letters. Their formal enact-
ment was a measure of expediency, intended to forestall more drastic
initiatives on the part of the Powers. In a dispatch to Berlin, Prince
Radolin, the German Ambassador, informed his Chancellor of a conver-
sation with Sultan Abdul Hamit. During that exchange, "he [the Sultan]
most solemnly swore to me that under no circumstances Would he yield
on the matter of 'the unjust' Armenian reforms."' 84 Moreover, the Otto-
man system was ill-suited to extend equality to the Armenians, either
socially, politically, or legally. As the prominent late Harvard historian
William Langer concluded, "It was perfectly obvious that the Sultan was
81. Id. at 38(emphasis in original).
82. Melson, A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896, 24 COMP.
STUD. IN Soc'Y & HisT. 507 (1982).
83. Kaiser Wilhelm II informed British Charg6 Colonel Swaine in Berlin that up to Dec.
31, 1895, approximately 80,000 Armenians had been slain (umgebracht). DAS TORKISCHE
PROBLEM 1895, 10 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, Doe.
No. 2572, at 251 (transcript of Kaiser's dictation)(J. Lepsius, A. Bartholdy, & F. Thimme eds.
3rd ed. 1927). British ambassador White, however, estimated 100,000 victims up to early
December 1895. 10 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINETE 1871-1914, Doc.
No. 2479, Report No. 233, at 127. Loz6, the French ambassador at Vienna, cited the com-
bined figure of 200,000 to cover those actually killed as well as those expected to perish from
"hunger and cold during the coming winter." FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE, 12 DOCUMENTS
DIPLOMATIQUES FRANqAIS 1871-1900 Doe. No. 256 at 384 (1951) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS
DIPLOMATIQUES]. German Turkophile and Foreign Office operative Jiickh estimates the
number of Armenian victims of Hamit as follows: 200,000 killed, 50,000 expelled, and 1 mil-
lion pillaged and plundered. E. JACKH, DER AUFSTEIGENDE HALBMOND 139 (Berlin 6th ed.
1916).
84. DER NAHE UND DER FERNE OSTEN, 9 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAlSCHEN
KABINETTE 1871-1914, Doc. No. 2184, at 203 (J. Lepsius, A. Bartholdy & F. Thimme eds., 3d
ed. 1927).
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determined to end the Armenian question by exterminating the
Armenians."
8 5
b. Lack of cohesion among the European Powers
The European interventions historically hinged upon a modicum of
consensus among the Great Powers. Until the 1878 Berlin Treaty, the
unified insistence of England and Russia, the dominant Powers in the
Concert of Europe, could induce, if not compel, Turkey to submit to
some degree of intervention by the Powers. 86 However, this line of coop-
eration was not exclusive of rivalries on many other levels; nor were
these interventions purely "humanitarian. ' ' 87 But the Treaty of Berlin
ushered in a period of increasingly acute distrust between Russia and
England, thus ensuring the gradual collapse of the Concert of Europe.
The necessity of cooperation among the Powers, and the ever-present
85. W. LANGER, I THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890-1902 203 (1935).
86. The cooperation of these two Powers started with the Apr. 4, 1826 St. Petersburg
Protocol in which they agreed to mediate between the Turks and Greeks on the basis of com-
plete autonomy for Greece under Turkish suzerainty. See J. MARRIOTT, supra note 59, at 214.
The July 6, 1827 Treaty of London which under the name of "humanitarian intervention,"
threatened Turkey with military support for Greece, was likewise initiated jointly by Britain
and Russia. Id. at 218. The December 1876 Constantinople Conference, at which the Powers
insisted on European control and supervision of Ottoman reforms, was the consequence of
Anglo-Russian agreement as to the terms of the projected peace between Salisbury and Igna-
tief, the respective plenipotentiaries. BLUE BOOK, TURKEY, supra note 56, No. 1, (1877), Doc.
No. 1053, at 719. The July 13, 1878 Berlin Treaty followed a secret Anglo-Russian Agreement
(May 30, 1878) engineered by Shuvalof, the Russian ambassador to Britain. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF WORLD HISTORY 735-36 (W. Langer rev. ed. 1948) The Anglo-Russian accords on major
issues were thus crucial to the Concert of Europe's united action bringing pressure upon the
Ottoman authorities.
87. In the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1844, Tsar Nicholas I proposed a joint action for the
disposition of the Ottoman Empire in the event of its collapse, which was then anticipated.
Nine years later, during discussions with Lord Seymour the Tsar described the Ottoman Em-
pire as "the sick man," and bid for its partition. DAS STAATSARCHIV, supra note 62, No.
5612, at 167 and No. 5613, at 169. In the July 8, 1876 Reichstadt Agreement, Russia and
Austria laid out contingency plans involving territorial acquisitions in the event the Turks
should suffer defeat at the hands of the Serbs and Montenegrins. 3 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER
EUROP.AISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 84, No. 605, at 293 (1926); ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF WORLD HISTORY, supra note 86, at 734. In the January 15, 1877 Budapest Conven-
tion between Russia and Austria, similar plans were devised for disposing of Turkish
territories. Id. at 735. Most importantly, Austria was given a mandate to occupy Bosnia and
Herzegovina and to garrison the district of Novi Bazar, a strip between Serbia and Montene-
gro; similarly, in a secret Anglo-Turkish agreement, Great Britain took Cyprus from Ottoman
dominion. For the French text of the agreement see 3 G. NORADOUNGHIAN, supra note 36,
vol. 3, at 522-25 (1902). For the English text see E. HERTSLET, supra note 45, at 2721-22. All
these events were directly connected to the Treaty of Berlin. To the Russians, the benefits of
victory in the 1877-1878 conflict were minimal enough to plant in their minds the seeds of
bitterness toward Great Britain that lasted for decades.
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suspicion of ulterior motives,88 are limitations inherent in the principle of
multilateral intervention, whether humanitarian or not.
These limitations became distinct liabilities for the Armenians, as Eu-
ropean concern for Turkey's implementation of article 61 of the Berlin
Treaty lessened and eventually evaporated in the face of the Anglo-Rus-
sian rivalry and suspicion. 89 While England appeared willing to inter-
cede if joined by the other Powers,90 France supported Russia's adamant
88. See Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 742 (1949)
(discussing Lauterpacht's view of the subversion of humanitarian intervention for "selfish
purposes").
89. These rivalries found expression in the British challenge to the provisions of article 16
of the San Stefano Treaty in which Russia had acquired the right to continue to occupy the
eastern (primarily Armenian) provinces of Turkey, which they had conquered through the
1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war, until Turkey had carried out the reforms she had promised.
Considering the presence of Russian troops in that region a threat to British colonial interests
in India, Disraeli went through the motions of preliminary mobilization to signal to Russia his
intent to wage war, if necessary, to force Russian withdrawal. This British maneuver directly
affected Armenia, as Lloyd George outlined:
Had it not been for our sinister intervention, the great majority of the Armenians would
have been placed, by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, under the protection of the Rus-
sian flag.
The Treaty of San Stefano provided that Russian troops should remain in occupation of
the Armenian provinces until satisfactory reforms were carried out. By the Treaty of
Berlin (1878)-which was entirely due to our minatory pressure and which was acclaimed
by us as a great British triumph which brought "Peace with honour"-that article was
superseded. Armenia was sacrificed on the triumphal altar we had erected. The Russians
were forced to withdraw; the wretched Armenians were once more placed under the heel
of their old masters, subject to a pledge to "introduce ameliorations and reforms into the
provinces inhabited by Armenians." We all know how these pledges were broken for
forty years, in spite of repeated protests from the country that was primarily responsible
for restoring Armenia to Turkish rule. The action of the British Government led inevita-
bly to the terrible massacres of 1895-97, 1909, and worst of all to the holocausts of 1915.
By these atrocities, almost unparalleled in the black record of Turkish misrule, the Arme-
nian population was reduced in numbers by well over a million.
Having regard to the part we had taken in making these outrages possible, we were
morally bound to take the first opportunity that came our way to redress the wrong we
had perpetrated, and in so far as it was in our power, to make it impossible to repeat the
horrors for which history will always hold us culpable.
When therefore in the Great War, the Turks forced us into this quarrel, and deliber-
ately challenged the British Empire to a life and death struggle, we realised that at last an
opportunity had been given us to rectify the cruel wrong for which we were responsible.
2 D. LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 811 (1939). During the Nov.
18, 1918, Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, Aneurin Williams raised the same
question, declaring,
This country owes a debt to Armenia, because, after all, we more than forty years ago
prevented Armenia from being released by Russia from Turkish tyranny. If we had not
done that, the awful sufferings which have occurred since would not have occurred. We,
therefore, owe them a debt. We owe them a further debt because they have fought val-
iantly for us in this War.
ARMENIA, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (House of Lords, Nov. 13, 1918, House of Commons,
Oct. 23, 24, 30, 31, Nov. 6, 7, 12, 14, 18, 1918) 16-17 (A. Raffi ed. 1918).
90. The tenuous character of this willingness bordered on deception. Diplomatic records
highlight the incidence of frivolous party politics carried out under the guise of "humanitarian
intervention." The British handling of the Armenian Question exemplified the influence of
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opposition to such intercession. Germany was even more reluctant to act
on behalf of the Armenians; but unlike the other Powers, she did not
equivocate about her posture. Bismarck, who tried to dissuade England
from interfering in "the internal affairs" of Turkey, articulated that exer-
cise of Realpolitik with brutal frankness. In a dispatch dated May 17,
1883 to his Ambassador in London, Bismarck deprecated
the so-called "Armenian Reforms" [as] ideal and theoretical efforts consti-
tuting the ornamental part of the [Berlin] Congress. Their practical signifi-
cance is of very doubtful value and for the Armenians means [a] double-
edged [sword] ... I cannot join Lord Dufferin [British Ambassador to Tur-
key] in a policy which sacrifices its practical goals to a temporary philan-
thropic halo.91
Apprised of Bismarck's policy, which amounted to a deliberate deroga-
tion of article 61, British Foreign Affairs Minister Granville two years
earlier had ordered Ambassador Goschen at Constantinople to cease to
pursue the Armenian Question "in consequence of the objections raised
by the German Government. ' 92 Kaiser Wilhelm II ratified the Bismar-
ckian attitude regarding the Armenian reforms when he subsequently de-
clared that "the Berlin Congress was a mistake that entailed grave
consequences. I will never agree to the convening of a second one."'93
Austria eventually joined these Powers in defining the stipulated reforms
as moribund and inherently full of "hidden complications for the Pow-
ers."'94 For a variety of reasons, the Powers thus abdicated the responsi-
bilities they had assumed as signatories to the Treaty of Berlin.
The vague and imprecise terms of the Treaties of Paris and Berlin also
allowed the Powers to hedge and to disclaim responsibility. For exam-
domestic party squabbles on foreign policy, pitting the Gladstonian liberals against the con-
servatives represented by Disraeli, and subsequently by Salisbury. In dismissing Gladstone's
fervent pronouncements in support of efforts to extricate subject races from the Ottoman yoke,
for example, Disraeli denounced Gladstone as "an unprincipled maniac,-extraordinary mix-
ture of envy, vindictiveness, hypocrisy.. .never a gentleman." A. MAUROIS, supra note 60, at
310.
This overall judgment seems to be corroborated in part by the statement of William Sum-
mers, a liberal M.P. (and a colleague of Gladstone) who, during a brief visit in Constantinople
in 1890, met with some diplomats. In his Sept. 28, 1890 report to his Chancellor in Berlin,
German Ambassador Radowitz, after describing Summers as "the most energetic supporter of
the Armenian cause in England," quoted Summers as follows: "Gladstone and I are involved
in the Armenian Question for the sole purpose of causing difficulties to the Salisbury Cabinet."
9 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPXISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 84t Doe. No.
2178, at 194.
91. Id. Doc. No. 2183, at 200 n.*.
92. BLUE BOOK, TURKEY, supra note 56, No. 6 (1881), Report No. 170, Feb, 10, 1881, at
322.
93. 9 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPXISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 84,
Doe. No. 2464, Kaiser's marginalia at 114, n.5.




ple, article 9 of the Paris Treaty stipulated reforms while prohibiting any
intervention, "either collectively or separately," in the internal affairs* of
Turkey. The imprecision of the word "superintend," inserted into the
last paragraph of article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, compounded the treaty's
ambivalence. The specific functions of superintendence were left unde-
fined, allowing any signatory to argue that the Powers were contractually
responsible only to each other and to no one else. Thus, in practice, the
reforms were left unmonitored. Moreover, article 61 implicitly pro-
scribed unilateral action by any of the signatory Powers through the use
of the corporate term "the Powers."' 95 Sultan Abdul Hamit (1876-1908),
whose name and regime are associated with the nineteenth-century Ar-
menian massacres, understood the reluctance of the Powers to intervene
actively on behalf of the Armenians and appreciated their proclivity to
take refuge in the imperfections of the Treaty clauses involved. 96 The
Powers' only reaction to the massacres was to remonstrate Turkey and
issue ambiguous threats.
c. The Armenians' lack of a tie to any European power
The Armenians failure to obtain the national emancipation that was
achieved by other non-Muslim nationalities under Ottoman rule was also
a direct result of their lack of tutelage and active sponsorship by any of
the European Powers. The Slavic nationalities-the Serbs, the Bulgars,
95. As England's Duke of Argyll noted, "What was everybody's business was nobody's
business." G. CAMPBELL (DUKE OF ARGYLL), OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TURKEY 74
(1896). British scholar Dawson reasserted this point nearly thirty years later: "No solemn
international covenant has been so systematically and openly infringed and ignored, in part by
the Signatory Powers themselves, as the Treaty which was concluded in Berlin in July, 1878,
'in the name of Almighty God.'" W.H. DAWSON, IIITHE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY 143 (1923).
96. Commenting on the impact of this European stance, noted British historian Gooch
wrote,
The [European) Concert was dead ... it became clear that pressure without the intention
of resorting to force stiffened rather than weakened the resistance of the Sultan, who had
no intention of allowing Armenia to go the way of Bulgaria... The lamentable result of
the fitful interest shown by the Powers was to awaken the hopes in the Armenian high-
lands which could not be fulfilled, and to arouse suspicions in the breast of the Sultan
which were to bear fruit in organized massacre and outrage in the days to come.
G.P. GOOCH, HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE 1878-1919 22-23 (1923). In a speech in the
British Parliament, Lord Salisbury, later Foreign and Prime Minister of England noted skepti-
cally, "[w]hether it ever will be possible to induce the six Powers to agree together to use, not
diplomatic pressure, but naval and military force, I very much doubt... I am sure nothing can
be gained by a compromise between the two.. ." TIMES (London), Oct. 24, 1890; M. MAC-
COLL, THE SULTAN AND THE POWERS 291 (1896). The standard Turkish reaction to threats
of the use of force was the raising of the specter of general massacre against the entire national-
ity in the given provinces. In the 1860 French intervention in Lebanon, French Foreign Minis-
ter M. Thouvenel dismissed this threat stating, "[i]f such reasoning were once to be admitted,
it would be put forward on every occassion when an abuse was to be corrected in Turkey." Id.
at 34.
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and the Montenegrins-enjoyed Russian guardianship because of their
racial and ethnic kinship. Religious ties through the Eastern Orthodox
Church account for the Russian guardianship of the Greeks and the
Rumanians of Wallachia. The French, for their part, virtually rescued
the Catholic Maronites of Lebanon by invading Lebanon and compelling
the Turks to give the Maronites limited autonomy. The Armenians,
however, did not enjoy sufficient religious or ethnic bonds to any Euro-
pean power to warrant similar treatment.
Further, the "ingratitude" of the nationalities who had benefited from
outside intervention reduced the Armenians' chance of receiving similar
assistance. Bulgaria, for example, thwarted Russian attempts at control,
despite the active Russian support it received in obtaining freedom. Af-
ter that experience, the Tsars not only studiously dissociated themselves
from the Armenians but, during the reign of Abdul Hamit, tacitly sup-
ported the Turkish persecution of the Armenians. The Russians ex-
plained their behavior as a way to avoid the emergence of a second
Bulgaria on their border.97 Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador at
St. Petersburg, quoted Russian Foreign Minister Lobanof as declaring
that he was decidedly opposed to seeing the rise in the proximity of Rus-
sian territory of "another Bulgaria."98
Another factor separating the Armenians from other Ottoman subject
nationalities involved geo-political considerations. All the other nation-
alities for whom the European powers intervened were located on the
periphery of the Ottoman Empire, whereas Armenia's historical location
caused it to be regarded as a threat to the Turkish heartland. Logistical
difficulties involved in providing assistance, such as Armenia's lack of
ports for British vessels, further compounded the problem. 99
97. Soon after the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria, the proteg6 of the Russians, was reduced to a
pawn in Russian hands. Russian officers and officials descended on Bulgaria's capital in a
swarm and reduced the country to a Russian province. Any complaint was branded as "in-
gratitude." Growing discontent, attended by anti-Russian sentiments, led to the 1881 over-
throw of the regime. Russia responded by appointing Russian generals, who took their orders
directly from the Tsar, and "Russian generals were appointed to the Interior, War, and Jus-
tice." Nationalists in Bulgaria subsequently coined the phrase "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians."
These are the conditions under which Bulgarian "ingratitude" arose and crystallized. G.P.
GOOCH, supra note 96, at 3-6.
98. Quoted from a dispatch to London on May 13, 1895, BLUE BOOK, TURKEY, supra
note 56, No. 1 (1896), Doc. No. 83, at 83.
99. Russia was the only power that felt capable of overcoming the logistical difficulties
involved in rescuing the Armenians from Ottoman bondage. Russian policy on this matter of
conflict between territorial sovereignty of the state and the principle of humanitarian interven-
tion was articulated by Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakof who in a November 7,
1876 dispatch to Count Paul Shuvalof, Russian Ambassador to Berlin, stated, "if the Great
Powers wish to accomplish a real work.. .it is necessary.. .to recognize that the independence
and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity, the
sentiment of Christian Europe and the general peace." BLUE BOOK, TURKEY, supra note 56,




The Armenians were also hindered because they lacked the geographic
concentration of the Balkan nationalities. The Turks had redistricted the
Armenians to reduce them to numerical minorities, especially in such
regions of historic Armenia as the provinces of Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis;
additionally, a significant portion of the Armenian population seeking
relief from depredations (as well as in a quest for economic opportuni-
ties) resorted to internal migration. The resulting geographic dispersion
diluted any idea of a concrete Armenian state analogous, perhaps, to
Greece or Bulgaria.
2. The Use of Rising Armenian National Awareness as an Excuse for
Liquidation
The international efforts of the European Powers may in fact have
caused the Armenians more harm than good. By raising the conscious-
ness and hope of the oppressed peoples within Turkey, without concur-
rently enhacing their power, international actors created a situation in
which the Ottomans had both the incentive and the excuse for the final
resolution of the "Armenian problem." Encouraged by the promises of
the Treaty of Berlin, the Armenians experienced a new sense of national
consciousness, which in turn engendered rising expectations. Sporadic
displays of assertiveness began to erode their tradition of passively endur-
ing the abuses endemic to the Ottoman system. Additionally, emigr6 Ar-
menian intellectuals formed committees in the capitals of Europe to
protest these abuses and to push-for the implementation of the promised
reforms. As the Ottoman regime resisted these agitations and refused to
execute the reforms in any meaningful way, Armenian revolutionary
cells emerged within and without the Empire and prepared for combat.
In a report to Paris entitled Exposd historique de la question
arme'nienne, long-time French Ambassador Paul Cambon traced the
genesis of the "Armenian question" to this period. He wrote:
A high ranking Turkish official told me, "the Armenian question does not
exist but we shall create it." . . . Up until 1881 the idea of Armenian inde-
pendence was non-existent. The masses simply yearned for reforms, dream-
ing only of a normal administration under Ottoman rule.... The inaction
of the Porte served to vitiate the good will of the Armenians. The reforms
have not been carried out. The exactions of the officials remained scandal-
ous and justice was not improved ... from one end of the Empire to the
other, there is rampant corruption of officials, denial of justice and insecu-
rity of life .... The Armenian diaspora began denouncing the administra-
tive misdeeds, and in the process managed to transform the condition of
tected if they would abandon their national Church and become formally united with the
Russian faith, but not otherwise." Pears, Turkey, Islam, and Turanianism, 14 CONTEMP.
REv. 373 (1918).
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simple administrative ineptness into one of racial persecution. It called to
the attention of Europe the violation by the Turks of the Treaty of Berlin
and thereby summoned up the image of Armenian autonomy in the minds
of the Armenian population. France did not respond to the Armenian
overtures but the England of Gladstone did: The Armenian revolutionary
movement took off from England[t°°l ... as if it were not enough to pro-
voke Armenian discontent, the Turks were glad to amplify it by the manner
in which they handled it. In maintaining that the Armenians were conspir-
ing, the Armenians ended up engaging in conspiracy; in maintaining that
there was no Armenia, the Armenians ended up conjuring the reality of her
existence.... The harsh punishment of conspirators, the maintenance in
Armenia of a veritable regime of terror, arrests, murders, rapes, all this
shows that Turkey is taking pleasure in precipitating the events [in relation
to] an inoffensive population. In reality the Armenian Question is nothing
but an expression of the antagonism between England and Russia ...
Where does Armenia begin, and where does it end?' 0 '
Later in the report Cambon prophetically questioned the reasonableness
of transporting the Armenians to Mesopotamia, a solution the Ottoman
government was reportedly contemplating. Mesopotamia would later
serve as the valley of the Armenian genocide.
3. The Rise of the Ittihadists and the Decision to "Liquidate" the
Armenians
The transition in July, 1908, to a new regime in Turkey through a
bloodless revolution that deposed Sultan Abdul Hamit and installed the
Ittihadists (also known as the Young Turks) only compounded the
problems of domestic conflict in general and the Turko-Armenian con-
flict in particular. Though their regime (1908-1918) was dubbed the Sec-
ond Era of the Constitution, the Young Turk Ittihad leaders, like their
predecessor, Abdul Hamit ("the Red Sultan"), embraced violent meas-
ures against the minorities on whose behalf the Powers had again begun
to intercede. Their policy of repression helped spark the 1912 Balkan
war and later played a role in the adoption of nationalist policies that
plunged Turkey into World War I. As Marriott stated,
100. In an exchange with his German colleague Saurma, Russian Ambassador Nelidof
commented that the Armenians were frustrated not only by the lack of any tangible results
from European intervention, but also by the ensuing massacres. 10 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER
EUROP.ISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 83, Doc. No. 2426, at 69. See also supra
note 90.
101. 11 DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES, supra note 83, Doc. No. 50 (Feb. 20, 1894) at 71-
74 (1947); see also LIVRE JAUNE. Affaires Arm~niens. Projets de rdformes dans I'Empire Otto-




The Young Turk revolution brought matters to a head. [That undertaking]
was in fact a last effort of the Moslem minority [in the Balkans l02 ] to retain
its ascendancy in the face of growing resistance on the part of subject races
and impending European intervention. The revival of the constitution was
little more than an ingenious device for appeasing Liberal sentiment abroad
while furnishing a pretext for the abrogation of the historic rights of the
Christian nationalities at home. 103
At the 1910 annual Ittihadist Congress at Saloniki, the secret discus-
sions outside the formal sittings revolved around the plan for the coercive
homogenization of Turkey, euphemistically called "the complete Ot-
tomanization of all Turkish subjects.' °4 British Ambassador Lowther
observed that "[t]o them 'Ottoman' evidently means 'Turk' and their
present policy of 'Ottomanization' is one of pounding the non-Turkish
elements in a Turkish mortar." 105 Surveying the thrust of these deci-
sions, the British Foreign Office in a report employed the words "to
level," with the forecast that "the Young Turks will endeavor to extend
the 'levelling' system to the Kurds and the Arabs." 10 6 In a series of re-
ports based on "authentic documents" furnished by confidential sources,
the French Consul at Saloniki informed his Foreign Ministry in Paris
that the Young Turks decided to employ force and violence, including
massacres, as a last resort for the resolution of nationality conflicts. 10 7
102. The British Foreign Office in 1910 estimated that as a national rather than a religious
group, "the Turkish element only numbers some 6,000,000 in an Empire of 30,000,000. Under
a real constitutional regime it would be swamped, more especially as it is inferior to the major-
ity in intelligence, instruction, and business qualities. It can only maintain its position by the
army and by the method [of repression]." FO 424/250, Turkey, Annual Report 1910, at 4.
103. J. MARRIOTT, supra note 59, at 443-44.
104. FO 195/2359, folio 276.
105. 9 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1889-1914, part 1, Doc. No.
181, Sept. 6, 1910 report, at 207 (Gooch & Temperley eds. 1926).
106. FO 424/250, Annual Report 1910, at 4.
107. M. CHOUBLIER, LA QUESTION D'ORIENT DEPUIS LE TRAITt DE BERLIN (1889). In
his Nov. 15, 1910 report, quoting Halil, the head of the parliamentary branch of the party
comprising Ittihadist deputies, Consul Choublier mentions the proposal of relying "solely on
military might" in order to deal with the nationalities. 8 N.S. TURQUIE (Politique Interieure,
Jeunes Turcs) 149. In his November 16 report, the Consul revealed a divergence of opinion as
to the choice between "deportation" and "massacre" in handling the problem of Macedonia
and the Bulgarians in Adrianople (Edirne). Id. at 150. According to the highly confidential
information supplied to him (Nov. 16, 1910 report), the Monastir branch opted for the depor-
tation to Asiatic Turkey of parts of the Christian population of Macedonia to be supplanted by
Muslim refugees, whereas the Adrianople branch opted for the massacre of the resident Chris-
tian population (l'extermination de tous les chrdtiens hostiles d la jeune Turquie), should the
implanting of large bodies of Muslim immigrants fail to attain the desired results. In the Nov.
17 report he speaks of the resolve of Ittihad to resort to "Ia force des armes" if efforts "to
achieve peacefully the unity of Turkey should fail.. .for which purpose we should develop the
patriotism of the Turks." Id. at 151. All these disclosures are confirmed by the Dean of Turk-
ish historians who stated that, weary of the protracted Turko-Armenian conflict, Ittihad would
turn to the army to resove the conflict by force of arms. 2:4 Y. BAYUR, TURK INKILABI
TARIHI (The History of the Turkish Revolution) 13 (1952).
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A final clue to understanding this repudiation of social and political
reform is found in a secret speech by Talat, who was the preeminent
Young Turk leader and Interior Minister. He delivered the speech to a
conclave of Ittihad leaders assembled in Saloniki in August 1910 for a
pre-Congress strategy meeting. Austrian, French and British intelligence
sources in that city confirmed the occurrence of this meeting and the
authenticity of the speech. The British Vice Consul at Monastir, Arthur
Geary, vouched for "the accurate reproduction of the gist of Talat's dis-
course" as it was obtained from "an unimpeachable source." The rele-
vant portion reads:
You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution equality of Mussulman
and Ghiaur [infidel, a derogatory label applied to non-Muslims] was af-
firmed but you one and all know and feel that this is an unrealizable ideal.
The Sheriat [the religious laws of Islam], our whole past history and the
sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Mussulmans and even the senti-
ments of the Ghiaurs themselves ... present an impenetrable barrier to the
establishment of real equality .... There can therefore be no question of
equality until we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the
Empire. 108
The homogeneous Ottoman society Talat envisioned as a precondition
for real equality thus required the liquidation in one form or another of
the existing heterogeneous elements. In confirming the authenticity of
that speech, a fourth source, a French diplomat, spoke of the Ittihad
resolve to "deracinate" (diraciner) the bases of nationalistic tendencies
and to "deform" the nationalities themselves. 10 9
108. BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1889-1914, supra note 105.
Confirmation of the speech is in Austrian Vice Consul von Zitkovsky's No. 69 "secret" report
of Oct. 14, 1910, in A.A. TORKE1 159 No. 2, Bd.12, A18643. French confirmation is in 7 N.S.
TURQUIE at 92-97. A particular additional phrase in this French version, not found in the
British report, is Talat's proposal to lull the potential victims of the Ottomanization program
to complacency: "il faut que nous tranquillisions nos voisins." This report is stamped "re-
ceived" by the Direction Politique et Commerciale of the French Foreign Ministry, bearing the
symbols D, Carton 391, and the date Aug. 6, 1910, thus indicating that it was wired on the
very same day on which the speech was delivered.
109. This source was the French charg6 at distant Hidjaz in Arabia, who was reporting to
Pichon, the French Foreign Minister. 7 N.S. TURQUIE, Jan. 26, 1911.
Two prominent Turkish sociologists both confirm and explain the inevitability of this deci-
sion of Ittihad to resort to the violent elimination of non-Turkic nationalities. One concluded
that Ittihad meant to "assimilate them through coercive methods, if necessary." A. YALMAN,
supra note 23, at 101. The other, the high priest of Ittihadist ideology, traced the lingering
nationality conflicts to the introduction of statutory public laws, equating Muslims with non-
Muslims. In a rarely publicized internal party document written during the World War I
genocide against the Armenians, bearing the title: "The Two Mistakes of Tanzimat," ideologue
Ziya G~kalp lambasted the 1839 and 1856 reform edicts. Declaring them serious mistakes, he
reasserted the concept of the nation of overlords (milleti hakime) with the watchword: "Is-
lam mandates domination." According to the author of the book in which this document was
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The Armenian Genocide
Within a year of taking power, the Young Turks introduced a number
of constitutional changes and laws purporting to liberalize the regime.
Although promulgated through the Parliament, these changes brought
no relief to the minorities. In the Balkans (particularly Macedonia and
Albania), in the eastern provinces with large concentrations of Armeni-
ans, and even in distant Yemen, Ottoman misrule deteriorated into
bloody oppression. With the exception of the Armenians, the subject na-
tionalities resorted to open rebellion. Many of these rebellions were suc-
cessful, and the Empire, as a result, suffered further shrinkage of its
territories. As one student of the Young Turks observed, the Albanians,
Greeks, and the different Slavic nationalities in the Balkans one by one
emancipated themselves from Ottoman dominion, and by 1913 "only the
Armenians and Arabs remained" as subject nationalities. 110
II. The Initiation of the Genocide Under Cover of Turkey's
Intervention in the War
Although the Armenian massacres preceding World War I were sig-
nificant in many respects, they underscored two especially important
facts. First, the massacres were not subjected to the test of criminal pro-
ceedings, either nationally or internationally; the resulting impunity ac-
corded the perpetrators became a form of negative reward. Second, no
deterrence materialized in anticipation of the genocide of 1915. Current
international law on genocide revolves around these twin principles of
published for the first time in 1949, the document was in the possession of Ittihad party Secre-
tary-General Midhat §iUkrii Bleda. K. DURU, ZIYA G6KALP 60-69 (1949).
110. F. AHMAD, THE YOUNG TURKS 154 (1969). In one particular respect the Armenians
stood out among all the subject nationalities, such as the Albanians and various Arab groups,
the Yemenis, the Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians. The Armenians avoided militancy and
confrontation, consistently seeking remedies through appeals and pleas which were always
suffused with pledges of unswerving loyalty, while the Balkan nationalities and the Arabs re-
sorted to rebellion to end Ottoman subjugation and attendant repression. For this display of
fidelity the Armenians were characterized by Ottoman rulers as "the loyal nation" (milleti
sadika). S. KOCA§, TARIH BOYUNCA ERMENILER VE TURK-EMENi ILI§IKLERI (The Armeni-
ans Throughout History and Turko-Arminian Relations) 59, 61 (1967). Their subsequent
transformation from loyal servants of the State into its militant opponents is, however, an
example of the futility of entreaties and pleas applied to regimes thriving on oppression and
tyranny. In a meeting with British Ambassador Sir Henry Elliot on December 6, 1876, Patri-
arch Varjabedian, the duly recognized religious head of the Armenians, expressed the hope
that the impending Constantinople Conference would not urge the Porte to accord certain
privileges to the rebel provinces (Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins) and to deny the same to the
loyal ones (the Armenians). The Ambassador demurred, saying that the purpose of the Con-
ference was not to scrutinize the entire Administration of Turkey but to secure peace and
tranquility in those provinces whose revolts were threatening the general peace. The Patriarch
retorted that if rebellion were a prerequisite for enlisting the support of European Powers,
there would be no difficulty whatsoever in organizing a movement of that nature. FO 424/46,
No. 336, Dec. 7, 1876 (Elliot's communication to British Foreign Minister Lord Derby).
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prevention and punishment. The examination of the special case of the
Armenian Genocide, in which both of these principles failed to operate,
brings into question the adequacy of international law"' and the efficacy
of international efforts to deter genocide.
A. The Legal-Political Context
Evidence suggests that Turkey's entry into World War I was substan-
tially influenced by a desire to create a suitable opportunity to resolve
once and for all certain lingering domestic conflicts. The recent litera-
ture analyzing the problems of genocide is replete with discussions recog-
nizing this historical fact. Several of these discussions singled out the
1894-96 Abdul Hamit-era massacres as a historical antecedent of con-
111. The classification of genocide as a crime under international law in the U.N. Conven-
tion Against Genocide poses a number of difficulties in current international jurisprudence,
where the principle of state sovereignty remains powerful. While a variety of new principles,
doctrines, conventions, and covenants have emerged in the post-Nuremberg period and pro-
vided some help in this area, these difficulties remain substantial. Specifically, some of the
obstacles to countering genocide under international law include:
a) The fact that international law has been largely confined to the level of declaratory prin-
ciples. As Cardozo explained: "International law ... has at times ... a twilight existence
during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, until at length the imprima-
tur of a court attests its jural quality." New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934);
b) The uncertainties attending the "self-executing" provisions in certain treaties which have
somewhat diminished the usefulness of these treaties as legally binding instruments in munici-
pal courts;
c) The fact that treaties, lacking the force of legislation, often cannot effectively specify a
crime, assign jurisdiction, or provide the machinery for the administration of punitive justice;
d) The absence in international law of criminal statutes and jurisdiction;
e) The lack of international criminal courts competent to deal with offenders.
As indicated above, however, the major impediment to successful prevention or punishment
of genocide under international law are the principles of state sovereignty and raison d'dtat.
These principles allow a state substantial latitude in the treatment of their own subjects and
substantial immunity from extra- or supra-national jurisdiction over such actions. Lauter-
pacht succinctly spelled out the abuses that can emerge from this system, abuses which are by
no means obsolete in our times. These abuses involve the "cruder forms of treacherous vio-
lence, brazen perfidy, and outright deceit." Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in Interna-
tional Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 21 (R. Falk, F.
Kratochwil & S. Mendlowitz eds. 1985); see also Moore, Law and National Security in id., at
47-58 (discussion of legal ramifications of national security problems with particular emphasis
on U.S. government policies). Nor is the U.N. exempt from the propensity to countenance
such abuses. See text accompanying supra note 13.
It is only recently that the crime of genocide has even been considered a crime under inter-
national law. As Willis states:
Not until 1948 would genocide ... be clearly defined as an international crime, and in
1919 adherence to time-honored notions of sovereignty placed limitations upon the scope
of traditional laws and customs of war. The Hague conventions ... [did not deal] with a
state's treatment of its own citizens ... From this perspective, Turkish action against
Armenians was an internal matter, not subject to the jurisdiction of another government.
J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 157. As indicated in this paper, this deference to state sovereignty
was ever-present in the international reaction to the Armenian genocide. See the exchange




temporary issues of genocide,1 12 while others focus on the World War I
massacres. 11 3
1. The Opportunity Factor
Vice-Field Marshal Pomiankowski, the Austrian Military Plenipoten-
tiary attached to the Ottoman General Headquarters during the War,
alluded in his memoirs to the unabating antagonism between the
Muslims and the non-Muslim nationalities. Referring to "the spontane-
ous utterances of many intelligent Turks," Pomiankowski conveyed their
view that these conquered people ought to have been forcibly converted
into Muslims, or "ought to have been exterminated (ausrotten)" long
ago. His conclusion is noteworthy:
In this sense there is no doubt that the Young Turk government already
before the war had decided to utilize the next opportunity for rectifying at
least in part this mistake.... It is also very probable that this consideration,
i.e., the intent, had a very important influence upon the decisions of the
Ottoman government relative to joining the Central Powers, and upon the
determination of the exact time of their intervening in the war." 14
Ambassador Morgenthau, whose contacts with high-ranking Young
Turk officials were more frequent and intimate than Pomiankowski's,
was even more explicit in this regard:
The conditions of the war gave to the Turkish Government its longed-for
opportunity to lay hold of the Armenians.... They criticized their ances-
tors for neglecting to destroy or convert the Christian races to Mohamme-
danism at the time when they first subjugated them. Now ... they thought
the time opportune to make good the oversight of their ancestors in the
15th century. They concluded that once they had carried out their plan,
the Great Powers would find themselves before an accomplished fact and
that their crime would be condoned, as was done in the case of the mas-
112. See Jacoby, Genocide, 4 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT (4 RE-
VUE PtNALE SUISSE) 472 (1949); Cervantes Rio, Etude sur l'Article 175 du Code Pdnal Mexi-
cain "Genocide", 16-17 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES DE PSYCHO-SoCIOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 52
(1969).
113. See A. PFLANZER, LE CRIME DE Gf-NOCIDE 15, 18, 20 (1956); THE UNITED NA-
TIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COM-
MISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 35, 45 (1948) [hereinafter WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION]; S. TORIGUIAN, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d. ed. 1988); Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CASE W. INT'L. L. J.
210 (1979); Kuhn, The Genocide Convention and State Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1948);
Kunz, supra note 88, at 741; Lemkin, Genocide: A New International Crime: Punishment and
Prevention, 10 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL 367 (1946); Schwelb, Crimes
Against Humanity, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 181-82, 198; Stillschweig, Das Abkommen zur
Bekdmpfung von Genocide, 3 DIE FRIEDENSWARTE FOR ZWISCHENSTAATLICHE ORGANISA-
TION 97, 99 (1949).
114. J. POMIANKOWSKi, DER ZUSAMMENBRUCH DES OTTAMANISCHEN REICHES 162
(1969).
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sacres of 1895-96, when the Great Powers did not even reprimand the
Sultan. 11-5
Morgenthau's opinion was unequivocally confirmed by the Young
Turk party leader Talat, one of his chief sources in Turkish government
circles. Talat told Dr. Mordtman, the man in charge of the Armenian
desk and the dragoman at the German Embassy at Istanbul, that Turkey
was "intent on taking advantage of the war in order to thoroughly liqui-
date its internal foes, i.e., the indigenous Christians, without being
thereby disturbed by foreign intervention."'1 16 In a joint memorandum to
Berlin requesting the removal of German Ambassador Metternich, on
account of the envoy's unceasing efforts to intercede on behalf of the
Armenians, Talat (along with war lord Enver) reemphasized this point:
"the work must be done now; after the war it will be too late." 117
The observations of two prominent German experts also merit special
attention. In explaining Turkey's motivation for entering World War I
on the side of Germany, K. Ziemke, a renowned German political scien-
tist, described Turkey's desire to extricate herself from the bondage of
the Armenian Reform Agreement of February 8, 1914, an agreement ini-
tiated in the wake of the 1912 Balkan war, as a contributing factor. He
in fact recognized the massacre and destruction of "one million Armeni-
ans" during that war as "the radical solution" of the Armenian question
delivering Turkey from the burden of all future vexations; by so doing,
115. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 9. Louis Heck, the U.S. High Commissioner in
Istanbul and a Special Assistant of the Department of State, also pointed out the opportunity
factor provided by World War I: "[T]he Young Turk Government soon availed itself of the
opportunity afforded by war conditions to try to exterminate the Armenian population of Asia
Minor and thus rid itself once and for all of the 'Armenian question.'" FO 371/3658/75852,
Folio 441, at 2 (May 19, 1919).
116. The Talat statement is in German Ambassador Wangenheim's June 17, 1915 report
to his Chancellor in Berlin. A.A. TORKEI 183/37, A19744; J. LEPSIUS, DEUTSCHLAND UND
ARMENIEN 1914-1918 84 (1919).
These judgments are confirmed by Ernst Jackh, the German expert on Turkey who under-
took several inspection trips to Turkey during the war, relaying his conversations with high
ranking Turkish officials and his observations to Kaiser Wilhelm II at his Headquarters, the
German Chamber of Deputies, and the Foreign Office. In his 22-page report covering his
September-October 1915 trip he stated, "Indeed Talat openly hailed the destruction of the
Armenian people as a political relief." A.A. TORKEI 158/14, at 18 (Oct. 17, 1915). Another
German author, the last German Ambassador to Turkey in World War I, commented in his
memoirs: "When I kept on pestering him on the Armenian Question, he once said with a
smile, 'What on earth do you want? The question is settled. There are no more Armenians.'"
The ambassador later explained this assertion of having solved the Armenian Question in
terms of the ancestral territories of the victims, namely, "Armenia where the Turks have been
systematically trying to exterminate the Christian population." Despite his expressions of es-
teem for Talat, the ambassador conceded Talat's role in that extermination: "His complicity
in the Armenian crime he atoned for by his death." MEMOIRS OF COUNT BERNSTORFF 176,
180, 374 (Eric Sutton trans. 1936).




the Turkish Government eliminated the conditions for future reform
projects and the allied pressures.' 18 More significantly, a German officer
serving as Vice Consul of Erzurum (where a large Armenian population
was destroyed) informed Berlin that "the Armenian question which for
decades occupied. the attention of Europe's diplomats is to be solved in
the course of the present war... [M]easures undertaken by the Turkish
government . . . are tantamount to the total destruction of the
Armenians." 119
This view is further corroborated by sources within the Ittihadist re-
gime itself. Cemal Pa§a, who served both as a member of the Young
Turk triumvirate running the Ittihadist regime between 1908-18 and also
as the Commander of the Fourth Army and Marine Minister during the
war, states in his memoirs that, "our sole objective (bizim yegdne
gayemiz) was to free ourselves from all the governmental measures [im-
posed upon us] in this war and which constituted a blow to our internal
independence."'120 These shackles involved the international stipulations
on the autonomy of Lebanon, and the Armenian reform agreement
signed on February 8, 1914 between Turkey and Russia, with the concur-
rence of the other Powers. As Cemal stated, "We wanted to tear up that
Agreement." 121 Enver, also a member of the ruling Ittihad triumvirate,
likewise denounced the reforms stipulated by the international agreement
of February 8, 1914. During an exchange on August 6, 1915 with Hans
Humann (German naval attach6 and Enver's childhood friend), the Min-
118. K. ZIEMKE, DIE NEUE TORKEI 1914-1929, 271-72 (1930).
119. A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A28584 (Aug. 10, 1915 report by Dr. Max Erwin von
Scheubner Richter). See also J. LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 123-24.
120. C. PA§A, HATIRALAR 438 (1977).
Cemal in the September-December 1913 period, during which the Armenians were again
pressing for reforms to be executed under European control, repeatedly threatened the Arme-
nian leaders with massacres through "the Muslim populations of the six provinces" targeted
for reforms. The threat was made to Vartkes, one of the Armenian Deputies serving in the
Ottoman Parliament. Being an ardent Ittihadist, Vartkes, who was also a nationalist Dashnak
leader, was advised to inform his party of this threat, warning it against further solicitation of
European intervention. A. KARO, ABRUADZ ORER (Lived Days) 191-92 (1948). This threat
was confirmed by K. Zohrab, another Armenian Deputy and a professor of international law
at Istanbul's law school. In his pre-World War I secret diary, Zohrab, in anticipation of the
genocide, called attention to Cemal's threat. Zohrabee Orakroutinu Yegernee Nakhoriageen
(K. Zohrab's Diary on the Eve of the Genocide), VII NAVASART (Armenian Los Angeles
monthly), Apr. 1989, at 21. Both Vartkes and Zohrab were arrested and summarily killed
during the war by agents of the Special Organization.
In December 1913, Cemal had several Armenian students arrested for leading the festivities
celebrating the 1500th anniversary of the invention of the Armenian alphabet. When ex-
horting them to stop their "traitorous activities," Cemal again threatened to "exterminate the
Armenians, sparing neither infants nor the old." L. MOZIAN., AKSORAGANEE MU VOTISA-
GANU: SEV OREROU HISHADAGNER (An Exile's Odyssey: Memories of Dark Days) 9-10
(1958).
121. C. PA§A, supra note 120, at 438.
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ister admitted that the main rationale of the anti-Armenian measures was
"the total elimination of any basis" for future interventions by the Pow-
ers on behalf of the Armenians. 122 As a departmental head in the Turk-
ish Justice Ministry declared, "There is no room for Armenians and
Turks in our state, and it would be irresponsible and thoughtless for us if
we didn't take advantage of this opportunity [afforded by the war] to do
away with [the Armenians] thoroughly."
'123
2. The Annulment of the Treaties
Through a December 16, 1914 Imperial Rescript, the Agreement of
February 8, 1914 was cancelled. 24 Talat, then Interior Minister, justi-
122. A.A. KONSTANTINOPEL 170, folio 52; J. LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 122,
123. J. LEPSIUS, DER TODESGANG DES ARMENISCHEN VOLKES 230 (1930).
124. Jischke, Das Osmanische Reich yom Berliner Kongress bis zu seinem Ende (1878-
1920/22), 6 HANDBUCH DER EUROPAISCHEN GESCHICHTE 543, 545-56, n. 36 (1968). See also
3:3 Y.BAYUR, TORK INKILABI TARIHI (The History of the Turkish Revolution) 12 (1957);
British Ambassador Mallet's Sept. 23, 1914 report to Grey in FO 371/2116/56207.
The cancellation coincided with the termination of the contract of the two inspectors, a
Dutchman, L.C. Westenenk, Assistant Resident in the Dutch East Indies, and a Norwegian,
Nicolai Hoff, Major, later Lieutenant Colonel, in the Norwegian Army and the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Norwegian Ministry of War, who were to implement the reforms. However, as
Toynbee pointed out, the two Inspectors' mission was intentionally handicapped by the Turk-
ish authorities so as to derail and abolish it at an opportune moment:
A clause was inserted in the Inspectors' contract of engagement, empowering the Govern-
ment to denounce it at any moment upon payment of an indemnity of one year's salary-
a flat violation of the ten years' term provided for under the scheme; and the list of "supe-
rior officials" was inflated until the patronage of the Inspectors, which, next to their irrev-
ocability, would have been their most effective power, was reduced to an illusion. The
unfortunate nominees were spared the farce of exercising their maimed authority. They
had barely reached their provinces when the European War broke out, and the Govern-
ment promptly denounced the contracts and suspended the Scheme of Reforms, as the
first step towards its own intervention in the conflict. Thus, at the close of 1914, the
Armenians found themselves in the same position as in 1883. The measures designed for
their security had fallen through, and left nothing behind but the resentment of the Gov-
ernment that still held them at its mercy. The deportations of 1915 followed as inexorably
from the Balkan War and the Project [Agreement] of 1914 as the massacres of 1895-6 had
followed from the Russian War and the Project of 1878 [Berlin Treaty].
J. (VISCOUNT) BRYCE, infra note 132, at 635-36; see also AUSTRIAN POLITICAL OFFICE FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS ARCHIVES, 12 Tiirkei, Karton 463. In Austrian Ambassador Pallavicini's May
16, 1914 report, he informed Vienna that "many of the competences agreed upon by the Pow-
ers were not included in the contract," and in his May 25, 1914 report he complained that the
two Inspectors were being treated as subordinate civil servants under the authority of the
Turkish government, not as European Inspectors General. Westenenk in his diary quoted
Talat as describing Hoff and him as "just our officials," with Hoff repeatedly expressing doubt
about the seriousness of the Turkish rulers. See Van der Dussen, The Westenenk File, 39
ARMENIAN REV. 46, 57, 69, 72 (1986). Interior Minister and Party ChiefTalat's two appoint-
ments were revealing in this respect, portending ominous developments for the Armenians,
Diyarbekir Deputy Feyzi and Bitlis province Governor Mustafa Abdulhalik, his brother-in-
law, were assigned to the staff of Hoff as Deputies. Both men were subsequently to play piv-
otal roles in the destruction of the largest concentration of Armenians in southeastern and
eastern Turkey, involving the provinces of Diyarbekir and Bitlis. Abdulhalik was later as-
signed to the post of Governor of Aleppo province, directing the ancillary liquidation of the
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fled this move by declaring to Dr. Mordtman, "C'est le seul moment
propice."125 This reflected a general determination during the war to ab-
rogate the international treaties that had resulted from the application of
the principle of "humanitarian intervention." On September 5, 1916, Ot-
toman Foreign Minister Halil informed German Ambassador Wolff-
Metternich that "the Ottoman Cabinet had decided to declare null and
void the Paris Treaty of 1856, the London Declaration of 1871, and the
Berlin Treaty of 1878."126 As Halil explained, "all three of these interna-
tional treaties had imposed 'political shackles' on the Ottoman state
which the Porte intended to be rid of."' 127 It is important to note that
Kiihlmann, the German Ambassador at Istanbul, pointed to the relation-
ship between the Armenian reform movement and the imposition of
these "shackles" on Turkey, especially the February 8, 1914 Reform
Agreement, as providing the rationale for the ensuing genocide. Two
weeks before he became Foreign Minister, Kiihlmann, in a February 16,
1917 report reviewing the history of the Turko-Armenian conflict, traced
"the destruction of the Armenians, which has been carried out on a large
remnants of the Armenian population who had survived the ordeal of an exacting forced trek
from the interibr to the deserts of Mesopotamia in 1915-16. A.A. TORKEI 183/38, A24658,
Enclosure VI of Aug. 20, 1915 report; Jhamanag (Istanbul) 6/19 July 1914, describes the
other, i.e., Abdulhalik's assignment, whose complicity in the Armenian genocide is sketched in
Dadrian, The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War One Destruction of the Ottoman
Armenians-The Anatomy of a Genocide, 18 INT'L J. MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 342, 336-38
(1986).
125. A.A. TORKEI 183/36, A5043 (Ambassador Wangenheim's Feb. 2, 1915 report to
Berlin).
126. U. TRUMPENER, GERMANY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1914-1918 134-35 (1968).
127. Id. Halil on the same day departed to Berlin to seek German support for the annul-
ments. In informing his government of this move in his Sept. 5, 1916 report, German Ambas-
sador Metternich directed attention to the Turkish concern for article 61 of the Berlin Treaty
involving Turkey's "engagements for Armenia," and to Halil's justification of the act on
grounds of "the effect of war" (Kriegszustand). A.A. TORKEI, 183/44, A24061. The full text
of the repudiation of the treaties in German is in Kraelitz-Greifenhorst, Die Ungfiltigkeitser-
kid'rung des Pariser und Berliner Vertrages durch die osmanische Regierung, 43 OSTER-
REICHISCHE MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEN ORIENT 56-60 (1917), where Halil predicates his
abrogation of the Paris and Berlin Treaties on the following main arguments: (1) The Paris
Treaty provisions proscribing interference in the internal affairs of Turkey were violated
through some of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. (2) While the Ottoman Empire scrupu-
lously adhered to the two treaties, Italy, England, France and Russia repeatedly violated them.
(3) France coerced Turkey to grant limited autonomy to Lebanon illegally; moreover, the
provisions of the autonomy were not part of any international treaty or agreement but rather
internal administrative adjustments. Hence, they could be revoked and cancelled. (4) Russia
blatantly violated the Paris Treaty by acts of agitation in the Balkan provinces, an aggressive
war against Turkey, a series of interventions in the internal affairs of Turkey, and by illegally
subverting the status of the Black Sea port city of Batum. (5) The present conditions have
altered the situation in that Turkey was no longer under the Powers' tutelage and as a totally
independent state could act with all the rights and privileges conferred upon such a state. (6)
This new situation justified the conclusion that the two treaties forfeited their right to exist.
For the English text of Halil's statements, see 5 CURRENT HISTORY (N. Y. Times monthly
publication) 822-24 (Feb. 1917).
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scale, resulting from a policy of extermination," to "Armenian reform
endeavors, especially those launched during the 1912 Balkan war."'
128
3. The Allies' Warning and the Introduction of the Principle of
"Crimes Against Humanity"
As the genocide was beginning, the Allies issued a joint declaration on
May 24, 1915 condemning "the connivance and often assistance of Otto-
man authorities" in the massacres. "In view of these new crimes of Tur-
key against humanity and civilization," the declaration continued, "the
Allied governments announce publicly... that they will hold personally
responsible ... all members of the Ottoman government and thdse of
their agents who are implicated in such massacres."'
1 29
B. The Implementation of the Genocide
Alleging treasonable acts, separatism, and other assorted acts by the
Armenians as a national minority, the Ottoman authorities ordered, for
national security reasons, the wholesale deportation of the Armenian
population of the Empire's eastern and southeastern provinces. 130 This
measure was subsequently extended to virtually all of the Empire's Ar-
menian population, including such far away cities as Bursa, Eski§ehir,
Konya, and the Ottoman capital, Istanbul.
T3 '
128. A.A. TORKEI 183/46, A5919. In his memoirs Talat confirms this Turkish reaction to
renewed Armenian reform efforts. TALAT PA§ANIN HATIRALARL (The Memoirs of Talat
Papa) 50-55 (E. Bolayir ed. 1946).
129. GUERRE 1914-1918, TURQUIE. 887. I.Armdnie (May 26, 1915); FO 371/2488/51010
(May 28, 1915); A.A. TORKEI 183/37, A17667; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915
Supp., 981 (1928); U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59, 867. 4016/67 (May 28). See
also the report of Polish jurist Litawski, the Legal Officer of the U.N. War Crimes Commis-
sion, who in addition to writing Chapter II in the volume cited in note 113 (WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION) prepared a separate report, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/W. 20/ Corr. 1, at 1, no. 3
(1948). (The May 28, 1915, date is a misprint for May 24, 1915, in these works, including that
of Schwelb, supra note 113, at 181).
130. 3:3 Y. BAYUR, supra note 124, at 37-38.
131. German Embassy Charg6 von Neurath informed Berlin on November 12, 1915: "Ac-
cording to a reliable source, the Turkish Government has, contrary to all assurances, decided
to deport the Armenians of Constantinople also." A.A. TORKEI, 183/40, A33705. On De-
cember 7, 1915, German Ambassador Metternich informed Berlin that 4,000 Armenians had
recently been removed from Constantinople, that the total number of those deported from the
Ottoman capital up to that time had reached 30,000, and that "gradually a clean sweep will be
made of the remaining 80,000 Armenian inhabitants" of the Ottoman capital. A.A. TORKEI,
183/40, A36184. For additional corroboration of this pattern of deportation of Istanbul's
Armenians, see Zurlinden, infra note 182, at 705; H. STORMER, infra note 138, at 55 (and the
German original, infra note 155, at 48-51) (author maintains that Istanbul police used daily
quota system to deport Armenians in groups ranging from 200-1,000). See also A. TOYNBEE,
ARMENIAN ATROCITIES: THE MURDER OF A NATION 77-78 (1915); Ambassador Morgen-
thau's October 4, 1915 cipher No. 1121. R.G. 59, 867.4016/159; A. REFIK, infra note 133, at
23-24 (Turkish intelligence officer recounts own observations about "atrocious" deaths of the




The execution of this order, ostensibly a wartime emergency measure
of relocation, actually masked the execution of the Armenian population.
The vast majority of the deportees perished through a variety of direct
and indirect atrocities perpetrated during the deportations. As Winston
Churchill wrote,
In 1915 the Turkish government began and ruthlessly carried out the infa-
mous general massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor...
the clearance of the race from Asia Minor was about as complete as such an
act, on a scale so great, could well be.... There is no reasonable doubt that
this crime was planned and executed for political reasons. The opportunity
presented itself for clearing Turkish soil of a Christian race opposed to all
Turkish ambitions, cherishing national ambitions that could be satisfied
only at the expense of Turkey, and planted geographically between Turkish
and Caucasian Moslems.
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132. W. CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS: THE AFTERMATH 405 (1929).
Three massive volumes in English, German, and French document these atrocities, relying
mostly upon neutral observers (Swiss, American, Swedish), and German and Austrian civilian
and military officials stationed in Turkey as war-time allies. (1) J. (VISCOUNT) BRYCE, THE
TREATMENT OF ARMENIANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1915-16, His Majesty's Stationery
Office, Miscellaneous No. 31, (A. Toynbee comp. 1916) (Viscount Bryce, also author of the
classic The American Commonwealth (1888), was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford
from 1870-1893, entered Parliament in 1880, and during 1907-1913 was Ambassador to the
United States, signing the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty in 1911. After the war he was
appointed Chairman of a Royal Commission on German atrocities in Belgium and subse-
quently became a member of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration); (2) J. LEPSIUS,
supra note 116; (3) A. BEYLERIAN, LES GRANDES PUISSANcEs, L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN, ET LES
ARMtNIENS DANS LES ARCHIvES FRANCAISES 1914-18 (1983). Because the second volume
was compiled during the war, some critics questioned the impartiality and balance of its con-
tents. To prove the veracity of the work, Bryce submitted the material before publication to a
number of scholars for evaluation. Among them was Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor at
Oxford, who declared: "I realize that in times of persecution passions run high... But the
evidence of these letters and reports will bear any scrutiny and overpower any skepticism.
Their genuineness is established beyond question..." Id. at xxxi. H.A.L. Fisher, Vice-Chan-
cellor of Sheffield University, declared: "The evidence here collected... will carry conviction
wherever and whenever it is studied by honest enquirers... It is corroborated by reports re-
ceived from Americans, Danes, Swiss, Germans, Italians and other foreigners... It is clear that
a catastrophe, conceived upon a scale quite unparalleled in modem history, has been contrived
for the Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire." Id. at xxix. Moorfield Storey, the
former President of the American Bar Association, observed:
I have no doubt that, while there may be inaccuracies of detail, these statements establish
without any question the essential facts. It must be borne in mind that in such a case the
evidence of eye-witnesses is not easily obtained; the victims, with few exceptions, are dead;
the perpetrators will not confess... Such statements as you print are the best evidence
which, in the circumstances, it is possible to obtain. They come from persons holding
positions which give weight to their words, and from other persons with no motive to
falsify, and it is impossible that such a body of concurring evidence should have been
manufactured... In my opinion the evidence which you print.. .establishes beyond any
reasonable doubt, the deliberate purpose of the Turkish authorities practically to extermi-
nate the Armenians, and their responsibility for the hideous atrocities which have been
perpetrated upon that unhappy people.
Id. at xxxi, xxxii. In commenting on Toynbee's competence and scrupulousness in compiling
the material Bryce declared "[n]othing has been admitted the substantial truth of which seems
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A secret propaganda campaign operated by Department II of the
Turkish War Office followed the deportation order. The campaign
sought to deflect blame from the Turkish government by labeling the
Armenians a national security threat. As one Turkish naval captain at-
tached to the office recounted:
In order to justify this enormous crime (bu muazzam cinayet) [of the Ar-
menian genocide] the requisite propaganda material was thoroughly pre-
pared in Istanbul. [It included such statements as:] "the Armenians are in
league with the enemy. They will launch an uprising in Istanbul, kill off the
Itihadist leaders and will succeed in opening up the straits [to enable the
Allied fleets to capture Istanbul]." These vile and malicious incitements
[were such, however, that they] could persuade only people who were not
even able to feel the pangs of their own hunger.'
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The main vehicle of this anti-Armenian agitation was the Ottoman
propaganda weekly Harb Mecmuasi (War Magazine). Edited by Colonel
Seyfi, the head of Department II at the War Office, this weekly's influ-
ence went well beyond its 15,000 subscribers. A Turkish newspaper dur-
ing the Armistice declared that it was Seyfi who, as director of the
Political Department at Ottoman General Headquarters, mapped the
strategy of the massacres against the Armenians, mobilizing the getes
(brigands) of the Special Organization, in close cooperation with Dr. B.
§akir, and under the auspices of the Ittihad party's Central Commit-
tee.' 34 The Turkish government also Worked to deflect blame for the
eventual killing of the Armenians through its use of the Special Organi-
open to reasonable doubt. Facts only have been dealt with; questions of future policy have
been carefully avoided." Id. at xvi. In his note to Vice-Chancellor Fisher, Toynbee himself
described the volume as "an awful piece of history. Fortunately, one gets absorbed in the work
of editing and arranging the documents and half deadened to things themselves." FO 96/206/
IV, Aug. 4, 1916. In the circular attached to the volume and sent to 250 American publica-
tions, Toynbee noted, "The fiendish character of the atrocities committed and the deliberate,
systematic plan on which they were organized from Constantinople appear to me to be the
most striking features that emerge." Id.
133. A. REFIK (Altmay), IKI KOMITE IKI KITAL (Two Committees and Two Massacres)
40 (1919). Dismissing these pieces of agitation as crass propaganda that "defies every logic,"
Refik returns to his central theme, that under the guise of deportation and wartime relocation,
Ittihad pursued the goal of "destroying (imha) the Armenians." Id. at 23. Refik later bacame
a Professor of History at the University of Istanbul.
134. The newspaper is the daily Sabah, from which an Armenian daily probably a day or
two later, repeated that declaration in summary form. ARIAMARD (namesake of Dja-
gadamard) Dec. 13, 1918. This shows the enormous power of Colonel Seyfi, a graduate of the
Istanbul Turkish War Staff Academy and a longtime Ittihadist supporter of war lord Enver; he
later became General Diizg6ren in the Turkish Republic. According to U.S. Acting Secretary
of State William Phillips, Seyfi "was vested with great power." FO 371/4173, folio 345
(March 20, 1919) (report to U.S. Ambassador to England John Davis assessing Seyfi's liability
as a top war criminal). British intelligence during the Armistice obtained a document from the
Turkish Interior Ministry's National Security Office files in which Seyfi is described as one of





zation. The members of the Special Organization, mostly ex-convicts,
would be identified as the actual villains and portrayed as "beyond the
authority and control of the government." An American author noted
this method and described the unruly "group of brigands" who made up
the Special Organization as "a secret, rather disreputable group."
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1. Mobilization and Deportation
Invoking the principle of "armed neutrality," Turkey, with the assist-
ance of German staff officers, launched a general mobilization on August
3, 1914. Among those affected by this scheme were male Armenians,
who were inducted in three stages. First called were those between
twenty and forty-five years of age, followed by those between fifteen and
twenty, and finally those in the forty-five to sixty age group, who were
used as pack animals for the transport of military equipment. 136 About a
month later, on September 6, 1914, the Interior Ministry instructed the
provincial authorities, through a cipher circular, to keep Armenian polit-
ical and community leaders under surveillance. When Turkey finally en-
tered the war by a preemptive attack on Russian seaports and shipping in
the Black Sea some two months later, 137 the military's emergency meas-
ures assumed inordinate dimensions of severity. The requisitions in par-
ticular stripped the provincial Armenian population of most of their
accumulated goods; the confiscations included almost anything sub-
sumed under the general category of supplies and provisions for the
Army. 138 Widespread governmental provocations, during which some
Armenians clashed with gendarmes and soldiers who were harassing
135. P. STODDARD, THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ARABS, 1911 TO 1918: A
PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE TE§KILTIMAHSUSA (SPECIAL ORGANIZATION) 49-50 (1963).
136. American Ambassador Morgenthau describes the use of these Armenian conscripts
as pack animals and their eventual destruction as follows:
Army supplies of all kinds were loaded on their backs, and, stumbling under the burdens
and driven by the whips and bayonets of the Turks... almost waist high through snow. :.
If any stragglers succeeded in reaching their destinations, they were not infrequently mas-
sacred. In many instances, Armenian soldiers were disposed of in even summary fashion,
for it now became almost the general practice to shoot them in cold blood.
H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 302.
137. U. TRUMPENER, supra note 126, at 51.
138. In discussing these requisitions, Dr. Henry Stiirmer, the Istanbul correspondent of
the influential German daily newspaper Kdlnische Zeitung, noted,
When I speak of requisitioning, I do not mean the necessary military carrying off of grain,
cattle, vehicles, buffaloes, and horses, general equipment, and so on ... I do not mean
that, even though the way it was accomplished bled the country far more than was neces-
sary, falling as it did in the country into the hands of ignorant, brutal, and fanatical
underlings, and in the town being carried out with every kind of refinement by the central
authorities. Too often it was a means to violent "nationalisation" and deprivation of
property and rights exercised especially against the Armenians, Greeks, and subjects of
other Entente countries.
H. STORMER, Two YEARS IN CONSTANTINOPLE 115 (G. Allen trans. 1917).
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them, accentuated these hardships.' 39 There were also sporadic acts of
sabotage by isolated groups of Armenians. 40 This unrest culminated in
the Interior Ministry order of April 24, 1915 authorizing the arrest of all
Armenian political and community leaders suspected of anti-Ittihad or
nationalistic sentiments. Thousands of Armenians were seized and in-
carcerated; in Istanbul alone 2,345 such leaders were arrested' 4 ' and
eventually executed. A large number of them were neither nationalists
nor in any way involved in politics. None of them were tried and found
guilty of war-time sabotage, espionage, or any other crime.
The last and decisive stage of the process of reducing the Armenian
population to helplessness was deportation. In a Memorandum dated
May 26, 1915, the Interior Minister requested from the Grand Vezir the
enactment through the Cabinet of a special law authorizing deportations.
The Memorandum was endorsed on May 29 by the Grand Vezir even
though the Cabinet did not act on it until May 30. The press, mean-
while, had already announced the promulgation of the new emergency
law, called the Temporary Law of Deportation, 142 on May 27. Without
referring to the Armenians, the law authorized the Commanders of Ar-
mies, Army Corps, Divisions, and Commandants of local garrisons to
order the deportation of population clusters on suspicion of espionage,
treason, and on military necessity. The key word was "sensing" (his-
setmek); the authorities, empowered to order deportations, had merely
to have a feel or a sense of the offense or danger.' 43 This vague but
139. See J. (VISCOUNT) BRYCE, supra note 132, at 33-36 (American nurse Grace Knapp's
eyewitness account); see also C. USSHER, AN AMERICAN PHYSICIAN IN TURKEY 264-65
(1917); R. DE NOGALES, FOUR YEARS BENEATH THE CRESCENT 60-70, 80-89, 95 (M. Lee
trans. 1926) (detailed description of Venezuelan officer who led Turkish artillery in reducing
Armenian defenses in Van).
140. As Morgenthau related, "some Armenians proposed to defend their own lives and
their women's honor against the outrages... Nothing was sacred to the Turkish gendarmes;
under the plea of searching for hidden arms, they ransacked churches, treated the altars and
sacred utensils with the utmost indignity... They would beat the priests into insensibility." H.
MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 304-05. Commenting on his intimate exchanges with "au-
thoritative Turkish personalities," Erzurum's German Vice Consul, Captain von Scheubner-
Richter, in a Dec. 4, 1916 summary report to his Chancellor in Berlin reveals Turkish plans to
provoke Armenians into "acts of self-defense" which then were used as a basis for "inflated
descriptions" of Armenian insurgency and, therefore, as "pretexts" for subsequent murder.
A.A. TORKEI 183/45, A33457. On April 26, 1915, the German Consulate at Adana relayed to
the German Embassy the German text of a lengthy report in which the Armenian Supreme
Patriarch of the See of Cilicia bitterly complains to the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul of "the
outrageous atrocities and mistreatments the sole purpose of which is to provoke the peaceful
people of the region to extreme acts in order to provide the government an excuse for annihila-
tion." A.A. KONSTANTINOPEL 168 (No. 2540); see also J. LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 53-54.
141. E. URAS, TARIHTE ERMENILER VE ERMENI MESELESI (The Armenians and the Ar-
menian Question in History) 612 (2d ed. 1976).
142. For the English text of the law, see R. HOVANNISIAN, ARMENIA ON THE ROAD TO
INDEPENDENCE 1918 51 (1967).




sweeping authorization resulted in the deportation of the bulk of Tur-
key's Armenian population. As one Turkish historian admitted, the In-
terior Minister "was intent on creating an accomplished fact," and
"railroad[ed] the Cabinet approval of the law" by beginning to adminis-
ter the deportations prior to submitting his draft bill.144 The Temporary
Law of Deportation, it should be noted, was eventually repealed "on ac-
count of its unconstitutionality" in a stormy November 4, 1918 session of
the post-war Ottoman Parliament, during which the Armenian mas-
sacres, the scope of the victims, and the responsibility of the government
were debated. 145
2. Expropriation and Confiscation of Goods and Assets
A supplementary law enacted on June 10, 1915 contained instructions
on how to register the properties of the deportees, how to safeguard
them, and how to dispose of others through public auctions, with the
revenues to be held in trust for remittance to the owners upon their re-
turn after the war.146 Another Temporary Law promulgated on Septem-
ber 26, 1915, disposed of the deportees' goods and properties. It
provided for the handling of the debts, credits, and assets of the depor-
tees. In relaying this new law to the German Foreign Office, Gwinner,
the Director of Deutsche Bank, sarcastically stated that the eleven arti-
cles might well have been compressed into the following two: "1. All
goods of the Armenians are confiscated. 2. The government will cash in
the credits of the deportees and will repay (or will not repay) their
debts."1
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Unlike the Temporary Law of Deportation which, though approved
by the Cabinet, was never promulgated by the Ottoman Parliament as
required by article 36 of the Ottoman Constitution, the Ottoman Senate
publicly debated the Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation
(the Temporary Law). Over a two month period, from October 4
through December 13, 1915, a lone Senator, Ahmed Riza, raised his
voice in opposition to the proposed measure. 148 The course of the debate
144. Y. BAYUR, supra note 124, at 38. In 1 T. TUNAYA, TDRKIYEDE SIYASI PARTILER
(The Political Parties in Turkey) 579 (2nd enlarged ed. 1984), the author characterizes this
"accomplished fact" as typical of Ittihad bypassing the regular channels of the government.
According to the testimony of Finance Minister Cavid the General Mobilization on August 2/
3, 1914 was likewise ordered prior to the approval of the Cabinet. Vakit (Istanbul), HARB
KABINELERININ ISTICVABI (The War Cabinets' Hearings) 81 (1933) [hereinafter WAR CABI-
NETS' HEARINGS].
145. JHAMANAG (Istanbul daily), November 5, 1918.
146. FO 371/4241/170751.
147. A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A29127 Oct. 7, 1915 report. The French text of the 11 articles
is listed in A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A29127, and J. LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 214-16.
148. J. LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 216-18. Senator Ahmed Riza was one of the original
founders of Ittihad. Subsequently, however, he became a dissident fighting vigorously against
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sheds further light on the political forces and biases that shaped the Otto-
man government's decisions.
In the September 21/October 4, 1915 session of the Senate, Senator
Riza pleaded with his government to allow the deportees, "hundreds and
thousands of whom, women, children and old people, are helplessly and
miserably wandering around in the streets and mountains of Anatolia[,]
to return to their original places of residence or to settle wherever they
wish before the onset of the winter."1 49 He then submitted a draft bill
that proposed to postpone the Temporary Law's application until after
the end of the war.150
Senator Riza claimed that the Temporary Law was contrary to Article
16 of the Ottoman Constitution because it was announced two days
before the convening of the Parliament. He further argued that "[ilt is
also inimical to the principles of law and justice. This law must, there-
fore, pass first through the Parliament and go into effect only after the
end of the war. Hence, on the basis of Article 53 of the Constitution[,] I
request the change as proposed in the bill before us."' 51 The ensuing
debate revealed that the Parliament knew nothing about the Temporary
Law in question, and that nobody knew when, if ever, it would come to
the Parliament for consideration. Therefore, no proposal for change
would be entertained. Following Senator Riza's expression of concern
that the Temporary Law might either come too late or not at all to the
Parliament, the Senate voted to transmit the Senator's bill to the Legisla-
tive Acts Committee of the Senate.
In the October 19/November 1, 1915 session of the Senate, Senator
Riza again urged his fellow legislators to consider the suffering of the
wretched deportees of the Anatolian mountains before the winter season.
He requested that the Senate expedite relief which, according to the Pres-
ident of the Senate, the government had formally promised to provide. 1
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In discussing these debates, prominent Turkish historian Bayur noted the
pressures brought to bear upon Senator Riza to withdraw his bill; one
Deputy shouted at Riza "this is not the time to provoke rumors"'
153 -
alluding to the delicate political matter of the massacres that were still in
progress. Bayur states that Senator Riza was especially harrassed during
Ittihad excesses. On Oct. 19, 1918, in his first post-war speech in the Senate, Riza invoked the
memory of "the Armenians who were murdered in a beastly manner." A.A. TORKEi 201/9,
A46488.
149. J. LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 216.
150. For this purpose, the bill amended article 2 of the Temporary Law to read as follows:
"This law goes into operation after the end of the World War and one month after the signing
of the peace treaty." Id.
151. Id. at 217.
152. A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A33514, Oct. 19/Nov. 1, 1915 report.




the November 24/December 7, 1915 session, when the Senate decided to
consider the bill only after the bill was reported to it. As Bayur ob-
served, "[t]wo and a half months had elapsed since the bill was intro-
duced and the Chamber of Deputies hadn't even begun to consider it.
Clearly, the Parliament was intent on sanctioning the application of the
Temporary Law while putting Riza's bill 'to sleep.' "154
During the November 30/December 13, 1915 session, Senator Riza
once more raised his voice, this time protesting the subversion of the
Constitution, which forbade the implementation of any law before the
Parliament passes it in session. Since the law had been introduced in the
Chamber of Deputies after the Chamber had convened, Riza argued, the
matter became the concern of the Legislative branch. Focusing on the
key elements of the Temporary Law, the Senator raised the following
objection:
It is unlawful to designate the Armenian assets and properties as 'aban-
doned goods' [emvah metruke] for the Armenians, the proprietors, did not
abandon their properties voluntarily; they were forcibly, compulsively
[zorla, cebren] removed from their domiciles and exiled. Now the govern-
ment through its officials is selling their goods .... Nobody can sell my
property if I am unwilling to sell it. Article 21 of the Constitution forbids
it. If we are a constitutional regime functioning in accordance with consti-
tutional law we can't do this. This is atrocious. Grab my arm, eject me
from my village, then sell my goods and properties, such a thing can never
be permissible. Neither the conscience of the Ottomans nor the law can
allow it.
155
In his November 4, 1915 communication to the State Department,
Morgenthau confirmed the occurrence of these debates. He further dis-
closed that Talat himself exerted the greatest pressure upon Senator Riza
by threatening to initiate more severe measures against the Armenians
should Riza continue his agitation on their behalf: "From other sources
it is stated that the Cabinet promised to modify their attitude towards the
Armenians if Ahmed Riza and his friends would agree not to interpellate
the government. This Ahmed Riza and his friends did."' 156 The Tempo-
154. Id. at 46-49.
155. Id. at 48. Dr. Harry Stiirmer, the Istanbul correspondent of the German daily news-
paper K6lnische Zeitung, relates an incident at the same Parliament when war lord Enver,
Talat's acolyte, "went so far as to hurl the epithet 'shameless dog' [edebsiz kdpek] at Ahmed
Riza in the Senate without being called to order by the President." H. STORMER, supra note
138, at 256; see also ZWEI KRIEGSJAHRE IN KONSTANTINOPEL. SKIZZEN DEUTSCH-JUNG-
TORKISCHER MORAL UND POLITIK 232 (1917).
156. R.G. (L) 59, 867.00/797 1/2, U.S. FOREIGN REL. L. at 763. Further confirmation of
the purported accommodation between Senator Riza and the Ittihad government can be found
in A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A33514.
The importance of economic motives in the genocide is highlighted by the following inci-
dent. Ambassador Morgenthau wrote in the diary he kept during the war:
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rary Law was thus left intact. A Turkish Armistice government facing
the victorious Allies1 57 subsequently annulled the law on January 8,
1920, but the insurgent Kemalists reversed the anullment on September
14, 1922.158
During the November-December 1918 hearings of the Fifth Commit-
tee of the Ottoman Chamber, investigating, among other things, the war-
time massacres, several Turkish Deputies took former Justice Minister
Ibrahim to task over the illegal aspects of the expropriation. One of them
pointed out the widespread "robberies and plunders" that were commit-
ted in the course of the confiscations."1 59 Ibrahim conceded that
"abuses" occurred which his government investigated. 160 Other ob-
servors were less charitable in their analysis. The Swiss historian Zur-
linden, in a detailed study of the Armenian genocide, quoted "a
knowledgeable German" source who stated: "What really happened was
an expropriation carried out on the greatest scale against 1.5 million citi-
zens."161 American Consul Jackson pointed to the major role the confis-
cation played in the genocidal scheme of the Turkish government,
identifying the genocide as "a gigantic plundering scheme as well as a
final blow to extinguish the [Armenian] race."1 62 Turkish historian
Dogan Avcioglu confirms this point stating that after the European inter-
One day Talaat made what was perhaps the most asonishing request I had ever heard.
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Equitable Life of New York had for
years done considerable business among the Armenians. The extent to which this people
insured their lives was merely another indication of their thrifty habits.
"I wish," Talaat now said, "that you would get the American life insurance companies
to send us a complete list of their Armenian policy holders. They are practically all dead
now and have left no heirs to collect the money. It of course all escheats to the State. The
Government is the beneficiary now. Will you do so?"
This was almost too much, and I lost my temper. "You will get no such list from me,"
I said and I got up and left him.
H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 339.
157. G. JAESCHKE, I TORK INKILABI TARIHI KRONOLOJISI 1918-1923 (The Chronology
of the Turkish Revolution) 61 (N.R. Aksu trans. 1939) (citing TAKVIMI VEKAYI No. 3747).
158. Id. at 136 (citing I KAVANIN MECMUASi 482 (1922) (the Code of Public Laws of the
newly established Ankara government)). There are several works treating the issue of confis-
cations during the war. After extensive legal debate, four prominent experts in international
law decided that the Armenian survivors were entitled to reclaim their properties and assets,
and to massive indemnities. These arguments are compiled in a book by COMITt CENTRAL
DES REFUGIIS ARMtNIENS, CONFISCATION DES BIENS DES REFUGIIS ARMtNIENS PAR LE
GOUVERNEMENT TURC (1929). Some more recent works are K. BAGHDJIAN, LA CONFISCA-
TION PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT TURC DES BIENS ARMtNIENS... DiTS ABANDONNtS (1987);
S. TORIGUIAN, supra note 113, at 85-96; L. VARTAN, HAIGAGAN DASNUHINKU YEV
HAYERU LUKIAL KOUYKERU (The Armenian 1915 and the Abandoned Goods of the
Armenians) (1970).
159. WAR CABINETS' HEARINGS, supra note 144, at 522.
160. Id. at 527.
161. 2 S. ZURLINDEN, DER WELTKRIEG 596 (1918).




ventions of 1856-78, "[t]here emerged a need to radically solve this prob-
lem. The nationalization of the economy was the complementary part of
this policy .. .Among those who quickly enriched themselves in the
process of the expropriation of the Armenians were [Ittihad] party in-
fluentials, ex-officers serving as party operatives, and Turkish
immigrants." 6
3
Neither the Temporary Law on Deportations nor the Temporary Law
of Expropriation and Confiscation referred specifically to the Armenians
or, in fact, to any nationality. During the secret Parliamentary debates
of the fledgling Turkish Republic after World War I, however, Turkish
Deputies were told that the general terms were used to conceal the true
purposes of the law from the Armenians. This fact emerged during the
debate on April 3, 1924, when Deputy Musa Kazim objected to article 2
of a draft fiscal bill which used the cover formula, "a political body of
people" (siyasi zimre) to target non-Muslim minorities. He argued that:
"[t]he guilt of a person should be determined in a court of law. In my
opinion, the insertion in a bill of economic character of a clause smacking
of politics is very much out of place. It is a shame. I implore you to let
us remove it."164 In responding to this objection, former Finance Minis-
ter Hasan Fehmi, representing the Parliamentary Commission in charge
of preparing the bill in question, explained the rationale of secretly
targetting non-Muslims, given the risks of specifically identifying them in
the bill. He said that the Commission had secretly made a deal with the
Finance Minister to the effect that the Muslims were to be excluded from
the application of the law. In this connection, he revealed the fact that
the same procedure had been adopted during the war when the Septem-
ber 13/26, 1915 Temporary Law on Expropriaton and Confiscation was
ingtituted:
Not a single Muslim's goods were liquidated ... you can establish these
facts by examining the old records of the secret deliberations. The Parlia-
ment at that time secretly secured reassurances from the Finance Minister
that the law would not apply to Muslims who had fled as a result of war.
163. 3 D. AVCIO6LU, MILLI KURTULU§ TARIHI (History of the National Liberation)
1137, 1141 (1974). Sina Ak§in likewise maintains that the Armenian deportations were imple-
mented in pursuit of economic goals which eliminated minority dominance and competiton in
business and industry, allowing Muslins to control these areas. See SINA AK§IN, 100 SORUDA
JON TORKLER VE ITTIHAT VE TERAKKI (Ittihad ve Terakki in the Context of 100 Questions)
283 (1980).
164. 4 TORKIYE BOYOK MILLET MECLISI GIZLI CELSE ZABITLARI 429 (1985) (Tran-
scripts of the Secret Sessions of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, March 2, 1923-
October 25, 1934) (28th secret session, second sitting).
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Only after registering this assurance did we proclaim to the world that law.
Presently, we are repeating that procedure.
165
Deputy Kfzim withdrew his motion and the bill was approved.
166
3. The Genocidal Killings
Contrary to the avowals of Ottoman authorities who promulgated
these emergency laws, the Armenians did not return from the deporta-
tion. 167 The deportations proved to be a cover for the ensuing destruc-
tion. As American Ambassador Morgenthau observed:
The real purpose of the deportation was robbery and destruction; it really
represented a new method of massacre. When the Turkish authorities gave
the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death war-
rant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations
with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact. 168
By official Turkish accounts alone, those directly killed numbered about
800,000,169 not counting the tens of thousands of wartime conscripts liq-
uidated by the military. To quote Morgenthau again:
In many instances Armenian soldiers were disposed of in even more sum-
mary fashion, for it now became almost the general practice to shoot them
in cold blood. In almost all cases the procedure was the same. Here and
there squads of 50 or 100 men would be taken, bound together in groups of
four, and then marched out to a secluded spot a short distance from the
village. Suddenly the sound of rifle shots would fill the air, and the Turkish
soldiers who had acted as the escort would sullenly return to camp. Those
sent to bury the bodies would find them almost invariably stark naked, for,
as usual, the Turks had stolen all their clothes. In cases that came to my
attention, the murderers had added a refinement to the victims' sufferings
by compelling them to dig their graves before being shot.17
0
In a message to his Ambassador in Istanbul (October 2, 1916), German
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Zimmermann, who six weeks later re-
165. Id.
166. Id. The Finance Minister at the time was Mustafa Abdulhalik, who was present at
the sitting and promised to execute the law as formulated. His pivotal role in the Armenian
Genocide as governor of two large provinces, Bitlis and Aleppo, and as deputy to Talat in the
Interior Ministry is discussed in supra note 124, and in Dadrian, infra note 169, at 331-32,
336-38. It is noteworthy that during the debate several Deputies singled out the Jews with the
derogatory Turkish epithet "Mi§on," denouncing them as the real "blood-suckers" of Turkey
and insisting that the law should apply to them with special emphasis. Id. at 430-31.
167. S. SHAW & E. SHAW, 2 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY
315 (1977). The authors completely ignore the deceptiveness of these avowals.
168. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 309.
169. This figure was released by a post-war Turkish Interior Minister relying on statistics
compiled by his Ministry. See Dadrian, supra note 124, at 342. In a recent volume by a
Turkish historian this figure is confirmed as a more or less accurate computation by Turkish
authorities. 3:4 Y. BAYUR, supra note 124, at 787 (1983).
170. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 302-03.
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placed Jagow as Foreign Minister, denounced the exterminations accom-
panying the deportations, including the forcible "mass conversions" to
Islam of Armenian children whose parents had been killed, as cause for
"indignation in the entire civilized world." 171 He added that he had dis-
cussed his feelings on this point with Turkish Foreign Minister Halil. In
that communication Zimmermann used the expression "with an appear-
ance of legality" when describing the official deportation measures. 172
C. The Disguises of the Law of Deportation and Ancillary Acts
1. Ultimate Responsibility for the Deportation
Ultimate responsibility for.these measures must lie with members of
the Ittihad party. Ittihad was able to accomplish the anti-Armenian
measures through its powerful stranglehold on the Turkish government.
Indeed, to fully understand the de facto power structure of the Ottoman
government in wartime emergency conditions, one must recognize that
the executive branch's actions were substantially freed from the restraints
of the already emasculated legislature. 173 At the same time, the military
and the quasi-military gained a preponderance of authority, legitimized
by the very same executive. Superseding these institutions was the autoc-
racy of Ittihad, a monolithic political party that dominated the state
apparatus.
As noted above, the Temporary Law of Deportation 74 was railroaded
through the Cabinet Council in May, 1915, when the deportations were
already well underway. By resorting to this unauthorized tactic "Inte-
rior Minister Talat singlehandedly assumed a very grave responsibility
... he probably wanted to forestall some opposition in the Cabinet."
175
The fourth article of that law, rarely publicized in pertinent literature,
contains two stipulations. The first charged the War Minister with exe-
cuting the deportations (meriyeti ahkdm). This stipulation was conso-
nant with the Monarch's prerogatives spelled out in article 7 of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, the Interior Ministry and its subsidiary of-
fices, including the provincial centers of administration, security, police,
and gendarmery forces, actually organized and administered the deporta-
171. Two prominent Turkish authors likewise denounced the practice of forcing Islam on
Armenian orphans. See H. EDIB, THE TURKISH ORDEAL 16 (1928); D. AvcIO6LU, supra
note 163, at 1141.
172. A.A. KONSTANTINOPEL 174/27, and A.A. TORKEI 183/44 A26071, corroborated by
the Turkish author A.E. Yalman in his memoirs, infra note 180, at 332.
173. Tu'kish historian Bayur mentions that attitude of War Minister Enver as typical in
this respect. Enver's contempt for the-procedures of orderly enactment of laws was expressed
in his motto: "If there is no [corresponding] law then make up law and [thus] you have law"
(yok kanun, yap kanun, var kanun). 3:2 Y. BAYUR, supra note 124, at 400 (1955).
174. For the text of the law, see supra note 142.
175. Y. BAYUR, supra note 124, at 38.
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tions.176 The second stipulation refers to the formal promulgation of the
law by the Parliament "in its next session," as provided by Article 36 of
the Ottoman Constitution. There is no evidence that this formal promul-
gation occurred when the temporarily suspended Parliament reconvened
on September 28, 1915.
Interior Minister Talat reveals in his memoirs that the suspension of
Parliament was directly connected to the intended anti-Armenian meas-
ures. 177 The architects of the "deportation" felt that as long as the Par-
liament was in session, they could take no effective counter-measures
against the Armenians in response to the anti-Turkish acts that were be-
ing attributed to them. Moreover, suspending Parliament allowed the
Deputies to return to their electoral districts and inform their constituen-
cies about the Armenian danger. The Supreme Directorate of Ittihad
made the decision to suspend Parliament on March 1, 1915 to facilitate
the deportations. 178 This marks one more instance in which Ittihad, a
political party, substituted its will for government policy, in this case pre-
empting the legislative branch.
2. The Special Organization (Telkilatt Mahsusa)
During this time, Ittihadist leaders secretly formed a unit called the
Special Organization, one of whose principal purposes was resolving the
Armenian question. Equipped with special codes, funds, cadres, weap-
ons, and ammunition, they functioned as a semi-autonomous "state
within the state."'179 Their mission was to deploy in remote areas of Tur-
key's interior and to ambush and destroy convoys of Armenian depor-
tees.' 80 The cadres consisted almost entirely of convicted criminals,
released from the Empire's prisons by a special dispensation issued by the
176. Id. at 40; see also C. PA§A, supra note 120, at 440.
177. 2 C. KUTAY, TALAT PA§ANIN GURBET HATIRALARI (The Memoirs of Talat Papa in
Exile) 907 (1983). Specifically, the proposal was made by Ittihad General-Secretary Mithat
iikrii (Bleda).
178. This termination one and a half months earlier than stipulated by the law (Feb. 11,
1915 Amendment of art. 35 of the Constitution), necessitated the reconvening of the Parlia-
ment on Sept. 28, 1915, one and a half months sooner than the normal date. Jischke, Die
Entwicklung des osmanischen Verfassungstaates von den Anfdngen bis zur Gegenwart, 5 DIE
WELT DES ISLAMS 37 (1917).
179. C. KUTAY, BIRINcI DONYA HARBINDE TE§KILATI MAHSUSA (The Special Organi-
zation During World War I) 38 (1962). Most of the data contained in this book was supplied
by one of the special organization's founders and chiefs, E. Ku§cuba§t.
180. In his July 27, 1915 report to his Chancellor in Berlin, Germany's Aleppo Consul
Rbssler described the Special Organization massacre details as "convicts, released from the
prisons, and put in military uniform. They were deployed on locations through which the
doomed deportee convoys were scheduled to pass." A.A. TORKEI 183/38, A23991; see also J.
LEPSIUS, supra note 116, at 11; 1 A. YALMAN, YAKIN TARIHTE GORDOKLERIM VE IIT-




Ministries of both Interior and Justice.18 1 In his testimony before the
Fifth Committee of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies on November 10,
1918, ex-Justice Minister Ibrahim acknowledged such a release of con-
victs from the prisons. 1 82 The application for Imperial Legal Authoriza-
tion (Irade) to form the Special Organization was deliberately framed in
a "vague formula to deflect attention from its secret goals"; this formula
invoked "national ideals and objectives to be ensured through solidarity
and cohesiveness to secure which will be the purpose of the
Organization." 
183
The stated responsibilities of the Special Organization included intelli-
gence, counter espionage, and preventing sabotage. The writings of two
Turkish authors who had access to secrets of the Special Organization,
however, indicate that its actual duty was the execution of the Armenian
genocide. Kutay alluded to the Ittihad Central Committee's covert
objectives in setting up the Special Organization as involving "the vital
interests of Turkey which could not be openly acknowledged as being
part of Ittihad's program";184 the other, a principal Special Organization
chief who "had assumed duties" in connection with the Armenian depor-
tations, admitted to having accomplished things which the government
and law enforcement agencies "absolutely couldn't," namely, "the execu-
tion of measures against non-Turkish nationality population clusters."'
' 85
Turkish historian Avcioglu was even more direct. He wrote:
In order to radically solve the Armenian question, Ittihad through the Spe-
cial Organization resorted to systematic and large scale deportations. Hun-
dreds of thousands of Armenians were in a very short time and en masse
taken to spots outside Anatolia. This policy, supported by the Germans,
181. F. ATAY, ZEYTINDAdI 35-36 (1981).
182. WAR CABINETS' HEARINGS, supra note 179, at 537. Western sources estimate the
number of these convicts between 30,000, E. DOUMERGUE, L' ARM9NIE, LES MASSACRES ET
LA QUESTION D'ORIENT 24-25 (1916), and 34,000, 2 S. ZURLINDEN, supra note 161, at 657.
183. C. KUTAY, supra note 179, at 39. In touching on this point of deflection, political
scientist Melson argues with reference to the massacres of the Hamidian era, that thereby
"massacre could achieve the desired results without clearly implicating the central govern-
ment." Melson, supra note 82, at 507. As noted above in supra note 135, another American
author specializing in the missions of the Special Organization suggests that the authorities
used the organization to shift the onus for their perpetrations to "groups of brigands" which
could not be controlled from Istanbul. P. STODDARD, supra note 135, at 49, 50.
184. 3 C. KUTAY, supra note 177, at 1299. The writings of two officers within the Special
Organization also confirm the direct involvement of the Ittihad Central Committee. In his
memoirs, the lieutenant colonel of the Special Organization conceded that Central Committee
authorized the anti-Armenian measures which led to the massacres, describing these measures
as reprisals against Armenian "insurgents." H. ERTORK, infra note 364, at 217, 327. The
lieutenant colonel's right hand man likewise maintained that the Ittihad's Central Committee,
a sort of directorate under Talat, formulated special plans for the Special Organization's mis-
sions. G. VARDAR, ITTIHAD VE TERAKKI I(INDE DONENLER (The Inside Story of Ittihad ve
Terakki) 244-46, 274 (S. Tansu ed. 1960).
185. C. KUTAY, supra note 179, at 38, 78.
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was sponsored in'the Councils of Ittihad by Dr. Bedaeddin akir... The
liquidation of the Christian elements was decided upon outside the auspices
of the official government and at the headquarters of the Ittihad, following
deliberations that lasted months. Young officers whom the Ittihad trusted
were recalled to Istanbul and were briefed [on the missions with which they
were] entrusted.18
6
These covert missions of the Special Organization were first exposed
through the efforts of the Turkish press. On November 4, 1918, ten days
after the signing of the Armistice, the Turkish daily Hadisat, in an open
letter to Grand Vezir Izzet, first mentioned publicly the existence and
wartime criminal activities of this organization.187 In December, the
press reported the statements, made during a debate in the Chamber by
the Turkish Deputy from Trabzon, mentioning the Special Organization
as the principal tool of the massacres and admitting that "up until now
we had remained silent about all this."'188 In an open letter to the Justice
Minister, the opposition daily Sabah provided the most explicit public
exposure of the Special Organization's existence and the complicity of
the Justice Minister in its activities:
Did you not drop by every morning at Talat's home to receive your atro-
cious orders from that brigand chief [getebali]? Did you not, as a result of a
decision reached at Ittihad's party headquarters, release from the central
prison of Istanbul the most ferocious murderers so that they could kill with
axes the innocent Armenians in the vicinity of towns and villages of which
they were the inhabitants? Did you not order similar releases from prisons
in the provinces? Was it not the general purpose to select the most blood-
thirsty murderers and enroll them in the brigand cadres [of the Special Or-
ganization] for which end you appointed the procuror-general of the
Appellate Court, whereas [the] War Minister was represented by a high
ranking officer? Furthermore, was not a physician appointed also to deter-
mine whether the selected convicts would be fit to apply a degree of say-
186. 3 D. AvcIOOLU, supra note 163, at 1114, 1135. Reference should be made to the
following findings made by British political and military intelligence. When reporting to
London about the Court Martial death sentence against §akir, British High Commissioner
Admiral John de Robeck wrote, "He was a member of the small secret Committe known as
Teshkilati Mahsusa [the Special Organization] formed by the Central Committee of the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress [the Ittihad] to organize the extermination of the Armenian
race." FO 371/5089/E949, Feb. 18, 1920 report. An intelligence report prepared by the Is-
tanbul branch of the M.I.L.C. likewise stated: "Teshkilati Mahsusa [was] created by the CUP
in 1914 for the extermination of the Armenians and was controlled by the infamous Behaeddin
Shakir." FO 371/5171/E12228, at 7 (August 29, 1920).
187. HADISAT (Istanbul), November 4, 1918.
188. JHAMANAG (Istanbul), December 12, 1918; ARIAMARD (Istanbul), December 12,
1918. The deputy was Hafiz Mehmet, who later became the Interior Minister in the fledgling
Turkish Republic and was executed in July, 1926 on charges of conspiring against the life of





agery of killing desired by you? Did not the formation of the brigand
criminals take place in the office of the same procuror-general of the Appel-
late Court which was located just below your own office? Did not this orga-
nizational work continue for weeks during which one could observe the
prison convicts being brought to the corridors located outside of the offices
of the procuror-general, the chamber of the Criminal Court, and the Court-
room itself?' 89
In his November 9, 1918, testimony before the Ottoman Parliament's
Fifth Committee investigating "the misdeeds" of the Cabinet Ministers,
Grand Vezir Sait Halim twice stated that the Cabinet had not authorized
the formation of the Special Organization. The Organization, which he
called "a very bad thing," was thus constituted outside the purview of
the government. 190 The Justice Minister made the same statement. 91
Both officials admitted that the purpose of the deportations was sub-
verted, as the Grand Vezir clearly testified, to "killing." In this connec-
tion, in one paragraph he used the term "massacre" three times,
dropping entirely the term "deportation."' 192
A captain of the Ottoman War Office's Intelligence Department, sub-
sequently a professor of history at Istanbul University and a prolific au-
thor, wrote of the massacres:
The criminal gangs who were released from the prisons, after a week's
training at the War College's training grounds, were sent off to the Cauca-
sian front as the brigands of the Special Organization, perpetrating the
worst crimes against the Armenians... The Ittihadists intended to destroy
the Armenians, and thereby to do away with the Question of the Eastern
Provinces. 1
93
3. Efforts to Disguise Responsibility and Intent: A Challenge for
Punishment
On May 24, 1915, the Allies declared the Turkish government and its
officials responsible for the massacres then in progress. Despite the con-
tinuance of the government-sponsored Armenian genocide, the Otto-
mans responded to the declaration by carefully disguising the intent
behind the anti-Armenian massacres. The Turkish response stated that
the Ottoman government "considers its principal duty to resort to any
measure it deems appropriate for safeguarding the security (muhafazat
emniyet) of its borders, and feels, therefore, that it has no obligation
189. SABAH (Istanbul), Nov. 21, 1918.
190. WAR CABINETS' HEARINGS, supra note 144, at 308, 309.
191. Id. at 534, 535.
192. Id. at 290, 293-94.
193. A. REFIK, supra note 133, at 23.
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whatsoever to give an account to any foreign government." 94 This state-
ment implicitly relied upon the rule of international law that "the state is
entitled to treat its own citizens at discretion."'' 95 At the same time, the
Turkish declaration served as an artful deflection, hedging against the
criminal consequences of intent. Ultimately, the question of intent be-
came the cardinal challenge to the ensuing prosecution. As one legal
scholar pointed out, "governments less stupid than that of National So-
cialist Germany will never admit the intent to destroy a group as such,
but will tell the world that they are acting against the traitors .... ,1"96
Laws enacted under such conditions and rationale run the risk of being
sham laws transforming the principle of legality into willful license. The
intent of the crime of genocide can be located precisely in that particular
zone which separates the stated purposes of the law from the conse-
quences of its application. When massive deportations culminate in mass
destruction, the law covering the former betrays a criminal intent to
achieve the latter. The religious strain in the Ottoman-Turkish martial
legacy only reinforced that intent. The proclamation. of holy war (cihad)
on November 11, 1914,197 carefully planned beforehand, proved an expe-
dient catalyst in that respect, despite the fact that it was formally aimed
at the Entente powers, i.e., France, England and Russia, while excluding
Turkey's equally Christian allies Germany and Austria.
III. The Aftermath: Efforts Toward Punishment
As World War I ended, the Allies focused attention on punishment for
the war crimes committed against the Armenians. At first, the Allies
attempted to apply principles of international law to the perpetrators of
the massacres. The initial impulse to seek justice, however, faded in the
months after the war and eventually gave way to political expediency.
The Turkish government's attempts to bring its own nationals to justice
also faltered. The rise of nationalism, and the Turkish populace's in-
creasingly defiant attitude toward the Allies, weakened the government's
resolve in its quest for justice. This weakened resolve and the Allies' own
waning interest sabotaged the efforts to punish those responsible for the
genocide.
194. E. URAS, supra note 141, at 621 (1950); in the 1976 edition the editors instead use the
expression "public safety" (genel gilvenlik), at 612.
195. 1 L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 583 (7th ed. 1948).
196. Finch, The Genocide Convention, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. 743 (1949).
197. For a discussion of the holy war proclamation itself, see P. STODDARD, supra note




A. Allied Attempts at Retributive Justice
When Turkey signed the Armistice on October 30, 1918, she lay at the
mercy of the European Allies. 198 Churchill described Turkey as being
"under the spell of defeat, and of deserved defeat." 199 Similarly, British
Foreign Minister Curzon denounced Turkey as "a culprit awaiting sen-
tence. ' '2z° Turkey's "culpability," in Allied eyes, involved mainly war
crimes and crimes against her own citizens. The Allies, pursuant to their
warning in May, 1915, initiated criminal proceedings against Turkish of-
ficials suspected of complicity in the Armenian massacres.
1. The Judicial Arm of the Paris Peace Conference
In January, 1919, the Preliminary Peace Congress in Paris established
the Commission on Responsibilities and Sanctions. Chaired by U.S. Sec-
retary of State Lansing, its First Subcommission (also known as the
Commission of Fifteen) examined, among other offenses, "barbarous and
illegitimate methods of warfare." This included the category of "offenses
against the laws and customs of war, and the principles of humanity,"
which the French representative of the Third Subcommission, Larnaude,
insisted was "absolutely" necessary to ensure human rights.
20 1
The Commission of Fifteen proceeded in its investigation according to
the terms of the Fourth Hague Convention. This Convention, part of the
1907 Second Peace Conference, was intended to give "a fresh develop-
ment to the humanitarian principles [towards] evolving a lofty concep-
tion of the common welfare of humanity. °20 2 In the Preamble of the
Convention, the Contracting Parties attempted to guarantee that "the
inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and governance
of the principles of the law of the nations, derived from the usages estab-
lished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the
198. Having not declared war against Turkey until April 1917, the United States did not at
that time maintain a belligerent status toward Turkey.
199. W. CHURCHILL, supra note 132, at 367.
200. 4 DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939 661 (First Series, W. Wood-
ward & R. Butler eds. 1952) (Statement of Minister Curzon, July 4, 1919).
201. FO 608/246, Procs-Verbal no. 6, at 57 (folio 417)(Mar. 8, 1919). For a description
of the gradual emergence in the Allied countries' political and legal circles of an agreement to
punish the Central Powers' civilian and military officials suspected of war- or atrocity-crimes,
see J. READ, ATROCITY PROPAGANDA 1914-19 240-84 (1941); for details of the Commission
deliberations see id. at 254-65. The work of the Commission was divided into three areas with
three corresponding subcommittees: (1) Criminal Offenses respecting (a) violation of peace
through aggression and (b) war crimes; (2) Responsibilities of the War involving the offenders
covered under (1)(a) above and their criminal liabilities and their possible prosecution; (3)
Violations of the laws of war affecting the offenders covered under (1)(b) above and their
criminal liabilities and possible prosecution. Lansing headed this last Sub-committee, other-
wise called the Commission of Fifteen.
202. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 113, at 24.
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dictates of public conscience. ' 20 3 It was in this context that Nicolas
Politis, a member of the Commission of Fifteen and Foreign Minister of
Greece, proposed the adoption of a new category of war crimes meant to
cover the massacres against the Armenians, declaring: "Technically
these acts did not come within the provisions of the penal code, but they
constituted grave offenses against] the law of humanity. '20 4 Despite the
objections of American representatives Lansing and Scott, who chal-
lenged the ex-post facto nature of such a law, the majority of the Com-
mission "hesitatingly" concurred with Politis.205 The Commission based
its decision upon a Hague Convention principle which allowed for reli-
ance upon "the laws of humanity" and "dictates of public conscience"
20 6
whenever clearly defined standards and regulations to deal with grave
offenses were lacking.
A March 5, 1919 report by the Commission specified the following
violations against civilian populations: systematic terror; murders and
massacres; dishonoring of women; confiscation of private property; pil-
lage; seizing of goods belonging to communities, educational establish-
ments and charities; arbitrary destruction of public and private goods;
deportation and forced labor; execution of civilians under false allega-
tions of war crimes; and violations against civilians as well as military
personnel. 20 7 The Commission's final report, dated March 29, 1919,
spoke of "the clear dictates of humanity" which were abused "by the
Central Empires together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by bar-
barous or illegitimate methods" including "the violation of ... the laws
of humanity. ' 20 8 The report concluded that "all persons belonging to
enemy countries ... who have been guilty of offenses against the laws
and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prose-
cution. ' 20 9 Prompted by the Belgian jurist Rolin Jaequemeyns, the
203. Id. at 25. See also FINAL ACT OF THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE, THE HAGUE
(1907) (Cmd. 4175) (1914), reprinted in 36 Stat. 2277, Treaty Series No. 539, with Annex.
204. J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 157.
205. Id.
206. When a Committee of Jurists in 1920 was commissioned by the Council of the League
of Nations to prepare the Statute of Permanent Court of International Justice, the issues of
humanity and civilization surfaced again. Baron Descamps of Belgium, the Chairman, in-
jected into the concept of international law not only such rules as were "recognized by the
civilized nations but also by the demands of public conscience [and] the dictates of the legal
conscience of civilized nations." After much debate, including the objections of Elihu Root,
the American representative, the Committee adopted his revised version, the third point of
which referred to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." P.C.I.J.,
ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, Procs-Verbaux of the Committee, June 16-July 24, 1920,
at 310, 318, 331, 344.
207. See Articles 1, 23, 46, 53, and 56 of the Fourth Hague Convention, FO 608/246,
Procs-Verbal, Annexe. 2e Rapport, at 60.
208. VIOLATIONS, supra note 12, at 19.
209. Id. The dissenting American members were Robert Lansing and James Scott, who




Commission included, albeit did not sharply highlight, the crimes which
Turkey was accused of having perpetrated against her Armenian
citizens.
2 10
As a result of the Commission's efforts, several articles stipulating the
trial and punishment of those responsible for the genocide were inserted
into the Peace Treaty of S~vres,. signed on August 10, 1920.211 Under
article 226, "the Turkish government recognize[d]" this right of trial and
punishment by the Allied Powers, "notwithstanding any proceedings or
prosecution before a tribunal in Turkey. ' 2 12 Moreover, Turkey was obli-
gated to surrender "all persons accused of having committed an act in
violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by
name or by rank, office or employment which they held under Turkish
authorities. ' 2 13 Under article 230 of the Peace Treaty, Turkey was fur-
ther obligated
to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may be
required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed dur-
ing the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of
the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914. The Allied powers reserve to them-
selves the right to designate the tribunal which shall try the persons so ac-
cused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognize such tribunal.
The provisions of Article 228 apply to the cases dealt with in this
Article.
2 14
The Treaty of S~vres, therefore, provided for international adjudica-
tion of the crimes perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the
Armenians during World War I. Unfortunately, these provisions never
came into force. As discussed in the following. section, political tensions
within the Allied Powers and nationalistic passions in Turkey eventually
led to the scrapping of this Treaty.
2. The Legal Gropings of the British
While the international community was attempting to pursue the pun-
ishment of the Turkish war criminals under international law, the British
were likewise attempting to bring these accused mass murderers to jus-
their Merhorandum of Reservations, they maintained that the law and principles of humanity
were not "a standard certain" to be found in legal treatises of authority and in international
law practices. They argued that these laws and principles do vary within different periods of a
legal system, between different legal systems, and with different circumstances. In other
words, they declared that there is no fixed and universal standard of humanity, and that a
judicial organ only relies on existing law when administering it.
210. See FO 608/246, Third Session, Feb. 20, 1919, at 20 (folio 163).
211. 1920 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11.
212. Id. See also J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 180.
213. J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 180-81.
214. Id. at 181.
Yale Journal of International Law
tice. Their efforts, however, proved no more successful than those em-
bodied in the Treaty of S~vres.
a. The High Commission -and the Law Officers of the Crown
The immediate task facing the Allies following the Armistice was the
treatment of the enemies' accused war criminals. The crimes charged fell
into two major categories. The first concerned "the mistreatment" of
war prisoners, mostly British; the second referred to "deportations and
massacres," principally against the Armenians. 215 The sudden escape
from Istanbul of the seven top Young Turk leaders aboard a German
destroyer on the night of November 1-2, 1918, catalyzed action against
the remaining high ranking officials and party leaders. As Richard
Webb, Rear Admiral and Deputy High Commissioner at Istanbul, wired
then British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour: "There is hardly
an organ of the Press which is not vehemently attacking these men...
for their share in the massacres. 216 Describing the flight of these seven
Turks in his memoirs, the Secretary-General of Ittihad, who stayed be-
hind, indicated that the complicity of the fugitives in Armenian "depor-
tations" was the chief reason for their flight.
217
On January 18, 1919, British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe
told the Turkish Foreign Minister, "His Majesty's Government are re-
solved to have proper punishment inflicted on those responsible for Ar-
menian massacres. 218 Ten days later, Calthorpe wired London, "It was
pointed out to [the Turkish] Government that when [the] massacres be-
came known in England, British Statesmen had promised [the] civilized
world that persons connected would be held personally responsible and
that it was [the] firm intention of H.M. Government to fulfill [that]
promise. ' 219 Deputy High Commissioner Webb, in an April 3, 1919 ci-
pher telegram to the Peace Conference in Paris, declared:
To punish all persons guilty of Armenian atrocities would necessitate
wholesale execution of Turks and I therefore suggest punishment should
rather take the form of, nationally, dismemberment of [the] late Turkish
215. FO 371/4174/129560, at 2 (acting Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Tilley's July 10, 1919 communication to the Law Officers of the Crown).
216. FO 371/3411/210534 (folio 334).
217. M. BLEDA, IMPARATORLUdUN (;6KO§0 (The Collapse of the Empire) 124 (1979).
218. FO 371/4174/118377 (folio 253).
219. Id. On March 20, 1919, the Director of British Military Intelligence relayed to the
U.S. State Department a February 27, 1919 report from British Military Attach6 Brigadier-
General W.H. Deedes to General Allenby in which Deedes declared, "H.M. Government not
only desired the punishment of massacrers, but intended to secure it.. .they would never forget




Empire and, individually, in trial of high officials such as those on my lists
whose fate will serve as an example.220
Punishment, however, required appropriate jurisdiction, legal evi-
dence, penal codes, and the machinery to administer the applicable laws.
The British were quite sensitive to the need to separate executive from
judicial acts and to bar, as much as possible, political considerations from
intruding into legal proceedings. Many British jurists insisted that the
British Military Courts in occupied zones carry out the trial and punish-
ment of Turkish offenders in accordance with the "Common Law of
War." The "Common Law of War," it was argued, subsumed the viola-
tions of the customs and laws of war.22 1 An authoritative opinion, issued
by the Law Officers of the Crown in response to a detailed inquiry from
the Foreign Office, clarified the legal ramifications of the alternatives.
The Law Officers maintained, for example, that British Military Courts
in occupied territories could proceed with such trials "if this course has
the sanction of the British Government. The matter is not within the
sphere of municipal law, but is governed by the customs of war and rules
of international law[, hence] there is no legal objection. ' 222 In addition,
such courts could try persons for any offenses committed outside the
zones of occupation, provided that there is "the consent of the Turkish
Government to the exercise of the jurisdiction. '223
Speaking strictly of crimes such as the Armenian massacres, the Law
Officers considered it preferable that such crimes "be reserved for dispo-
sal under the provisions of the Peace Treaty, and that there is no legal
objection to the detention of these offenders. Such detention is an act of
State, the propriety of which cannot be questioned by any court of
law."' 224 Because the British felt that the Turkish government was inca-
220. FO 371/4173/53351 (folios 192-93). There was similar agitation in the United States,
where in the fall of 1918 Charles H. Livermore of the World Peace Foundation drew up a list
of eleven "outlaws of civilization" meriting "condign punishment." The list included the three
leading Young Turk leaders comprising the Ittihad triumvirate; i.e., Talat, Enver, and Cemal.
J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 43. A similar, but larger list, was prepared in 1917 in France by
Tancr~de Martel, an international law expert, who argued that the men he indicted deserved to
be tried as common criminals by ordinary civil and criminal courts of the Allied countries
because of the type and scope of the atrocities they were accused of having perpetrated. In its
final report, completed on Mar 29, 1919, the Commission on Responsibilities through Annex I,
Table 2, identified 13 Turkish categories of outrages liable to criminal prosecution. J. READ,
supra note 201, at 245, 266.
221. FO 608/244/8493 (folio 423), May 9, 1919 (Minutes by Lieutenant-Colonel J.H.
Morgan).
222. FO 371/4174/129560, at 2-3 (folio 430-31) (all emphasis in the original). The For-
eign Office inquiry was sent on July 10, 1919, by Acting Assistant Under-Secretary J.A.C.
Tilley. The Aug 7, 1919, response of the Law Officers was signed by Gordon Hewart and
Ernest M. Pollock.
223. Id. (folio 431).
224. Id.
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pable of dealing with their own offenders, the Crown Law Officers con-
cluded that it would be "practicable and desirable" to. "insert . . .a
provision quashing the [Turkish criminal proceedings]," and stipulating
that "the offenders should be disposed of in the same manner as is de-
cided upon for offenders in Allied custody.
'225
b. Transfer of the prima facie suspects from Turkish to British custody
Beginning in January, 1919, Turkish authorities, directed and often
pressured by Allied authorities in Istanbul, arrested and detained scores
of Turks. Those arrested comprised four groups: (1) the members of
Ittihad's Central Committee; (2) the two war-time Cabinet Ministers; (3)
a host of provincial governors; and (4) high ranking military officers
identified as organizers of wholesale massacres in their zones of author-
ity. The suspects were first taken to the Military Governor's headquar-
ters and were subsequently transferred to the military prison maintained
by the Turkish Defense Ministry. Their custody and the disposal of their
case by the Turkish judiciary, however, posed serious problems. 226 Fur-
thermore, events were complicated by political developments including:
(1) Greek occupation of Smyrna (Izmir) in May, 1919; (2) the massive
and demonstrative funeral, on April 12, 1919, of a district commissioner
following his trial, conviction, and execution by the Turkish Military Tri-
bunal for having been a principal perpetrator of Armenian massacres in
his district; and (3) the series of mass demonstrations at various locations
in Istanbul on May 20-23, 1919, challenging the Allied occupation forces
and asserting Turkish national rights. As one Turkish author wrote, the
danger of "storming the Bekiraga military prison in the style of the Bas-
tille raid" to free the high ranking prisoners was imminent.227 To mollify
the public, on May 21 the Ottoman Grand Vezir ordered the release of
forty-one prisoners. 228 Following that, the Interior Minister instructed
the Director of Police not to proceed with any more arrests for the time
225. Id.
226. See infra note 228.
227. B. IM§IR, MALTA SORGONLERI (The Malta Exiles) 113 (1976).
228. Id. Of these, twenty-six were ordered released by the Court Martial itself with the
assertion, "There is no case against them." SPECTATEUR D'ORIENT (Istanbul), May 21, 1919.
Admiral Calthorpe informed London regarding the forty.one Turks released from military
prison by Ottoman authorities that "there was every reason to believe, [they] were guilty of the
most heinous crimes... mainly in connection with massacres." FO 371/4174/88761 (folio 9)
(May 30, 1919). Referring to the Malta exiles, Foreign Office Near East specialist Edmonds
declared, "There is probably not one of these prisoners who does not deserve a long term of




being.229 These events prompted the British to initiate measures for the
transfer of the detainees to British custody in Mudros and Malta.230
Turkish officials resisted handing over the offenders for trial before an
international or inter-allied tribunal. They claimed that such a surrender
of Turkish subjects contradicted the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Em-
pire as recognized by England in the Armistice Agreement. As the
Turkish Foreign Minister argued, compliance with the demand for sur-
render by the Turkish Government
would be in direct contradiction with its sovereign rights in view of the fact
that by international law each State has [the] right to try its subjects for
crimes or misdemeanors committed in its own territory by its own tribu-
nals. Moreover, His Britannic Majesty having by conclusion of an armi-
stice with the Ottoman Empire recognized [the] latter as a de facto and de
jure sovereign State, it is incontestably evident that the Imperial Govern-
ment possesses all the prerogatives for freely exercising [the] principles in-
herent in its sovereignty.2 3 1
Despite this argument, the Commission of Responsibilities and Sanctions
of the Paris Peace Conference held that trials by national courts should
not bar legal proceedings by an international or an allied national tribu-
nal. On April 2, 1919, Foreign Minister Balfour stated that, should the
Turks persist in their recalcitrant attitude, "pressure should at least be
brought to bear upon them to refrain from instituting any form of pro-
ceedings against [the accused war criminals] until the Peace Conference
has decided as to their ultimate disposal. '2 32
On May 28, 1919, sixty-seven detainees were seized by surprise by the
British and removed from the military prison. Twelve of them, mostly
ex-Ministers, were taken to the island of Mudros, the rest to Malta. The
twelve ministers were eventually transferred to Malta, where the number
of prisoners rose to 118 by August, 1920.233
229. U.S. Admiralty Weekly Intelligence Report No. 15, R.G. 256, 867.002/10 (May 27,
1919). The British had decided in a February 25, 1919 conference that "it was undesirable to
leave it to the Turkish authorities to try to punish such offenders as could not be competently
tried by Military Courts." FO 608/244/3700 (folio 311-2). The participants of the conference
included representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, and Foreign Office.
230. FO 371/4174 No. 1302/1 G. (folio 125) (May 22, 1919), and FO 371/4174/88761
(May 30, 1919). For British apprehension regarding further releases of Turkish detainees from
the military prison ("some or all of them"), see FO 371/4173/76582 (folio 381) (May 19, 1919
report by Rear Admiral Webb).
231. FO 608/244/3749 (folio 315) (Rear Admiral Webb's February 19, 1919 telegram to
London, quoting from the Turkish Minister's February 16 note whose original, full text in
French is in FO 608/247/4222 (folio 177)).
232. FO 371/4173/47590 (folio 89).
233. Fourteen of the latter group were accused of mistreatment of British prisoners during
the war.
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c. The effects of national and international politics
In the months following the removal of Turkish suspects to Malta, the
political climate in Istanbul, and particularly in the interior of Turkey,
began to change to the Allies' detriment. As insurgent Kemalism2 34
gained a foothold throughout Turkey, the Sultan's government steadily
weakened. Moreover, the Allies began to bicker among themselves. De-
lays in the final peace settlement with Turkey complicated this volatile
situation. France and Italy began to court the Kemalists in secret; the
Italians lent the new regime substantial military assistance, and both the
French and the Italians sabotaged British efforts to restore and
strengthen the authority of the Sultan and his government. 235 In the face
of these developments, Britain's resolve to secure justice in accordance
with the May 24, 1915 Allied note was progressively attenuated.
Toward the end of September, 1919, the demise of pro-Sultan Damad
Ferid's Cabinet became imminent. On November 17, 1919, the new
High Commissioner Admiral de Robeck, told Curzon that
the present Turkish Government...[is] so dependent on the toleration of
the organisers of the [Kemalist] National Movement that I feel it would be
futile to ask for the arrest of any Turk accused of offences against Chris-
tians, even though he may be living openly in Constantinople ... I do not
consider it politically advisable to deport [to Malta] any more prisoners. 236
Notwithstanding, the British Admiral stated almost prophetically that
unless a legal process was initiated "it may be safely predicted that the
question of retribution for the deportations and massacres will be an ele-
ment of venomous trouble in the life of each of the countries
concerned." 237
234. The main tenets of Kemalism are summarized in two documents framed as the party
was crystallizing the emergent post-war Turkish nationalism: the Declaration of the Kemalist
Congress at Sivas (Sep. 9, 1919) and the subsequent National Pact (Jan. 28, 1920). See Mears,
Select Documents, in MODERN TURKEY: A POLITIco-EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION, 1908-
1923 INCLUSIVE 627-31 (E. Mears ed. 1924).
235. See D. LLOYD GEORGE, supra note 89 at 871, 878. Willis summed up the situation
as follows:
During the two years between the armistice and Mudros and the signing of the treaty of
Svres, the Turkish Nationalist movement grew into a major force, and the Allied coali-
tion virtually dissolved. By 1920 most of the victors no longer included among their aims
the punishment of Turkish war criminals... the Italians evaded a British request for the
arrest of former Young Turk leaders then reported as meeting within their territory. The
French and Italians hoped to secure concessions in Asia Minor and did not want to antag-
onize powerful factions in Turkey unnecessarily, particularly the rising Nationalists.
J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 158.
236. FO 371/4174/156721 (folios 523-24).




d. The problem of probative and legal evidence
Political considerations were not the only impediments to the com-
mencement of retributive justice. In mid-1920, Lamb, the political-legal
officer of the British High Commission at Istanbul, enumerated in a de-
tailed Memorandum the evidentiary difficulties encumbering the effective
prosecution of the authors of the Armenian genocide. These conditions
were: (1) the impossibility of obtaining any Turkish documents regarding
pertinent orders and instructions issued by the Central Government or
provincial authorities; (2) the reluctance of the Allied Governments to
participate in prosecuting the suspects accused of the massacre; (3) "the
apparent apathy of our Authorities in the Middle East as evidenced by
their replies to the H.C.'s queries in the matter"; (4) the massacre of the
great majority of the adult male Armenian population in the provinces
and of practically all the intellectuals; (5) the lack of public security and
want of confidence about the intention of the Allies to exact punishment
from the perpetrators, for those who could come forward and supply
evidence; and (6) the indications of eventual release of prisoners from
Malta.2 38 Alarmed by the implications of these impediments, Lamb
warned his superiors:
Unless there is whole-hearted co-operation and will to act among the Allies,
the trials will fall to the ground and the direct and indirect massacres of
about one million Christians will get off unscathed. Rather than this should
happen, it were better that the Allies had never made their declarations in
the matter and had never followed up their declarations by the arrests and
deportations that have been made.2 39
In a report to London on March 16, 1921, High Commissioner Rumbold
confirmed several of the points that Lamb made in this memo.240
Lamb did state in his Memorandum that the British High Commission
had gathered through its Greek-Armenian section a large mass of infor-
mation concerning the 118 prisoners on Malta and some 1000 others, all
alleged to have been directly or indirectly guilty of participation in mas-
sacres. Despite his concerns, Lamb concluded, "[i]t is safe to say that
very few 'dossiers,' as they now stand, would not be marked 'no case' by
a practical lawyer.
' '241
Perhaps the most difficult evidentiary problem was the inability of the
British to gather incriminating evidence held by the Turkish government.
238. FO 371/6500/, W. 2178, appendix A (folio 385-118, 386-119), Aug. 11, 1920.
239. Id. In discussing the evidentiary difficulties, Lamb stated further: "Though none of
this information is in itself of strict legal value, still no prosecution could get to work without
it." Id.
240. FO 371/6500/E3557 (folios 63-64).
241. Id. (folio 385-118).
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As W.S. Edmonds, Undersecretary in the Eastern Department of the
Foreign Office, observed on August 3, 1921, "there is probably some evi-
dence in the archives of the [Turkish] court martial at Constantinople
[but] the really important documents could no doubt be smuggled away
before we begin to examine them. ' 242 On August 10, 1921, the British
Secretary of State expressed his agreement with this view to the High
Commissioner in Istanbul, adding that it would be "useless" to seek help
from the French in exacting justice against the war criminals, consider-
ing "the general attitude observed by the French Government as regards
Turkey. '243 Similarly, British judge Lindsey Smith asserted his belief
that "a considerable amount of incriminating evidence was collected by
the Turkish Government but it is idle to expect to get it. The only alter-
native is, therefore, to retain them as hostages only and release them
against British prisoners." He recommended, therefore, the abandon-
ment of the plans to prosecute the Malta prisoners. As he judged, "an
abortive trial would do more harm than good."'244
3. The Ultimate Suspension of Prosecution
In the end, the May 24, 1915 Allied declaration proved the brutum
fulmen (empty, hollow threat) of the entire episode; retributive justice
gave way to political accommodation. Abandoned by their allies, and
pressured domestically to seek the release of some British prisoners held
hostage by the Kemalists (who had gained national, political, and mili-
tary ascendancy), the British sought a deal with Kemalist representatives
for the total release of the Malta detainees. Mustafa Kemal refused,
however, to honor the former government's Exchange Agreement of
March 16, 1921,245 since this agreement had excluded several Ittihadists
implicated in Armenian massacres, as well as eight others accused of
mistreating British prisoners during the War. Instead, new Foreign Min-
ister Yusuf Kemal (Tengir§ek) pressed for an "all for all" exchange. 246
Meanwhile, sixteen Ittihadists excluded from the exchange and slated for
trial before an International Tribunal had collectively fled from Malta on
September 6, 1921, following an initial, partial exchange.247 This group
included two army commanders, four governors, one district commis-
sioner, one deputy and iikrii Kaya, the wartime Director of Deporta-
tions. Two other prisoners who would have been candidates for trial,
242. FO 371/6509/E8745 (folios 23-24).
243. Id. (folio 29).
244. FO 371/6509/E10023 (folios 100-01) (Aug. 24, 1921 opinion).
245. FO 371/6500/E3375 (folio 284/15).
246. FO 371/6509 (folio 47) (Aug. 4, 1921 summary of the negotiations); B. §IM§IR, supra
note 227, at 447.
247. FO 371/6509/EI0319 (folios 122-23).
Vol. 14:221, 1989
The Armenian Genocide
labelled "the most notorious members of the group," (one of whom was
Tahir Cevdet, the former Governor of Van) had escaped earlier.248 In a
final opinion relayed to the Cabinet, the Law Officers of the Crown ar-
gued that for the reasons described above, the Turks could not be tried
and found guilty, and that the only remedy was the implementation of
the S~vres Treaty.
249
The "all for all" exchange agreement ensued on October 23, 1921, and
the remaining fifty-three Turks were released on November 1, 1921.
British shame and guilt set in immediately afterwards. Calling some of
the Turks whom they had set free "notorious exterminators" of Armeni-
ans,250 the British officials involved in the negotiations and decision-mak-
ing appended their reactions to the relevant documents. Foreign
Minister Curzon scolded himself for having made "a great mistake" in
pushing for the release of the Turks from British custody; he attributed
his act "to a pressure which I always felt to be mistaken." Another Brit-
ish official commented as follows:
The less we say about these people the better... I had to explain why we
released the Turkish deportees from Malta, skating over thin ice as quickly
as I could. There would have been a row I think .... [T]he staunch belief
among Members [of the Parliament is] that one British prisoner is worth a
shipload of Turks, and so the exchange was excused. 251
4. A Commentary on the Abortiveness of Allied Justice
From a strictly legal point of view, the British failure to bring the
Malta detainees to trial before a national or international tribunal was
due to evidentiary problems resulting from a lack of prosecutorial powers
and jurisdictional competence. These constraints were, however, self-im-
posed on two accounts. First, the Allies did not assert their belligerent
status strongly from the very start through a complete occupation and
248. FO 371/5091/E16080 (folio 85). In announcing this escape the British Foreign Office
noted that the first two "have broken parole"; on the occasion of the subsequent escape of the
16, the Office wondered out loud "how little Turkish sense of honor can be relied on." FO
3071/6509/E10662 (folio 159).
249. J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 162.
250. FO 371/7882/E4425 (comment by D. Osborne, May 23, 1922).
251. FO 371/7882/E4425 (folio 182). This attitude is also evident in the remark General
Campbell inserted in his letter to Lloyd George, whom he was pressuring for the release of his
son, Captain Campbell, from Turkish custody. Captain Campbell had written his father, who
repeated it to Lloyd George, "I am more valuable than any of these miserable Turks." FO
371/6509/E8562 (folio 16). But a major source of pressure was the maneuvering of Winston
Churchill, then Secretary of State for War, who persuaded the Cabinet to adopt a lenient
attitude toward "less guilty Turks." J. WILLIS, supra note 12 at 160. It is equally significant
that one of the Turkish internees gleefully stated after his release that the British were duped
by "a sly trick" of the Ankara government whose "British prisoners" to be exchanged included
"six Maltese laborers and their Greek wives and children." A. YALMAN, TURKEY IN MY
TIME 106 (1956).
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control of Turkey, as was done in Germany and Japan at the end of
World War II. Second, they studiously refrained from any involvement
in the Turkish Courts Martial prosecutions.
The'British statements on the relative worth of Turks and Britons
quoted above epitomizes the subversion of justice by national and inter-
national politics. The May 24, 1915 Allied declaration was, to a consid-
erable degree, a politically motivated act akin to the nineteenth-century
tradition of proclaiming the doctrine of humanitarian intervention on be-
half of oppressed nationalities and minorities. Though that declaration,
cited through the end of the War,252 served as the forerunner of the prin-
ciple of "crimes against humanity and civilization" adopted by the Nu-
remberg Charter (article 6c) and the U.N. Convention on Genocide
(preamble), it proved ephemeral in the case of the Armenian genocide.
In this sense, the declaration suffered the fate of many rules of interna-
tional law that declare general principles but lack compulsory force. As
victors who had exacted from the vanquished a virtually unconditional
surrender, however, the Allies missed a rare opportunity to create with
their May 24 declaration a new touchstone of international jurisprudence
calling for the application of force in cases involving organized mass
murder.253 The S~vres Treaty, signed by the representatives of the Otto-
man government, had included the rudiments of such an international
jurisprudence. As noted above, however, the treaty was jettisoned as the
victors chose political gain over effectation of their promises and
principles.
The ascendancy of Kemalism may be traced directly to the conse-
quences of certain clauses in the Armistice of 1918254 which allowed Tur-
key to escape total Allied occupation, to maintain and refurbish a
number of Army Corps and associated divisions and their staffs, and to
effectively sabotage the stipulated processes of demobilization and dis-
armament. Above all, the Allies left the Ottoman state system intact,
252. Less than three months before the onset of the Turkish Armistice, French Premier
Clemenceau publicly declared that France and Great Britain intend to secure justice for the
Armenians "selon les regles supdrieures de l'Humanitd et de lajustice." K. ZIEMKE, supra note
118, at 273 (Letter from Clemenceau to Armenian National Delegation, Paris, July 14, 1918).
See also THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE OPPOSED TO THE LAUSANNE TREATY, THE LAU-
SANNE TREATY, TURKEY AND ARMENIA 195 (1926). Echoing the May 24 Allied declaration,
this pledge proved as inconsequential as its predecessor. The forsaking of Armenia and Arme-
nian claims was a classic instance of adaptive politics in which the military challenge of the
vanquished paradoxically emerged as the determining factor in the capitulation of the victors.
Lloyd George decried that capitulation by excoriating the Lausanne Peace Treaty, in which
neither Turkish war crimes nor Armenia were mentioned, as "abject, cowardly and infamous."
D. LLOYD GEORGE, supra note 89, at 872.
253. See Brierly, supra note 70.
254. See E. MEARS, supra note 234, at 624-26; BRITISH GENERAL STAFF FILES, W.O.
100, EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE WITH TURKEY app. 1 (30 Oct.-30 Nov. 1918). Some of




granting it de facto and de jure sovereign rights. In so doing, the Allies
relinquished the power needed to carry out the pledges contained in the
1915 Allied Note.
The failure of the Allied prosecutorial efforts illustrates the inherent
weakness of international law as a deterrent to crimes committed by sov-
ereign governments. The political and practical limitations that exist in a
system that respects independent state sovereignty will almost always
prove more tenacious than the call for humanitarian intervention. The
Armenian genocide was not punished through international efforts. We
now turn to the domestic efforts within Turkey to obtain retribution.
B. The Recourse to the Machinery of Turkish Justice
The efforts to prosecute those responsible for the Armenian genocide
under Turkish domestic law also faltered as a result of domestic and in-
ternational political considerations. The Turkish trials were successful in
documenting the crimes that had been committed against the Armenian
people. They failed dismally, however, in punishing the war criminals.
Domestically, the rise of a strong nationalist movement, led by Mustafa
Kemal, conflicted with legal efforts to prosecute Turkish military and
government officials. The nationalist aspirations of unity and national
pride were inconsistent with the internal impulse to fix blame and appor-
tion responsibility for the Armenian genocide on Turkish leaders. In the
international sphere, political considerations outweighed the Allies' de-
sire to force the Turks to acknowledge and effectively prosecute the war
criminals. In their zest to win favor with the Kemalist government,
France and Italy undermined the efforts of Britain, and to a lesser extent
the United States, to bring about retributive justice for the Armenians
through the use of the Turkish Courts. Britain, lacking the support of
her allies and facing Turkish opposition, eventually sacrificed the pursuit
of justice to political expediency.
A parallel can be drawn between the Istanbul and Leipzig trials, where
the German war criminals were prosecuted. At Leipzig, domestic and
international forces combined to thwart efforts to prosecute alleged war
criminals. As with Turkey, nationalist feelings in Germany militated
against prosecuting one's own nationals, especially under foreign pres-
sure. The Allies, during both the Turkish and Leipzig trials, allowed
political considerations to prevail over the efforts to prosecute the en-
emy's officials. The Leipzig parallel shows that the failure of the Turkish
domestic efforts should not be seen as an exception. Rather, their joint
lesson is that it is difficult to achieve effective punishment for genocide
and other crimes against humanity through domestic processes.
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Although ultimately ineffectual, the prosecution of the Turkish leaders
implicated in the Armenian Genocide before Turkish Courts Martial,
which resulted in a series of indictments, verdicts and sentences, was of
extraordinary, though unrecognized, significance. For the first time in
history, deliberate mass murder, designated "a crime under international
law, ' 255 was adjudicated in accordance with domestic penal codes, thus
substituting national laws for the rules of international law. These trials,
therefore, provide a perspective on the developing efforts to criminalize
genocide under domestic laws. In 1949, the Special ABA Committee on
Peace and Law through the United Nations, defined the U.N. Conven-
tion on Genocide as "a code of domestic crimes which are already de-
nominated in all countries as common law crimes. ' 256 Lemkin likewise
asserted that "genocide is a composite crime and consists of acts which
are themselves punishable by most existing legislation.
' '257
In 1988, Congress added the crimes of genocide and attempted geno-
cide to the U.S. criminal code. Such legislative efforts, however, can only
be effective to the degree that they are enforced. As noted above, inter-
national and domestic political structures work against such enforce-
ment. In post-World War I Turkey, however, there were countervailing
pressures which could have provided enough momentum for the initia-
tion and ultimate success of enforcement efforts. By agreeing to try
Turkish war criminals, the Ottoman authorities expected to be treated
less sternly at the Peace Conference, a fact confirmed by both contempo-
rary Turkish historians 258 and British officials involved. 25 9 These Otto-
man authorities reasoned that the Turkish nation could not be held
responsible for the crimes of a political party and its governmental
agents. Commenting on the first sentence of capital punishment imposed
by the Turkish Military Tribunal, British High Commissioner Admiral
Calthorpe maintained that the Turks, including the Grand Vezir and his
supporters, "consider executions a mere concession to the Entente rather
than as punishment justly meted out to criminals.
'2 60
255. Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L. L. 150
(1947).
256. Finch, The Genocide Convention, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. 735 (1949).
257. Lemkin, supra note 255, at 150.
258. S. AIjSIN, ISTANBUL HOKOMETLERI VE MILLI MOCADELE (The Istanbul Govern-
ments and the National Struggle) 140-41 (1983); 4 I. DANI§MEND, IZAHLI OSMANLI TARIHI
KRONOLOJISI (The Annotated Chronology of Ottoman History) 457 (2d ed. 1961).
259. FO 371/4173/44216, folio 51 (Mar. 20, 1919, report by W. H. Deedes). In folio 50,
Deedes explicitly states the official British position of non-interference in Turkey's internal
affairs.




In addition, the surreptitious flight in November, 1918 of the principal
architects of the Armenian genocide created a furor among many sectors
of the Turkish public still suffering the hardships of war and defeat. The
anti-Ittihadist factions that had been persecuted and oppressed before
and during the war demanded speedy trials. Others, including many
journalists, simply lamented the atrocities perpetrated against the
Armenians. For example, the journal Minber, published by F. Okyar,
Interior Minister in the first post-war Cabinet and subsequently Prime
Minister of the Turkish Republic from 1924-25, denounced "the extermi-
nation of the Armenians as sheer madness. ' 261 Thus, the domestic trials
against the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide were not without
political, public, and media support within Turkey. The failure of these
trials, therefore, is doubly instructive.
1. Pretrial Inquiries and Investigations
a. The Parliament's Fifth Committee
Article 31 of the Ottoman Constitution detailed procedures through
which one or more Deputies could lodge allegations of misconduct
against a Minister. These allegations ultimately would lead to a trial
before the High Court, whose composition, jurisdiction, and function
were spelled out in articles 92-95. If a Committee of the Chamber of
Deputies decided to investigate theallegations, the Constitution required
a two-thirds vote of the full Chamber and the sanction of the Sovereign
for an actual trial.
On the very day the seven top leaders of Ittihad fled from Istanbul
(November 1-2, 1918),262 a Muslim Deputy introduced a motion for the
trial before the High Court of the two wartime Cabinet Ministers. He
attached to that motion ten charges against these Ministers referring to
their misdeeds related to the Turkish participation in World War I, in-
cluding aggression, military incompetence, political abuses, and eco-
nomic crimes. Two of these charges related to the Armenian massacres.
Number 5 challenged the enactment of the Temporary Laws 263 as "com-
pletely contrary to the spirit and letter of our Constitution." In denounc-
ing "the disasters" that followed this enactment, and the associated
"orders and instructions," the Deputy invoked "the rules of law and hu-
261. A.A. TORKEI 167/14, at VI (Istanbul German Embassy review of Turkish press,
based on reproduction in Le Soir (French language Istanbul daily) (Nov. 12, 1918). But Ar-
menian-language papers give the date of the original article in Minber (Istanbul) as November
9, 1918.
262. See A. YALMAN, supra note 180 , at 314-15.
263. See supra text accompanying note 144; WAR CABINET'S HEARINGS, supra note 144,
at 6, 7.
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manity." Charge No. 10 indicted the Ministers for the creation of "brig-
ands [qetes] whose assaults on life, property and honor rendered the
Ministers guilty as co-perpetrators of the tragic crimes that resulted.
' '264
To investigate these charges, the Fifth Committee of the Chamber of
Deputies was created, its members having been selected by the drawing
of lots. Its slow pace and digressions, however, gave rise to public com-
plaints. Further, by the time of the full Chamber's vote to institute High
Court trials, only 156 Deputies remained of the 256 who had been
elected before the war; the corresponding ratio for the Senate was 30 out
of 48.
In response to these concerns, the Sultan dissolved the Chamber on
December 21, 1918, and transferred jurisdiction to the Courts Martial.
The Sultan's action precluded High Court jurisdiction, since there was
no Chamber to vote on the findings of the Fifth Committee and to rec-
ommend trials under the jurisdiction of that Court. This move also
served the political interests of the Sultan by cutting off the Ittihadists'
power and giving the Sultan's government a free hand to control the
country by edict.
Notwithstanding the preemption of its procedural sequence, the Fifth
Committee's work had already yielded some results. From November 9
to December 12, 1918, the Committee conducted fourteen hearings in
which it interrogated fifteen ministers, including two §eyhulislams.
2 65
These interrogations resulted in a number of important admissions. For
example, former Justice Minister Ibrahim admitted to the release from
the prisons of "an appreciably large number of convicted common law
criminals upon the instance of the Army claiming to be needing
them. ' 266 Ibrahim further accepted responsibility for the atrocities re-
sulting from the Temporary Law of Deportation, collectively for the
Cabinet, and individually as a Minister, although he argued that the ex-
cesses were perpetrated "without the knowledge of the government.
'267
When a Deputy retorted, "What do you mean 'the government was not
cognizant of them, the problem did not occur in one day, but dragged on
for eighteen months," Ibrahim shifted the blame to the military, which in
turn persistently denied "the vile deeds. ' 268 Another Deputy raised the
264. Id. (referring to the Special Organization). The Deputy was Fuad, who represented
the Divaniye district. His motion was drafted on October 28, submitted on November 2, and
entertained on November 4, 1918.
Fuad was part of that group of Arab Deputies in the Ottoman Parliament which, unlike any
other group, boldly pursued the task of holding high ranking officials accountable for the
crimes against the Armenians; this was most evident during the Fifth Committee hearings.
265. Id. at 3-4.
266. Id. at 537.
267. Id. at 534-35.
268. Id. at 520.
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question of the military "willfully carrying out deportations and execu-
tions in areas outside the theaters of military operations." To this the ex-
Minister of Justice responded, "we are unaware of such things. ' 269
In addition to the revelations and confessions exacted from the minis-
ters during these hearings, the Committee also secured a number of doc-
uments, some of which were top-secret orders and instructions regarding
the massacres. These documents were eventually turned over to the
prosecutors attached to the Courts Martial.270
b. The Administration's Inquiry Commission
The Administration's Inquiry Commission, which came into being on
November 23, 1918 and operated concurrently with the Parliamentary
investigation, was charged with the investigation of the misdeeds
(seyyiat) of governmental officials irrespective of rank. As mandated by
paragraphs 47, 75 and 87 of the Ottoman Code of Criminal Proce-
dures, 271 the Commission, headed by Hasan Mazhar, was vested with
broad powers. These powers, including subpoena, search and seizure,
and arrest and detention, were executed by the judicial police and the
agency of the Military Governor. Over two months, the Commission
secured coded and decoded telegraphic orders from dozens of provincial
locations identified as centers of deportations and massacres in Asiatic
and European Turkey. The Commission obtained a batch of forty-two
ciphers from the Ankara province alone. In addition, the Commission
compiled a mass of pre-trial evidence through interrogatories adminis-
tered orally and in writing to suspects. Among these suspects were
twenty-six Chamber Deputies whose possible escape was averted by a
Cabinet order denying them permits to travel to their electoral dis-
tricts. 272 Through a set of ten questions directed to the Defense Minis-
try, the Commission also sought information on the organization,
function, command, and control of the Special Organization.
When finished with its task, the Commission forwarded to the Courts
Martial the dossiers of the suspects; by mid-January, 1919, it had com-
piled separate dossiers for 130 suspects.2 73 This transfer of pre-trial evi-
dence was accompanied by a recommendation, as stipulated by the
Criminal Procedure Code, that evidence was incriminating enough to
269. Id. at 523.
270. 1 M. GOKBILGIN, MILLI MUCADELE BA§LARKEN (As the National Struggle Began)
57 (1959).
271. 7 G. YOUNG, CORPS DE DROIT OTTOMAN, CODE DE PROCEDURE Pf-NALE (Treatise
of Ottoman Law, Code of Criminal Procedure) 235, 239, 241 (1906).
272. FO 371/4141/49194, at 4 (part II of extensive, six-part report of British Saloniki
Force Intelligence Section, Mar. 8, 1919).
273. United States National Archives, Record Group 256, 867.00/59, at 3 (U.S. Commis-
sioner at Istanbul Lewis Hecks' January 20, 1919 report to the State Dept.).
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warrant the commencement of criminal proceedings against the
suspects.
274
2. The Formation of the Court Martial
The next steps of martial justice originated in early December, 1918
from the office of the Procuror-General of the Court of Appeals in the
Ottoman capital, and were subsequently formalized in a conference be-
tween the head of the Criminal Affairs division of the Justice Ministry
and the Chief Legal Counsel of the Interior Ministry. 275 The Court Mar-
tial was initially formed by Imperial authorization on December 16,
1918.276 A subsequent authorization, dated December 25, 1918, declared
that jurisdiction for areas not under martial law would devolve upon ex-
isting criminal courts as stipulated by article 88 of the Constitution. 277 A
third decision, dated January 8, 1919, rendered the Extraordinary (or
Special) Court Martial operational.2 8 In March, however, the Sultan
installed a new government which he believed would bring about a more
efficient and expedited trial of the accused; by Imperial authorization, the
statutes of a new Court Martial were set forth on March 8, 1919.279 The
"principal task of this Tribunal" was the investigation of the charges of
"massacres and unlawful, personal profiteering. '280 On May 26, 1919,
the new Procuror-General framed a new indictment which added more
comprehensive allegations, centering around the main charge of "over-
throw of the government (taklibi htiktimet).' '281 This revision was in line
with the terms of paragraph 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedures
providing for the amendment of charges in the event that new crimes
should come to light during a trial.28 2 Finally, on April 23, 1920, the
charges were expanded to include "rebellion" and "violation of public
order."
283
274. G. YOUNG, supra note 271, at 247.
275. M. GOKBILGIN, supra note 270, at 15.
276. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3424.
277. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3430.
278. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3445.
279. There were two formations of the Court Martial in March 1919: (1) March 8, pre-
sided over by Fevzi Paga. R.G. 256, 867.00/27, R.G. 59, 867.4011/408; TAKVIMI VEKAYI,
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Code of Criminal Procedures, the Court Martial ordered the seven top leaders of the Young
Turk regime "presently being fugitives," to appear before the Court within ten days. Other-
wise, they would be treated as rebels against the law, tried in absentia, lose all their civil rights,
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bul), Apr. 15, 1919, at 1.
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3. The Initiation of the Proceedings
The evidence obtained in preparation for the trials was indexed and
cross-indexed along the lines of (1) ratione personae, or accomplices (cer-
ayim failleri), (2) ratione loci, or location of the crimes and (3) ratione
materiae, involving the classification and itemization of the evidence.
The Court Martial adopted broad standards concerning the laws of evi-
dence. Relying on longstanding Ottoman judicial tradition, it applied the
principle of "intimate conviction" (hukuku takdiriye, or kanaat
vicdaniye), by which a judge can, to the best of his conscience, assess the
probative value of the evidence available to him. Further, nearly every
document obtained by the Inquiry Commission was authenticated by the
legal experts of the Interior Ministry with the standard notation of "it
conforms to the original" (ashna muafik or mutabik). In the seventh,
eighth, and ninth sittings of the Yozgat trial series, which were held pre-
viously, several of the military cipher-telegrams were introduced as pros-
ecution exhibits and, as with all prosecution exhibits, read aloud in court.
The presiding judge also decided to allow public trials, stating that while
"[i]t is not customary, nor is there any legal obligation for a Court Mar-
tial, to allow the proceedings to be public .... In order to demonstrate
the intent of the Court to conduct the trials impartially and in a spirit of
lofty justice [kemali adil ve bitaraf], I am going to use judicial discretion
and conduct public trials. The Court is simply trying to help the defend-
ants and facilitate their defense [teshil ve istiane].' '284
The defense, coordinated during the "Cabinet Council" sessions that
were held in the prison, amounted to a form of stonewalling: individu-
ally and collectively, the defendants steadfastly denied the charges.2 85 In
trying to overcome this defense, the Military Tribunal used three meth-
ods: (1) surprising the defendants through the sudden production of ci-
pher telegrams bearing their signatures; (2) confronting them with their
statements and confessions from the oral and written pretrial interroga-
tories they had signed;286 and (3) isolating a defendant at the dock and
rigorously questioning him. The admissions extracted were then used in
284. TAKVIMI VEKAYi, No. 3540, May 5, 1919, at 4.
285. This denial prompted Aka Giindiiz (Enis Avni), the celebrated nationalist writer, to
mock them in an article imitating their defense style, "Oh alas, oh alas, oh alas, oh alas. We
didn't see, we didn't know, we didn't hear" (Vah yah, yah yah. gdrmieyorduk, bilmiyorduk,
ilitmiyorduk"). ALEMDAR (Istanbul), May 10, 1919. For a description of "Cabinet Council"
sessions, see infra note 366.
286. Ottoman criminal procedure codes stipulated secrecy in the trial preparations; de-
fense counsel were therefore barred from access to the pre-trial investigatory files and from
accompanying their clients to the interrogations conducted as preparatory to the trials. The
discretionary powers of the presiding judge of a criminal court are set forth in the Code of
Criminal Procedure articles 232-34 and address the matters of reliance on one's conscience in
the quest for probative evidence, including the authority to hear witnesses whose testimony is
"informational" and whose oath-taking can be dispensed with. G. YOUNG, supra note 271, at
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the examination of the other defendants, leading some of the defendants
to amend their testimony.
4. The Key Indictment
Although separate indictments were framed for the series of subsidiary
trials on massacres which took place in different locales, the Key Indict-
ment focused on the Cabinet Ministers and the top leaders of the ruling
Ittihad party. The League For the Defense of Ottoman Interests pointed
to this indictment as "a historical document" through which "the coun-
try" will be tried and judged.287 The cardinal feature of the Key Indict-
ment, not present in any other indictment, was the set of documents
lodged within it. In support of the charges spelled out, the Indictment
cited forty-one specific documents in the possession of the Court. Most
of these documents consisted of decoded telegrams sent to and from -the
Interior Minister, the IIIrd and IVth Army Commanders, the Deputy
Commanders of the Vth Army Corps and the XVth Division from An-
kara province, (both of whom subsequently testified regarding their ci-
phers), the Directors of the Special Organization, two Military
Governors of Istanbul, and a host of governors and district
commissioners.
a. The charges
The charges in the indictment centered on the Ittihad party, some-
times called Cemiyet (meaning a close knit community of party mem-
bers). In. declaring the party's objectives and methods criminal, the
Procuror-General specifically cited its Central Committee, General As-
sembly, and two provincial control groups headed by Responsible Secre-
taries and Inspectors. The Defense Ministry, the War Office
(particularly the Special Organization), and the Interior Ministry were
likewise included in these charges since they were all led and directed by
the two principal chiefs of the party, War Minister Enver and Interior
Minister (later Grand Vezir) Talat.288 "The evidence gathered yields the
picture of a party whose moral personality is mired in an unending chain
261-62. Article 269 of the same code provides for new judicial measures in case of detection of
discrepancies or inconsistencies between pre-trial depositions and court testimony. Id. at 266.
287. LE COURRIER DE TURQUIE (Istanbul), Apr. 30, 1919. An editorial in a Turkish daily
described the impending court martial proceedings against high-ranking officials and party
leaders as "the most important trial in the six-hundred year history of the Ottoman empire."
Hadisat (Istanbul), Apr. 26, 1919.
288. The entire discussion of the Indictment is based on the text as published in TAKVIMI
VEKAYI, No. 3540; the citations are from 4-8 of that issue. It is noteworthy that American
Ambassador Morgenthau in a lengthy analysis (Nov. 4, 1915) of the omnipotence of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Young Turk Ittihad party, mentions these men as the arch leaders of
.,an invisible and irresponsible government." That omnipotence with particular reference to




of bloodthirstiness, plunder and abuses. ' 289 The principle charges are
discussed below.
i. Conspiracy
This charge was two-pronged: the defendants were first accused of
having deliberately engineered Turkey's entry into the war "by recourse
to a number of vile tricks and deceitful means"; they were also accused of
using "this vantage ground to carry out their secret intentions. '290 In
accord with a central plan, the indictment stated, the party proceeded to
implement its "covert and conspiratorial" goals.291 The conspiracy was
thus extended to the point of subverting the legitimate authority of the
government whose "high ranking officials submitted" (inkiyad) to the
dictates of the party.292 The principal objective of Ittihad was "the mas-
sacre and destruction of the Armenians" 293 for which purpose they fur-
ther conspired to "release gangs of convicts from the prisons,"
294
ostensibly for combat duty. In reality, "the prisons were emptied ... of
these criminals and outlaws"; they were then assigned "massacre" duties
in the Special Organization. 295 The indictment alleged that the conspir-
acy included self-enrichment not only for the members of the units but
also for the principal leaders of the party who "likewise tried to pile up
fortunes" for themselves through "the pillage and plunder" of the goods
and possessions of their victims. 296 In this way, the indictment empha-
sized that "the investigation of massacres and illegal, personal profiteer-
ing is the -principal task of this Tribunal" (czimlei vazife).297 The
provincial organization and supervision of the plan of "extermination"
was entrusted to the Responsible Secretaries, carefully selected by the
party leadership.
298
absolute control of the army, navy and civil government of the country. They have re-
moved many governors of interior vilayets [provinces] who would not obey their orders.
They also completely control the Chamber of Deputies, whose members are absolutely
selected by them.. .they have frightened almost everyone into submission... There is no
opposition party in existence. The Press is carefully censored and must obey the wishes of
the Union and Progress Party... They have annihilated or displaced at least two thirds of
the Armenian population ....
R.G. (L.) 59, 867.00/797 1/2; L. at 762-66. On December 1, 1915, Morgenthau changed his
language in a report to Sec. of State Lansing to use the words "the destruction of the Armeni-
ans" as a near completed fact. R.G. (L.) 59, 867.00/799 1/2; L. at 771.
289. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3540, at 4.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 7.
293. Id. at 6.
294. Id. at 5.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 4.
297. Id. at 8.
298. Id. at 6.
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ii. Premeditation and Intent
The Indictment further alleged that "[t]he massacre and destruction of
the Armenians were the result of decisions by the Central Committee of
Ittihad. ' '299 The decision process involved "extensive and profound de-
liberations," in consequence of which the scheme against the Armenians
"has been determined upon.' ' 30° In order to conceal that decision, the
Indictment maintained, Ittihad leaders relied on the party's tactic of
"disguise." The execution of the central plan was "ensured and directed
through oral and secret orders and instructions. '30 1 These orders, sent
via coded ciphers, were always accompanied by the instruction to "de-
stroy" (iptal) them after reading.
302
On the issue of intent, the Indictment countered two possibilities that
were later advanced by the defense. One was military necessity, which
the defense argued necessitated massive relocation through deportations;
the other was the justified punishment of a disloyal community. The
Indictment asserted that "the deportations were neither a measure of
military necessity, nor a punitive, disciplinary act."' 30 3 Rather, they en-
tailed "massacres ... as acts subsidiary to a centrally directed plan.
' '3°4
That plan had nothing to do with "a particular incident" provoked by
the Armenians nor were the massacres "limited to a particular local-
ity."' 30 5 The Indictment's allusion to a comprehensive and centrally di-
rected plan of destruction was based on Ittihad's overt purpose of
"solving once and for all (hall vefasl) unresolved problems and conflicts"
of which Ittihad considered the lingering Armenian question the most
troublesome. 30 6 The Indictment cited as proof the Ittihad Central Com-
mittee's intent of "solving the Eastern question. '30 7 The plan of whole-
sale destruction was eventually confirmed in two separate verdicts: (1)
one was based upon a cipher telegram in which the Chief of the Special
Organization asked the Responsible Secretary of Harput province
whether the Armenians of his province "are being annihilated, or are
299. Id. at 8.
300. Id. The August 3, 1915 entry of American Ambassador Morgenthau's diary reads,
"Talat . .. told me that the Union and Progress Committee [Ittihad party] had carefully
considered the matter in all its details and that the policy which was being pursued was that
which they had officially adopted. He said that I must not get the idea that the deportations
had been decided upon hastily; in reality, they were the result of prolonged and careful deliber-
ation." H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 23, at 333.
301. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3540, at 5.
302. Id. at 6.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 7.
305. Id. at 6.
306. Id. at 4.




they being merely deported and exiled"; 308 and (2) documentary evi-
dence was adduced to substantiate the charge that Ittihad party Chief
and Interior Minister Talat had given oral instructions to interpret the
order for "deportation" as an order for "destruction" (imha).30 9
The military commander in whose command zone the massacres were
carried out substantiated these charges of premeditation and intent.
When informed that a contingent of 2000 Armenian soldiers assigned to
labor battalion duties were trapped and slaughtered on their way to a
new assignment on the Baghdad Railroad, General Vehib of the IIIrd
Army's command zone launched an investigation that led to a court-
martial and some executions. It was in the course of this investigation
that General Vehib learned of the large-scale massacres that had taken
place in the six provinces of the IIIrd Army's command zone in the
months preceding his assuming command in February, 1916. In his de-
tailed affidavit prepared at the request of the Administration's Inquiry
Commission and repeatedly cited in the Key Indictment and two Ver-
dicts, Vehib summed up his findings as follows:
The massacre and destruction of the Armenians and the plunder and pil-
lage of their goods were the results of decisions reached by Ittihad's Central
Committee.... The atrocities were carried out under a program that was
determined upon and involved a definite case of premeditation (mukarrer
bir program ve mutlak bir kasd tahtnda yaptlan ibu mezalim). It was
[also] ascertained that these atrocities and crimes were encouraged (telvik)
by the district attorneys whose dereliction of judicial duties in face of their
occurrence and especially their remaining indifferent (ldkayd) renders
them accessories to these crimes (feren zimethal).
310
iii. Murder and Personal Responsibility
The top leaders of Ittihad were also accused of having committed stat-
utory crimes in their capacity as members of the party's Central Commit-
tee. Two members of the triumvirate, Enver (the War Minister and de
308. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3771, Feb. 9, 1919, at 2.
309. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3772, Feb. 10, 1919, at 5.
310. Vehib's affidavit (dated Dec. 5, 1918) was read in its entirety at the second sitting of
the Trabzon trial series (March 29, 1919). Portions of it were incorporated in (1) the Key
Indictment, TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3540, May 5, 1919, at 7, with which the 12 page, hand-
written document was lodged, (2) the Harput verdict, TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3771, Feb. 9,
1919, at 1, and (3) LE COURRIER DE TURQUIE, Apr. 1 and 2, 1919. The copy of the full text
in its original Ottoman Turkish is in the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive, indexed
under the Armenian alphabet character H (pronounced Ho, the 16th letter, and not its variant
Hee, the 21st), at 171-182 of the "H" file. The citation used here is from page 5 of the affidavit
whose rough Armenian translation is in Hairenik, Apr. 13, 1968. The details of the Court
Martial set up by General Vehib are in Ariamard, Dec. 10, 1918, including the text in Ottoman
Turkish of the General's proclamation through which he informed, as a warning, his Third
Army units of the verdict of the court and the execution of the gendarmery commander
involved.
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facto Supreme Commander of Ottoman Armed Forces), and Cemal (the
Marine Minister and Commander of the IVth Army), were military lead-
ers. Talat, the third member, was Interior Minister and the ultimate co-
ordinator of the Special Organization's ties with the party's Central
Committee and the War Office. Both the Military Governors of Istanbul
attached to the War Office, and the head of Public Security were promi-
nently mentioned in the Indictment as organizers of the Special Organi-
zation cadres in the Ottoman capital. The most prominently mentioned
Ittihad Central Committee members were the two physician-politicians,
Nazim and akir. The Indictment cited both of them eight times as the
foremost organizers of the Special Organization, 31" which itself was cited
a dozen times as the principal tool used in association with the crimes of
"murder, arson, gutting, rape, and all sorts of torture." 312
The Responsible Secretaries were identified as the key group directing
these crimes. 313 For this reason, the Military Tribunal remanded their
case to a separate series of trials after repeatedly underscoring their piv-
otal role in the Key Indictment. In the separate and subsidiary Indict-
ment, framed for this series, the Court depicted the participation of these
provincial commissars in "the decision of the Central Committee... [in
that t]hey created a secret arm of the government and subverted that
government [tagayyffr], operating within the party as a special cadre of
high ranking officials [erkdni mahsusa].' ' 31 4 In describing their role in
the destruction of the victims under the cloak of "deportation," the
Procuror-General in his closing argument described these deportations
as "a pretext for the massacres," adding "[t]his established fact is as clear
as the equation 2 + 2 = 4.1'315 The Indictment concluded that as the
crimes were specified as "personal" (jahsi ceraim) or "ordinary" (ceraimi
311. For a detailed discussion of the leading role of these two party leaders, see Dadrian,
The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of the Armenians, 1 HOLOCAUST
& GENOCIDE STUD. 169-92 (1986).
312. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3540, at 4-8.
313. The following description by a Turkish author remarkably familiar with many of the
secrets of Ittihad and the Special Organization may help to underline the importance of this
role, somewhat akin to that played by the Gauleiters of Nazi Third Reich:
The title [Responsible Secretary) was created to avoid the appearance of overshadowing
the state authority while investing the holder with powers required for the direction of the
course of events. In fact, in all matters of consequence, the last decision belongs to them.
These men ... in line with this practice madefinal decisions. they were selected by the
Central Committee, the shadow Cabinet, on the basis of experience, age, brains and
familiarity.
C. KUTAY, CELAL BAYARIN YAZMAD11 VE YAZMAYACA1 U9 DEVIRDEN HAKIKATLER
(Facts On Three Eras About Which Celal Bayar Did Not and Will Not Write) 12 (1982)
(emphasis in original). Bayar himself was a Responsible Secretary in Izmir (Smyrna), Aydin
Province, and was 1950-1960 President of the Turkish Republic.
314. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3586, June 28, 1919, at 164.




adiye), the defendants would not be entitled to immunity under the act of
state doctrine.
b. The prosecution's exclusive reliance on domestic penal codes
In seeking to punish the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide, the
prosecution relied solely on the Ottoman Penal Code.316 The Code,
paralleling the French Penal Code's classification of offenses and corre-
sponding criminal sanctions, had three major divisions. The first 47 arti-
cles defined the principles of culpability, delineating individual
responsibilities and liabilities for violations. The second division, articles
48-167, defined general offenses directed against institutions, such as the
government. The third division, articles 168-253, mainly prescribed the
specific penalties. Of these, articles 168-191 dealt with acts of coercion
and violence against persons.
The Court Martial classified the defendants as either principal co-per-
petrators or accessories. For the first category, the Court invoked article
45, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code:
If several persons together commit a crime or if a crime is composed of
several acts and each of a gang of persons perpetrates one or some of such
acts with the object of the accomplishment of the offense, such persons are
styled accomplices and all of them are punished as sole perpetrators.
317
Further, the Procuror-General proposed to apply article 170 to the
offenders of the first category. This article reads:
If a person's being a killer with premeditation is proved according to law[,]
sentence for his being put to death is passed legally.
318
Most importantly, the Procuror-General added the last paragraph of ar-
ticle 55 to cover the charge of "forcible alteration of the government"
that was subsequently incorporated into the amended bill of charges.
That paragraph reads:
The person whose forcible attempt to alter, change or destroy the Constitu-
tion, or the shape or form of the Government, or the system of succession
of the Ottoman Empire is [to be] put to death.
319
The Court designated the defendants in the second category, "accesso-
ries in the first degree" (feren zimethal), subjecting them to paragraph 2
of article 45, which read:
316. THE IMPERIAL OTrOMAN PENAL CODE (J. Bucknill & H. Utidjian trans. 1913). Ar-
ticle 13 of the original martial law provides for the application of civil penal codes whenever
courts martial do not dispose over corresponding military codes. See I A. BILLIOTTI & A.
SEDAD, LGISLATION OTTOMAN DEPUIS LA RtTABLISSEMENT DE LA CONSTITUTION 197
(1912).
317. THE IMPERIAL OTTOMAN PENAL CODE, supra note 316, at 32.
318. Id. at 125.
319. Id. at 47.
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Those who are accessories in the commission of a crime become subject to
punishment in the following manner where there is no explicitness in the
law.. .the punishment of temporary forced labor for not less than ten years
if the principal act calls for the punishment of death or perpetual forced
labor.. .320
5. The Jurisdictional Challenge by the Defense: The Constitutional
Argument
Before accepting the post offered him on March 3, 1919, Damad Ferit,
the new Grand Vezir, stipulated that he wanted, the defense's apparent
stalling notwithstanding, a "[s]peedy judgment of the crisis so as to be
able to deal with the authors of a crime that drew the revulsion of the
entire humankind. '321 The procedures adopted to satisfy Ferit provided
grounds for charges of constitutional violations. Defended by sixteen
lawyers, the Ministers repeatedly challenged the competence of the Tri-
bunal and criticized the procedures under which they were apprehended
and prosecuted.
Led by Istanbul University Law Professor C. Arif (later Deputy, Par-
liament President and Minister of the Ankara government), the defense
lawyers invoked several articles of the Constitution to support their chal-
lenge. The defense argued that article 31 of the Ottoman Constitution
322
set forth the procedures for bringing to trial a Minister charged with
misconduct, specifying the High Court as the requisite venue for trial.
The defense further claimed that the crimes charged in the indictment
were not "ordinary crimes, ' 323 but rather revolved around the imple-
mentation of the Law of Deportation which had been enacted by the
government and sanctioned by an Imperial Irade (authorization). Since
the massacres incident to the deportations were part of an act of state,
guilt or innocence depended on the scope of ministerial duties and au-
thority; as a result, they were not subject to article 33 but rather to article
92 which defined the function and composition of the High Court.
324
Indeed, the defense argued that even if one assumed that article 33 would
apply, the article stipulated that in the event misconduct was not related
to official acts, and a High Court is ruled out, existing criminal courts,
not a court martial, must have jurisdiction. 325 Finally, the defense ar-
320. Id. at 32.
321. A. TORKGELDI, GbROP I§IrrIKLERIM (The Things I Witnessed and Heard) 197
(1951). A month later the Grand Vezir went so far as to entertain the possibility of prosecut-
ing, as a collective entity, all the "active" members of Ittihad under the charge of having
belonged to "a criminal organization." S. AK§IN, supra note 258, at 201.
322. OTTOMAN CONST. (Midhat), 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (supp. 1909).
323. TAKVIMI VEKAYr, No. 3540, at 10, 11.
324. Id. at 13.




gued that the Court did not have the authority to determine which article
of the constitution should be applied in the case because article 117 speci-
fies the Senate as the ultimate interpreter of the exact meaning of an
article of the Constitution.
326
The Court first rejected the act of state argument. Even if it granted
that the massacres were incidental to the deportation, the Court noted
that massacre was still murder, a separate and distinct state act. Only if
new evidence established that the massacres were not intended but were
merely inevitable results, attending the fulfillment of official duties, would
the Court consider the argument. The Court found, however, that the
available evidence demonstrated that the massacres were part of policies
and decisions arrived at by the defendants, not as Ministers conducting
official work, but as members of a secret, conspiratorial association
(cemiyet).327 The Court also noted that the act of state defense was in-
consistent with the indictment, which defined "the principal task" of the
Court to be the investigation of "massacres and illegal, personal profi-
teering" (taktil ve ihtikdr).328 Further, the bill of particulars singled out
"the moral personality" of the Ittihad party of which they were the lead-
ers, and asserted that in the course of exercising that leadership the de-
fendants committed "personal crimes" (jahsi ceraim).
329
The Court then rejected the remaining constitutional and jurisdic-
tional challenges. Since martial law -had been imposed by the Ittihad
regime itself, and was still in force, neither articles 32 nor 33 could be
invoked for the purpose of effecting a change of venue or for transferring
the defendants to the jurisdiction of regular criminal courts, as motioned
by the defense. Further, article 113, concerning the imposition of martial
law, provided for the temporary suspension of civil rights. The Court
again pointed to the language of the indictment: "wherever martial law
is in force, civil and judicial laws are entirely muted" (kavanini mfilkiye
ve adliye tamamille sakin), and courts martial become the only penal
recourse (mercii ceraim).330 (Ittihad itself had further revised the origi-
nal martial law in 1909 in order to have greater authority in suspending
regular laws.331) The Court also rejected the defendants' claim that the
Fifth Committee of the Chamber opted for the High Court. The Court
noted that the Deputies had merely conducted an investigation without a
326. Id. at 11.
327. Id. at 14.
328. Id. at 8, 9.
329. Id. at 8, 14.
330. Id. at 8.
331. The Martial Law of Aug. 19/Sept. 1, 1910, article 1, reprinted in 1 A. Biuorri & A.
SEDAD, supra note 316, at 483. Article 2 of the original martial law of October, 1877 specifi-
cally declares as "temporarily suspended" those provisions of the Constitution and other laws
and administrative regulations that contravene martial law. Id. at 195.
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final decision; since the Sultan had dissolved the Parliament, the impossi-
bility of a Parliamentary vote invalidated the claim in question. Finally,
consistent with the Court's holding, a special Imperial Irade with the
force of a decree-law vested the Court with the requisite authority and
competence to try the accused. 332
6. The Key Verdict
Following a prolonged trial of the Cabinet Ministers, marked by a se-
ries of amendments of the Key Indictment in May and June, 1919, the
Court entered its Key Verdict on July 5, 1919.3 33 The Court found the
Ministers guilty of both orchestrating the entry of Turkey into World
War I and of committing the genocide of the Armenians. The Key Ver-
dict traced Ittihad's wartime crimes to its 1908-1914 pre-war career. The
Court cited the betrayal of the ideals of the Ittihad revolution which had
overthrown the regime of Abdul Hamit in 1908, and the subsequent im-
position of "arbitrary rule and tyranny to such a point that people began
to yearn" 334 for the overthrown regime. It focused especially on Ittihad's
violent reseizure of power in January, 1913, in the course of which War
Minister Nazim and one of his Adjudants were killed.335 By creating "a
fourth instance of authority, above and beyond the three [branches of
government] that comprise the legal framework of the Ottoman govern-
ment, [Ittihad] resorted to coercive intimidation [kuvvei tehdidiye] in al-
tering [takyir] the machinery of the government ... which amounts to
altering the form of the government. ' 336 The Court also found that they
332. See TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3540, May 5, 1919, at 8; TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3543,
May 8, 1919, at 17. In rejecting the defense arguments, the Court overlooked or ignored a
major consideration. It is true that article 31 of the Ottoman Constitution sets the condition of
a trial before tile High Court for Ministers accused of misconduct-as opposed to a Court
Martial. But it contains a contingency element-"if"-at the very beginning. It reads: "If
one or more Deputies wish to level a complaint against a Minister whose responsibility is at
issue on matters touching the domain of the Chamber.. ." (likayet beyan ettiki halde). Thus,
the Constitution neither compels nor precludes any particular line of procedure. Its provisions
are binding only for Parliamentary procedures; other procedures, such as recourse to regular
criminal courts, are not addressed. A Deputy may or can, but is not directed to take the High
Court route. Consequently, the statute is not preemptory in its thrust; other options are avail-
able to Deputies or to judicial officials wanting to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Moreover,
there is no record of any constitution with any provision affording an official, high or low, the
privilege of being placed beyond the reach of public law for common offenses or crimes. This
may be the chief, if not the only, reason why article 31 is prefaced with the preposition "if."
The prosecution failed to make this point, even though in the Key Indictment it had declared
emphatically that the crimes associated with the Armenian deportations did "constitute the
real purpose of these court proceedings," TAKVIMI VEKAYi, No. 3540, May 5, 1919, at 8, and
as such were justiciable in courts other than the High Court.
333. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3604, at 217-20.
334. Id. at 218.
335. Id. at 217.
336. Id. at 219.
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"maintained almost without interruption the state of siege which neces-
sarily was declared at the start of the revolution.
337
This domination of the state apparatus, the Court reasoned, was in
line with "the special aspirations and objectives" of the party.338 The
engineering of Turkey's entry into World War I through "aggression"
was cited as a principal objective.339 The Tribunal cited the testimony of
Trabzon province's delegate, who had been a key Special Organization
leader, when it alluded to the incidence of "crime against peace."' 340 As
this delegate testified, before the onset of the Russo-Turkish war in No-
vember 1914, Ittihad had organized guerilla forays into the Russian Cau-
casus in anticipation of the war it was set to provoke: "It was Ittihad's
predilection and intent that led to the declaration of war.
'341
The second objective, "the organization and execution of crime of
massacre [taktil cinayeti] by the leaders of Ittihad" against the Armeni-
ans, had been exposed during the preceding trials.342 "This fact," the
Court noted, "has been proven and verified [tahakkuk] by the Court
Martial. '343 The Verdict focused attention on two subsidiary facts: (1)
"The Armenians in particular suffered disaffection as the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing security and justice proved ill-founded; as a re-
sult, they were prompted to assume a posture of waiting for an opportu-
nity to fall back on their national aspirations. ' 344 (2) "The Ittihadists
deliberately exacerbated racial and national differences and cleav-
ages," '345 implicitly stigmatizing anyone against Ittihad as anti-Moslem.
In this connection, the Verdict cited the eyhulislam's testimony that "to
resign from Ittihad meant to resign from Islam.
' 346
In the conviction and sentencing of the principal co-perpetrators, the
Verdict relied on articles 45 (paragraph 1), 55, and 170 of the Penal Code
as had been demanded by the Prosecution in the Key Indictment. Talat,
Enver, Cemal and Dr. Nazim, the top leaders of Ittihad and Cabinet
Ministers, were condemned to death in absentia. The lesser Ittihadists,
also Cabinet Ministers, were convicted under article 45, paragraph 2.
The Court imposed a sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment with hard
337. Id. at 218.
338. Id. at 219.
339. Id. at 218.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. This reference is to the Yozgat and Trabzon trials that preceded the trial of




346. Id. at 219.
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labor on the second category of offenders. The ex-Ministers of Post and
Commerce were acquitted.
7. Ancillary Verdicts and the End of the Proceedings
The legal arguments and procedures applied to the trials of the Cabi-
net Ministers, especially the Key Indictment and the Key Verdict, set the
tone for other trials that were occurring during this time. The common
element in all the verdicts was the finding that the deportations were a
cloak for the central plan of destruction of the deportees. 347 As the Yoz-
gat Verdict declared, "there can be no doubt and no hesitation" about
this fact. Furthermore, the real purpose behind the deportations had
been proven by documents personally written and signed by the defend-
ants (hattt destiyle mukarrer vesika). 348 That same Verdict, besides rely-
ing on specific Ottoman penal codes (articles 45 and 170 of the Penal
Code and article 171 of the Military Code, concerning the offense of
plunder of goods and provisions), invoked "the sublime precepts of Is-
lam" as well as "humanity and civilization" to condemn "the crimes of
massacre, pillage and plunder.
'3 49
The Yozgat judgment, like the subsequent Key verdict, deplored the
Ittihadist defendants' agitation "not only among local Muslims, but
among Muslims in general," in favor of murdering the Armenians, call-
ing such agitation "a mortal sin."' 350 The Yozgat Verdict likewise repu-
diated the defense's argument that the murders of innocent people were
reprisals against Armenians elsewhere who had committed sabotage and
other acts of rebellion.
These circumstances do not justify the commission of the crimes with
which the defendants are charged. Besides, only a trifling portion of the
Armenian people is implicated in these acts; the majority of them demon-
strated their loyalty .... Such transfer of blame in any event is against the
dictates of law and conscience.
351
The Trabzon Verdict also invoked "the high principles of Islam and
the provisions of the Ottoman Civil Code" to emphasize "the rights of all
Ottoman elements to the protection of their honor, lives and properties,
without discrimination, by the officials of the state, that protection being
347. Trabzon Verdict, TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3616, Aug. 6, 1919, at 1-3; Yozgat,
TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3617, Aug. 7, 1919, at 1-2; Harput, TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3771, Feb.
9, 1919, at 1-2; Responsible Secretaries, TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3772, Feb. 10, 1919, at 1-6,
Erzincan, TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3917, July 27, 1920, at 5-6. Portions of the Court Martial
proceedings are embodied in TARIHI MUHAKEME (Historical Trial) (K. Sudi ed. 1919).
348. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3617, Aug. 7, 1919, at 2.
349. Id.




a matter of duty of the first order for the latter. '352 The Armenian de-
portees, the Court found, were instead handed over to gangs of "repeat
criminals" who methodically robbed, raped and murdered their charges,
usually by drowning them in the Black Sea (bahra ilka etmekle bo.,durup
mahv ettikleri).
353
The Responsible Secretaries Verdict found the defendants guilty of
"the massacre and destruction of the Armenians and the plunder and
looting of their goods and belongings... they had a free hand in their
criminal activities [involving mainly] the organization and engagement
[tertip ve ihzar] of the gangs of brigands assigned to massacre duty.
' 354
The actual sentences of those found guilty, however, provided a strik-
ing contrast to the concept of retributive justice which had motivated the
prosecution. In the Harput trial, Dr. akir, the Political Director of the
Special Organization, was convicted and sentenced to death in absentia.
In all the ancillary verdicts only two relatively minor provincial officials
and one gendarmery commander were executed for their complicity in
the Armenian massacres.355 In reference to light sentencing, Rear Admi-
ral and British Acting High Commissioner at Istanbul, Richard Webb,
stated "It is interesting to see... the manner in which the sentences have
been apportioned among the absent and the present so as to effect a mini-
mum of real bloodshed."
356
These trials were but a fragment of the many other trials for which
only the preparations were completed as Kemalism emerged to displace
the Sultan's government. On January 13, 1921, the Courts Martial were
abolished altogether, with jurisdiction reverting to regular military
courts.357 Nearly all of the key figures of Ittihad managed to escape Tur-
352. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3616, Aug. 6, 1919, at 2.
353. Id.
354. TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3772, Feb. 10, 1919, at 3.
355. Those executed were: (1) Mehmed Kemal, county executive (kaymakam) of
Bogazhyan, and during the massacres, Deputy District Commissioner (mutasarrij) of Yozgat.
TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3520.
(2) Abdullah Avni, nicknamed Hayran Baba, who was in charge of the Erzincan gendarm-
ery. He was the brother of Abdul Gani, a prominent Ittihadist and the Responsible Secretary
of Edirne. TAKVIMI VEKAYi, No. 3917, July 27, 1920, at 5-6.
(3) Behramzade Nusret, Bayburt county executive, later District Commissioner of Ergani.
and subsequently of Urfa. TAKVIMI VEKAYI No. 3924. After the debacle of the Damad Ferit
regime and the ascendancy of Kemalism, the military Appeals Court overturned Nusret's July
20, 1920 verdict on January 7, 1921. See G. JAESCHKE, supra note 157, at 95. Both Kemal
and Nusret were then declared "national Martyrs" (milli jehid). Jaeschke, Beitrdge zur Ges-
chichte des Kampfes der Tiirkei um ihre Unabhdngigkeit, 5 N.S. DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 16,
n.6 (1958). On December 25, 1920, the Ankara regime allocated a pension for Nusret's family.
See G. JAESCHKE, supra note 157, at 95.
356. FO 371/4174/118392, folio 267 (July 7, 1919 communication).
357. The abolition was part of a series of related political acts: (1) On April 29, 1920, a bill
was introduced in the new Kemalist National Assembly in Ankara to declare the official deci-
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key before being brought to trial.3 58 Scores of other, lesser Ittihadists
were likewise condemned to death in absentia or sentenced to prison
terms. Many of these eventually escaped or were set free. The July 24,
1923 Treaty of Lausanne359 which preempted and replaced that of Se-
vres, was framed in such a way so as to avoid treating the subject of war
crimes and massacres. With Declaration VIII of Amnesty and the Pro-
tocol attached to this treaty,360 and as Kemalism gained the upper hand
and eventually ended the Ottoman Empire, the pursuit of justice for the
Armenians within international law was abandoned.
sions and decrees of the Sultan's Istanbul government null and void. (2) On June 7, 1920, the
Ankara government enacted Law No. 7, which declared the Istanbul government, its Treaties
and Agreements, invalid as of March 16, 1920, when the Allies formally occupied the city and
assumed full control of it. (3) On January 3, 1921, the Kemalist Ankara Government decided
to have its Independence Court supplant the Court Martial in the judgement of the crimes
alleged to have occurred in Yozgat (Ankara province). (4) On April 25, 1922, the last Cabinet
of the last Grand Vezir was impelled by the Kemalists to declare military Tribunals incompe-
tent to try "nationalists," meaning adherents of Kemalism. (5) On November 6, 1922, Ankara
laws were introduced in Istanbul and proclaimed to be the new laws of the land. (6) Finally,
on March 31, 1923, general amnesty was announced for all those convicted by Courts Martial
as well as civilian courts. G. JAESCHKE, supra note 157. All six acts are described at 76, 80,
95, 128, 142, and 148 respectively.
358. Most of these war criminals, however, were tracked down and executed by Armenian
"avengers." These executions occurred in Germany and Russia, where all of the condemned
men cited in the text had fled. Talat was assassinated in Berlin on March 15, 1921. Dr. akir
assassinated in Berlin on April 17, 1922. Cemal was gunned down in Thilissi (Tiflis) on July
21, 1922. Enver is said to have been tracked down by Agabekof, an Armenian operative of the
Communist Secret Service, in the Emirate of Bukhara, and killed on August 4, 1922 during the
ensuing fight. Though the literature on Enver's end is imprecise, the following sources are
instructive: ESAD BEY, DIE VERSCHW6RUNG GEGEN DIE WELT (1932); Wie der Kias-
senkampf im Emirat Buchara entschieden wurde, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
(Frankfurt), Feb. 6, 1980, at 9; SOVETAGAN HAYASDAN (Yerevan, monthly publication), Aug.
1984, at 8.
Ten days after the execution of akir, Dr. Nazim, who had also taken refuge to Berlin, fled
back to Turkey to escape a similar fate after accepting the Kemalist condition that he as well
as other Ittihadists would be welcome to the fatherland if they would integrate themselves into
the new regime. But Nazim was charged with conspiracy in connection with the Ittihadist
attempt on the life of Mustafa Kemal and was hanged in Ankara on August 26, 1926, by the
order of the Independence Court. FO 371/11528/E5141. Only one of the commandos of these
carefully planned and accomplished series of executions was apprehended, but the German
Criminal Court acquitted the self-confessed culprit who had tracked down and assassinated ex-
Grand Vezir Talat in Berlin. Commenting on this event, Robert Kempner, U.S. Deputy Chief
of Counsel, Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, stated that the incidence "focused global attention
on a particularly important development in international law." From the foreword of a soon-
to-be published book on this trial (on file with author). For details on the assassination and
trial see Dadrian, supra note 169, at 359, n.113.
359. Treaty of Lausanne, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, 117 Brit. and For. St. Papers 543, reprinted in 18
AM. J. INT'L L. I (Supp. 1924).
360. Id.; Declaration of Amnesty is in article 1. In commenting on the failure of the feeble
Allied efforts to secure a measure of justice for the Armenians at Lausanne, an author wrote:
"it became a matter of the highest importance from the humanitarian standpoint that liberal
provisions be made regarding the treatment of the Armenians.. .as determined by the Treaty
of Peace." Turlington, The Settlement of Lausanne, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 699-700 (1924).
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8. Political Impediments to the Domestic Trials
The promise of domestic retribution went unrealized for the same rea-
sons that the international efforts had failed. The demands of national
sovereignty on the part of Turkey overwhelmed the weak commitment of
the European Powers to punish the Turks' crimes against humanity in
the genocidal killing of the Armenians. The force of the national sover-
eignty argument is especially strong in cases where the criminal act was
committed by Turkish subjects upon Turkish subjects and within the ter-
ritorial boundaries of Turkey. Furthermore, a nation will generally be
unwilling to assume the collective guilt that domestic punishment of its
former leaders implies. In this setting, the political infighting, both
within Turkey and between the Allied Powers, often played a larger role
in the criminal trials than the demands of justice.
a. The preliminary stages of the trials
From the very first stages of the criminal prosecution in Turkey, the
proceedings were subject to the pressures of internal Turkish politics.
The enemies of the discredited Ittihad party, comprising journalists, in-
tellectuals, civil servants, and retired military officers, were in the fore-
front of the campaign aimed at punishing the leaders of that party.
Himself a foe of Ittihad, the Sultan encouraged that effort. Further, for
most of the critical period of the trial (March 4, 1919-October 17, 1920),
Damad Ferit, himself an avowed foe of Ittihad, occupied the office of
Grand Vezir. In fact, the desire for retribution was at first so strong that
in the first few months after the Armistice, prosecution threatened to give
way to persecution. The headquarters of the Ittihad party as well as sev-
eral branches were raided, the inventories impounded, and the properties
of the fugitive leaders confiscated.361 Further, at one point "ten political
dignitaries" appealed to the Sultan to punish the Ittihadists by recourse
to speedy justice.
362
These efforts, however, were more than offset by the residual authority
and influence of Ittihad, whose partisans and sympathizers still domi-
nated the Civil Service, the War Office, and especially the police.363 Af-
ter temporarily receding into the background, Ittihad began to form a
361. M. GOKBILGIN, supra note 270, at 8-10; TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3462. The respective
official documents on these acts of confiscation are reprinted in 2 T. TUNAYA, supra note 144,
at 55-59.
362. S. AK§IN, supra note 258, at 151. The message was relayed on January 23, 1919.
363. A London Times correspondent stated that the organizational network of the Ittihad
in Turkey was "almost intact." TIMES (London), Jan. 1, 1919. American High Commissioner
Heck confirms this observation in his report to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, complaining
that "the great majority of officials [are] still members of the C.U.P. [Ittihad] organization."
FO 608/342/8514 (Curzon memorandum, enclosure no. 2, Apr. 18, 1919).
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network of resistance cells in many wards of the Ottoman capital. Many
key officials in the Interior and Justice Ministries, co-opted by Ittihad,
began to obstruct the pace and direction of the trials. These officials
withheld crucial documents, impeded communication with provincial
authorities, delayed compliance with court orders for production and
certification of secret and top secret cipher telegrams, and altogether en-
cumbered the proceedings. In addition, they helped a host of key sus-
pects escape.
364
While the suspects awaited trial in the military prison, the British mili-
tary authorities in charge of implementing Armistice terms issued a re-
port that noted:
All prisoners of whom there are 112 are allowed to walk about the prison
and mix freely during the day. Except for a casual glance at their passes,
individuals are not subjected to any inspection on entering the prison, and
large packets are often to be seen being carried in by individuals, stated to
be food, but might be anything. Women are allowed in all times during the
day, and are never inspected.
365
The privileges enjoyed by these suspects extended to the conditions of
their detention. They were not subject to the close confinement and stern
control ordinarily imposed upon suspects awaiting criminal proceedings.
In his memoirs, one inmate relates how the Cabinet ministers were able
to gather together in a large room for what the inmate sardonically la-
belled the prison's "Cabinet Council" sessions to discuss defense strat-
egy. The ministers even invited Osman, the Legal Counsellor of the
Interior Ministry, for consultation.
366
b. The trials
Despite their good intentions, the Turkish tribunals lacked the
strength for the full prosecution of those charged with carrying out the
Armenian genocide. This weakness reflected the relative impotence of
the post-war government. No government called upon to represent the
interests of a vanquished nation can be strong; rather, it can function at
best as a shock-absorber. By assigning blame and fixing punishment, the
364. The escapees included three top Party leaders heavily implicated in Armenian mas-
sacres: Trabzon's Responsible Secretary Nail, Erzurum's Delegate Hilmi, and that region's
Chief of the Special Organization, Cafer; they obtained documents (vesika) from the govern-
ment to flee by ship. Masterminded by the residual leadership of the Special Organization,
these ventures also involved escapes from War Ministry's Bekiraa prison by other prominent
perpetrators. Among these were Sixth Army Commander Halil, Ittihad Central Committee
member Kiigiik Talat, and former Diyarbekir province governor Dr. Re§id. H. ERTORK, IKI
DEVRIN PERDE ARKASI (Behind the Scenes During Two Eras) 213, 326-27 (S. Tansu ed.
1957).
365. FO 371/4174 (folio 149), June 28, 1919.
366. A. YALMAN, supra note 180, at 339-41.
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Turkish Courts Martial were expected to alleviate the devastating domes-
tic consequences of military defeat through "catharsis," and, at the same
time, mollify the victors. They were, therefore, placed in a position
which, by its very nature, tended to weaken the judicial will to adjudicate
the criminal charges.
367
Generally, no nation can adjudge impartially and condemn itself, di-
rectly or indirectly, on charges of complicity in atrocities unless it is
strictly constrained to adhere to the law and the facts of the case.368 This
tendency often emerged in the course of the trials in the Turkish Courts
Martial. For example, following the relatively mild Yozgat Verdict of
the Turkish Military Tribunal, in which one minor official received a
death sentence, the Secretary-General of the defunct Ittihad party indig-
nantly labelled the Verdict a "self-condemnation by the Government and
the Court, and a condemnation of the Turkish nation. ' 369 A Prime Min-
367. Adaptive justice can exert itself in the opposite direction as well. A very strong gov-
ernment with dictatorial powers can cause judicial sternness to transform prosecution into
persecution. Wartime governments inherently possess such unlimited or near-unlimited pow-
ers. As weak as the post-war Turkish Courts Martial were, their wartime counterparts, fully
propped up by the dictatorial Ittihadist regime, mustered sufficient strength to stage show
trials in order to execute countless numbers of Armenians on charges of treason without re-
gard to the elementary rules of due process and the law of evidence (most victims, of course,
were simply executed).
368. On May 20, 1919, the British Foreign Office counselor referred in his minutes to "the
incompetence of the Turkish tribunals," and to "the Gilbertian methods of the Turkish judici-
ary." FO 371/4173/76582, folio 380. On May 21, 1919 the British Foreign Office in a cable
marked "urgent" apprised Foreign Minister Balfour in Paris that the Turkish Court Martial
proceedings required "embarrassing supplementaries as to ability of Turkish authorities to
ensure satisfactory results. . ." FO 371/4173/77213, folio 388. On July 10, 1919, Tilley, the
Acting Undersecretary stated in a report to the Law Officers of the Crown that "the great
majority [of the suspects] are either under remand or have been released on bail, or have been
acquitted or escaped." FO 371/4174/129560, folio 430/2. On August 1, 1919, the British
High Commission at Istanbul in a historical review of the status of Turkey informed London
that "trial by the Turkish Court Martial was proving to be a farce and injurious to our own
prestige and to that of the Turkish government." FO 371/4174/118377, folio 256. On Sep-
tember 21, 1919, British High Commissioner Robeck told Foreign Minister Curzon that the
Court Martial proceedings are "in many respects unsatisfactory and chaotic;... such a dead
failure that its findings cannot be held of any account at all, if it is intended to make responsi-
bility for deportations and massacres of inter-Allied concern.. .it is generally thought now that
little can be expected from Court Martial. . ." FO 371/4174/136069, folios 466, 469-70. On
November 17, 1919, Vice Admiral de Robeck reiterated to Curzon that "the Turkish Court
Martial. . .was never efficient and whose President and members are continually being
changed, has become more of a farce than ever." FO 371/4174/158721, folio 524. This out-
come was anticipated by the U.S. High Commissioner in the Ottoman capital, Lewis Heck, at
the very start of'the Courts Martial when on February 7, 1919, he sent a telegram stating,
"proceedings conducted characteristically dilatory fashion and attitude of court.., showing
little disposition to be severe or rapid in judgement." R.G. 256, 867.00/81.
369. See supra note 217, at 62.
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ister of the Ankara government described the Verdict as "a concession
and certification of guilt by our own government"
370
The abortiveness of the Istanbul trials also reflected the Turks' increas-
ingly defiant attitude toward the Allies. The sources of this defiance were
due only in part to nationalism. To a much greater degree, they can be
traced to the irresoluteness of the victorious Allies. The Allies' failure to
completely occupy Turkey left the state system intact, thus implicitly
recognizing Turkish sovereign rights. Further, the treaty terms provid-
ing for the surrender and trial of war criminals before Allied tribunals
caused unnecessary delays, allowing suspects to disappear, witnesses to
disperse, incriminating evidence to be removed or rendered inaccessible,
and the immediate post-war public shock and revulsion regarding the
atrocities to dissipate. The Allied Powers also neglected to insert criminal
sanctions into the Armistice Conventions, incorporating them instead
into the terms of the Versailles and S~vres Treaties. At times, the Powers
seemed almost willfully to abandon their power over post-war Turkey.
For example, the British returned "over 100,000 prisoners of war... to
Anatolia without any condition whatever despite the fact that a state of
war still exists."'3
71
The disagreements, feuds and rivalries among the Allies further em-
boldened the Turks to flout the terms of Armistice. Within six months
after the Armistice, the British, French, and Italians began to work at
cross-purposes, often undermining each other's efforts. The French and
the Italians began to support, at first secretly and then openly, the rival
Kemalist government in Ankara, thereby hastening the demise of the Is-
tanbul government and its Sultan. These diplomatic efforts crippled the
retributive justice process. The British Attorney-General advising the
Foreign Office in London, and indirectly the British High Commission at
Istanbul, of the effects of these efforts, stated: "There is the improbabil-
ity that the French and the Italian Governments would agree to partici-
pate in constituting the court provided for in article 230 of the Treaty of
S~vres. ' ' 372 The British were thus left in the lurch.
The signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty was the Allies' final act of
acquiescence to Turkey's new national policy. The principle of retribu-
370. See F. OKYAR, 0U DEVIRDE BIR ADAM (A Man of Three Eras) 280 (1980). This
point is one that has no German parallel; is the Leipzig trials did not result in any death
sentences, there was no cause for a similar reaction in Germany.
371. FO 371/6509, folio 130 (British General Harrington's cipher No. 982 to the War
Office, Sept. 14, 1921). Addressing the same issue, British High Commissioner Thomas
Hohler wrote to London, "I never contemplated that the Allies would reduce their military
forces so thoroughly before they had made peace and imposed their conditions, We have acted
on the reverse principle of the Japanese, whose old proverb is that the end of the fight is the
right time to tie on your helmet." P. HELMREICH, FROM PARIS TO StVREs 236 (1974).
372. FO 371/6509, folio 29, No. 851.
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tive justice, solemnly heralded during World War I, and reiterated after
the end of hostilities, was lost in the aftermath of the war.
c. The parallels with the German Leipzig trials
The history of the 1921-1922 Leipzig trials was remarkably similar to
that of the 1919-1921 Istanbul trials. In both cases, the domestic govern-
ments were reluctant to accede to foreign pressure and institute criminal
proceedings against their own nationals for wartime crimes against hu-
manity. Both nations, however, finally agreed to prosecute the cases.
The Germans did so as a way of placating public opinion in the Allied
countries, while the Turks did so in expectation of being rewarded by
lenient peace terms.
By refusing to surrender German nationals to the Allies for trial, the
German government virtually repudiated article 228 of the Versailles
Treaty, which stipulated such a surrender. Field Marshal von der
Goltz's scornful declaration, "The world must realize that.., no catch-
poll shall hand Germans over to the Allies, ' ' 373 was symptomatic of the
powerful resistance among Germans to which the Allies eventually suc-
cumbed. The Turkish response to the demand for the surrender of crimi-
nal suspects paralleled the German response. Not only did the Foreign
Minister of the Istanbul government object to surrendering Turkish na-
tionals to the Allies, but Mustafa Kemal, the head of the antagonistic
Ankara government, rejected the very idea of "recognizing a kind of
right of jurisdiction on the part of a foreign government over the acts of a
Turkish subject in the interior of Turkey herself.
'374
Instead, both "vanquished states" offered internal proceedings against
the war criminals. On June 11, 1921, the Ankara government informed
the British that when the Malta internees were released in exchange for
British civilian and military persons, "those accused of crimes would be
put on impartial trial at Ankara in the same way as German prisoners
were being tried in Germany. '375 This, as well as subsequent similar
assurances, proved to be mere negotiating ploys. Beyond nationalist poli-
tics, a legal issue worked in Turkey's and Germany's favor: the ex post
facto character of the provisions of both the Versailles and S~vres treaties
in that they were not predicated on existing national or international
373. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 113, at 48.
374. Speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal in Ataturk in 1927, 497 (Istanbul, 1963) [herein-
after Speech].
375. FO 371/6509, folio 47. Three months later the Interior Minister of the Ankara gov-
ernment repeated the same pledge when he informed General Harrington, then the highest
military authority at Istanbul, that those Malta exiles implicated in war crimes "will be tried
on arrival." FO 371/6509/E10411, folio 130. A similar assurance was given by Ankara's
Foreign Minister Bekir Sami. FO 371/6499/E31 10, at 190; see also A. YALMAN, supra note
251, at 106.
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laws. Article 15 of the Ottoman Penal Code, for example, explicitly pro-
hibited that type of procedure ("punishment is not to be effected in ac-
cordance with a subsequent law"). Neither the Versailles nor the S~vres
treaties specified the jurisdiction and laws by which conviction and sen-
tence rendition could be effected.
Attempts at extradition raised comparable difficulties. The Dutch
government refused to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm II who had taken ref-
uge in Holland after fleeing Germany at the end of the war. The Dutch
rejected not only the concepts of "international policy" and "interna-
tional morality" upon which the Allies proposed to try and punish the
Kaiser, but they also invoked the domestic laws and national traditions
of Holland as further justification. The Dutch defined the offense with
which the Kaiser was charged as "political" and hence exempt from
extradition.
376
Similarly, Germany refused to surrender Talat Pa§a, who as Grand
Vezir was the de facto head of the Ottoman state when he fled to Ger-
many at the end of the war. German Foreign Minister Solf invoked par-
agraph 2 of article 5 of the 1917 Turko-German Extradition Treaty
which permitted extradition under three conditions: an arrest order, a
verdict against the person whose extradition is being sought, or the sub-
mission of related judicial documents. As the Court Martial had not yet
taken place, there was no judicial documentation of a verdict. At any
rate, added Solf, "Talat stuck with us faithfully, and our country remains
open to him. '37
7
As the trials progressed, internal pressures in both countries, caused
by resurgent nationalism, strongly affected the proceedings. From simi-
lar beginnings, the Leipzig trials resulted in similar failures as their coun-
terparts in Istanbul. "The German public showed indignation that
German judges could be found to sentence the war criminals and the
press brought all possible pressure to bear on the Court. ' 378 Many of the
defendants were cheered upon entering or leaving the courtroom, while
representatives of the Allies attending the trials were hooted. Those ac-
quitted often departed the courtroom with bouquets of flowers offered to
them by an admiring public. Prison guards who assisted in the escape of
some defendants before or after conviction were publicly congratu-
lated.379 The most famous case involved the Llandovery Castle Hospital
376. See Wright, The Legal Liability of the Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 120 (1919);
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1920.
377. A.A. TORKEI 183/54 A45718. For the protracted exchange on this subject between
the German Foreign Office and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, see FO 371/4173/82190, 371/
4174/98910, 371/5173/E6949, 618/113/1941, folios 404-15; see also 3:4 Y. BAYUR, supra
note 124, at 782.
378. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 113, at 51-52.
379. See J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 126-47.
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Ship, which had been torpedoed and sunk, with two naval lieutenants
firing upon the survivors in the lifeboats. The two lieutenants proudly
accepted the London Times calling them "barbarians," while the Ger-
man press hailed them as "U-Boat Heroes" upon their being sentenced to
four years' imprisonment.
380
The outcome of the Leipzig proceedings was dismal by any standard of
retributive justice. Out of a total of 901 cases, 381 888 suspects were either
acquitted or summarily dismissed. Only twelve trials were held; half re-
sulted in acquittals and half in convictions with light sentences. Allied
disappointment at the popular exaltation of the defendants and subver-
sion of justice in Turkey, also applied to Germany. In the latter case the
Allies appointed a Commission of Allied jurists to examine the effect of
the popular response on the proceedings. The Commission unanimously
recommended to the Supreme Council that the Leipzig trials be sus-
pended and the remaining defendants be tried before Allied Courts. As
in Turkey, the Commission's recommendations failed to yield the desired
results. 382
Summary
Although occurring more than seventy years ago, the Armenian geno-
cide provides important insight into the roles of international actors in
preventing or punishing genocide and the challenges that the interna-
tional legal system faces in each case. Its prescriptions, however, are
mostly negative. The Great Powers of Europe, through a misreading of
the Turkish domestic situation and a hesitant, fumbling policy of "hu-
manitarian intervention," not only failed to prevent the genocide but ex-
acerbated it by encouraging the Armenians to press for reforms and then
failing to protect them from Turkish backlash. The unsuccessful at-
tempts at punishment following the war suggest two additional general
principles. First, the domestic courts of a vanquished adversary cannot
effectively be used to punish citizens of that country for war crimes, espe-
cially crimes committed with the tacit support of the populace. Second,
genocide by a conquered power can only be effectively prosecuted if the
victors remain united in firm resolve. Pursuit of individual political gain
by the victors is incompatible with the demands of justice.
380. TIMES (London), July 9, 1921; German War Trials: Report of the Proceedings before
the Supreme Court in Leipzig, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 628-40, 674-724 (1922); see also C. MUL-
LINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921); 2 ANN. DIG. 436 (Reichsgericht 1921).
381. The lists of these suspects were, in part, compiled and transmitted to the Germans by
Britain (97), Belgium (334), Poland (57), France (332), Italy (29) and Rumania (41). The
remaining suspects were fugitives.
382. GERMAN WAR CRIMES: REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS, BRIT. PARL. PAPERS,
Cmnd. 1450 (1921).
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The Armenian Genocide was a direct consequence of the social-polit-
ical system that existed in Ottoman Turkey during the years leading up
to World War I. Because of certain intractable components, most nota-
bly religious beliefs which could not be reconciled with conceptions of
Armenian equality, the Ottoman system was subjected to unabating ex-
ternal and internal pressures. The specific challenge to scholarship here
is to discern the connection between these pressures and the unique and
tragic nature of the response they triggered in this case. It is the basic
thesis of this study that the genocidal nature of the Turkish response was
in part conditioned by Ottoman traditions and theocracy. The norms
and the associated corpus of the Ottoman customary and common law
for subject nationalities and minorities not only allowed, but in many
instances encouraged, such a drastic response as a form of crisis manage-
ment. Thus, what was considered deviant by external, international stan-
dards was considered normal and functional by domestic Ottoman
desiderata.
The concept of "status" provides the link between the social and legal
criteria in the study of the Armenian genocide. The Armenians were not
only an ethnic-religious minority with social disabilities, but also a politi-
cally disenfranchised group, denied legal equality. Their inferior status
made them permanently vulnerable. The permeation of Islamic dogma
and tradition into the Ottoman social system, reinforced by the martial
traditions of the Empire, reinforced Armenian vulnerability. Most im-
portant, the Ottoman legal system became permeated with the elements
of the Islamic canonic law, the eriat, which required this inequal status
as a fundamental and fixed truth under Islam.
The nineteenth-century "humanitarian interventions" of the Concert
of Europe to protect the Armenians failed in large part because they did
not give due consideration to the socio-political forces which forced the
Armenians into an inferior position. By failing to address this central
factor, the Europeans allowed the Ottoman state to pursue the more ex-
pedient but far less effective route of responding to the symptoms the
socio-political system produced. A series of treaties and agreements
signed between the European Powers and Turkey between 1856 and 1914
nominally obligated the Ottoman authorities to extend equality to their
non-Muslim subjects. The Turkish authorities, while feigning concur-
rence with the need for reforms, ensured that these reforms never took
actual effect. By pursuing a strategy of stalling and temporizing, 383 while
383. A Belgian legist described
the distinguishing characteristics of modem Ottoman diplomacy-great facility in assimi-




at the same time playing the Powers against each other, the Turks man-
aged to defuse internationally explosive situations without taking any ac-
tion contrary to their religious beliefs. At issue for the Turks was not the
formal introduction of reforms, a series of which were in fact enacted and
promulgated, but their effective implementation. The Armenians were
not "entitled" to, and hence were not going to be accorded, equality in
the Ottoman system. When deception and deferral were ineffective, the
Turks resorted to violent measures of repression, culminating first in the
1894-1897 Hamidian massacres. These massacres are important not only
because they foreshadowed the subsequent genocide, but also because the
pepetrators were not prosecuted. Given this precedent, the Turks had
strong reason to believe that there would likewise be no punishment for
subsequent killings.
The intransigence of the Ottoman government, which gathered mo-
mentum through the diplomatic crises and associated Armenian
pogroms, found a violent outlet in the pursuit of World War I, into
which Turkey willingly plunged by unilaterally provoking and initiating
hostilities. 384 The Ottoman government saw the war as a way to end
once and for all the grounds for foreign intervention. The peremptory
wartime annulment of the treaties of Paris and Berlin and the 1914
Agreement, depriving the Armenians of their last vestiges of hope, at-
tested to this intent.
These acts of annulment may technically be attributed to the effect of
war; international law has no explicit or uniform rules for the preserva-
tion or annulment of treaties during war.385 The annulments acquire
critical significance, however, when placed in the context of Ottoman
Turkey's continuous flouting of treaty provisions in the decades preced-
ing the war. The episodic pre-war massacres of Armenians occurred
cunning in taking advantage of this cunning to conceal, under deceptive appearances, the
barbarous reality of deeds and intentions; cool audacity, making promises which there is
neither the power nor the desire to make good and finally, a paternal and oily tone, in-
tended to create the impression that the Turkish Government is the victim of unjust
prejudices and odious calumnies.
M. ROLIN-JAEQUEMEYNS, supra note 35, at 87. The international law expertise of the author
of this statement lends it special significance. He was the editor of Revue de droit international
et de legislation comparie, and twice the President of the Institute of International Law. In
1899 he took part in the First Peace Conference of the Hague and was appointed Reporter for
the Fourth Convention on the Laws and Customs of War. At the end of World War I, he
went to the Peace Conference at Paris as the Secretary-General of the Belgian delegation, was
later appointed Belgian High Commissioner in the Occupied Territory of the Rhineland, and
subsequently became Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs. In 1930 he reached the pinnacle of
his career when he was elected to be a judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156-57 (1937) (obituary).
384. See supra note 126.
385. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 99 (7th ed. 1952).
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when these treaties were in force but not enforced. The European Pow-
ers elected to substitute expressions of outrage for any implementation of
sanctions. While it must also be pointed out that the relevant treaties
lacked self-executing provisions in case of violation, the fact remains that
the Powers' inaction was not due to any sensitivity to legal niceties but
rather to mutual suspicions and rivalries. 38 6 The climax of this European
ritual of alternately remonstrating with and threatening Turkey came in
May, 1915 with the initiation of the Armenian genocide. The genocide
was consummated irrespective of Europe's threats, and the perpetrators
once more escaped punishment.
38 7
The historical perspective employed in this study demonstrates the fact
that the episodic Armenian massacres served both as a crucible and a
prelude to the World War I holocaust. Had the Powers interceded in
concert after any one of these episodes, as they did in Lebanon in the
aftermath of the 1860 massacre, the issues of prevention and punishment
in all likelihood would not have arisen. 38 They were impeded, however,
by the vagaries of politics, among themselves and in relation to the Turk-
ish state. While they pretended to pursue "humanitarian intervention,"
they actually engaged in Realpolitik; the Turks understood the resulting
386. In the Nuremberg Judgment the Court specifically stated that "in many cases treaties
do no more than express and define for more accurate reference the principles of law already
existing." Bassiouni, supra note 113, at 285.
387. The viability of recourse to humanitarian intervention in contemporary settings of
domestic conflict and mass murder is discussed by a number of experts of international law.
Falk, for example, enumerates the obstacles to effective intervention in the face of genocidal
killings, underscoring his assertion that unless the world order becomes amenable to structural
changes providing new standards of international law, the obstacles are likely to persist. Falk,
Responding to Severe Violations, in ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1979). After sur-
veying the history of humanitarian intervention and the present state of the law respecting the
resort to coercive force on humanitarian grounds, two legal scholars conclude that such inter-
vention, especially when unilateral, is not sanctioned historically or by current standards, ex-
cept with the sanction of the United Nations. They, therefore, dispute the merits of arguments
defining as precedent-setting India's use of military force against Pakistan and in favor of
Bangladesh. Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by
Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1973).
The example these authors set in incorporating the Armenian case of genocide into their
arguments was followed by two others who, in their most recent contributions to the field of
international law, depict the "full-scale extermination of . . . approximately one million
Armenians... in Turkey," Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention
in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 593 (1987), and
emphasize the fact that "the [U.N.] Convention [on the Prevention and Punishment of Geno-
cide] would cover the Armenian Genocide." LeBlanc, The United Nations Genocide Conven-
tion and Political Groups: Should the United States Propose an Amendment?, 13 YALE J. INT'L
L. 270, 290, 293 (1988).
388. After his conviction at Nuremberg, Albert Speer, reflecting on the crime of deporta-
tions, deplored the failure of the Allies to prosecute the violators. Such prosecution "would
have encouraged a sense of responsibility on the part of leading political figures if after the
First World War the Allies had actually held the trials they had threatened ...... J. WILLIS,
supra note 12, at 173.
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cleavage between purport and intent and took it into account when con-
sidering radical preemptive measures. This aspect of the conduct of the
Powers introduced a third element into the picture, one which was coun-
terpoised to prevention and punishment but which distorted them both:
the inadvertent aggravation of a domestic conflict by perfunctory inter-
ventions whose latent functions produced disaster instead of relief.
The humanitarian interventions by the European Powers awakened
the national consciousness of the Armenian population in Ottoman Tur-
key. Once awakened, however, it was given no outlet. The Armenians
looked to the treaties and agreements signed by the Ottoman Empire and
began to demand that their paper rights be recognized in practice. The
problem, however, was that these treaties were not legislative enactments
but merely contracts between states; thus they did not specify a crime,
assign jurisdiction, or provide the machinery for the administration of
punitive justice. These limitations, still intrinsic to the field of interna-
tional law, spelled disaster for the Armenians. Rather than resulting in a
resolution of the Armenian Question, these treaties served only to inter-
nationalize the issue.
389
A domestic conflict for the Ottomans was thus transformed into an
international headache. Fridjof Nansen, who as High Commissioner of
the League of Nations tried very hard to succor the wounds of Armenia
and rehabilitate the survivors of the holocaust along with the other refu-
gees of the war, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
1922, ended his volume on the Armenian tragedy with this lamentation:
"Woe to the Armenians, that they were ever drawn into European poli-
tics! It would have been better for them if the name of Armenia had
never been uttered by any European diplomatist. ' '390
389. In his closing speech at the Cabinet Ministers' trial, the Turkish Procuror-General
Re§ad specifically cited the Berlin Treaty as the principal source of the rise and development of
the Turko-Armenian conflict. L'ENTENTE (Istanbul), June 26, 1919. It was article 61 of that
Treaty that stipulated reforms for the Armenians, "and thereafter the 'Armenian question'
[was] internationalized." Ahmad, Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish
Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914, in I CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE Oro-
MAN EMPIRE 404, 423 (1982)..Commenting on this issue in 1920, Brown deplored "the intrusive and fruitless friendship of
Great Britain for the Armenians" as being responsible for the 1895-96 and World War I mas-
sacres. Brown, The Mandate Over Armenia, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 396, 397-98 (1920). Secretary
of State (later Chief Justice) Charles Evans Hughes, in a 1924 address to the Council of For-
eign Relations, likewise attributed "a large part of the distress" at issue here to the "encourag-
ing action [of the British] which failed of adequate support.... [The victims were] left to their
own devices." Hughes, Recent Questions and Negotiations, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 229, 239
(1924).
390. F. NANSEN, ARMENIA AND THE NEAR EAST 324 (1976). During his engagement as
League of Nations' High Commissioner for Relief for Russia, Nansen tried to seek justice and
redemption for Armenia, whose fate he defined as "the betrayal of a nation." His exchange
with Lord Robert Cecil, then Assistant Foreign Minister of Great Britain, epitomizes his dis-
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The Armenian experience is also instructive in that the failure to pre-
vent a particular instance of genocide does not ensure its subsequent pun-
ishment. Although Nuremberg provides a striking counterexample of
international consensus, the Armenian experience of noble talk without
substantive action is, sadly, far more common. The international efforts
at retribution following World War I, both in the case of Turkey and its
ally Germany, reveal the weakness of international punishment as an ef-
fective deterrent to future acts of genocide. The international efforts of
the European Powers to bring the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide
to justice fell victim to the overarching principle of national sovereignty
and the machinations of international politics. By allowing the Ottoman
government to remain in place following its defeat in the war, the Euro-
pean Powers gave up the authority that they needed to effectuate retribu-
tion for the massacre. The presence of a sovereign government in Turkey
not only impeded the initiation of international trials through legal barri-
ers, such as issues of jurisdiction, and practical impediments, such as dif-
ficulties in securing the evidence needed for international prosecution,
but led to the splintering of European resolve by fostering political ma-
neuvering between the powers to curry favor with the Turkish
government.
The efforts at domestic retribution for the Armenian genocide were
similarly ineffective. Although Courts Martial were instituted in Turkey,
and a great deal of damning evidence concerning the genocide was re-
vealed, its perpetrators emerged relatively unscathed. The fact that these
trials were held at all likely was due only to the efforts of a weak post-war
government to secure more promising terms for peace. Thus, the Courts
were never given the power they needed to prosecute effectively the mur-
derers of the Armenian people. Instead, the trials served only to stir a
new ground swell of nationalist fervor among the Muslims which re-
sulted in the emergence of the Kemalist regime. The Turks, like the
Germans following World War I, were unwilling to accept the collective
guilt that these domestic trials represented. Thus, after the Kemalist re-
gime took power, the large number of the Courts Martial that had not
dain and bitterness with regard to foreign policies of governments. The irony of his remark
stems from the fact that Lord Cecil, the son of the famous nineteenth century British States-
man Lord Salisbury, who is regarded as the architect of Article 61 of the 1878 Berlin Treaty,
was one of the very few British diplomats who tried to implement the "Charter for Armenian
Justice." The four clauses of that charter are described in R. HOVANNISIAN, supra note 142,
at 248-49. Nansen is reported to have chastised Lord Cecil, "Your damned rotten govern-
ment. Well, all governments are rotten." Cited by his daughter Liv Nansen, who under the
married name Heoyer wrote and published the book NANSEN OG VERDEN (Nansen and the
World) (1955), (cited in Yayloian, Medz Deroutiunneri Gogme Moratzuadz Jhogovourt (A Peo-




reached the verdict stage were dismantled, and the last opportunity at
retribution disappeared. The European Powers, having lost the neces-
sary cohesion and authority, were unable to prevent this result.
The series of mistakes and failures on the part of the European victors
in World War I rendered the Armenian genocide impervious to both pre-
vention and punishment. The failure of the justice process in this case
(compounded by the dismal results of the German Leipzig trials)
prompted the Allies to employ different methods at Nuremberg following
World War II. This change was considerably facilitated by maintaining
a modicum of consensus and unison among the victors. The German
State and its subsidiary organizations were challenged on the main issue
of the criminal abuse of sovereignty, 391 whereby its own citizens had be-
come victims of "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation."
The Nuremberg Tribunal was not only a military court of occupation,
but an international court as well. As such it pioneered in some crucial
ways in overcoming areas of tension between national and international
law to impose penal sanctions for crimes against humanity committed by
a state. The procedural adaptations embedded in the Nuremberg Char-
ter illustrate the point.392 The resulting legal precedents circumscribed
391. United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson played a key role in this respect.
Questioning the relevance of the World War I arguments of the American members of the
Commission on Responsibilities who adhered to the doctrine of the inviolability and immunity
of the sovereign state, he declared, "[S]entiment in the United States and the better World
opinion have greatly changed since Mr. James Brown Scott and Secretary Lansing announced
their views...." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS,
LONDON, 1945 18-20 (1949). In his opening statement, he counterposed to that doctrine the
following arguments:
Of course, it was under the law of all civilized peoples a crime for one man with his bare
knuckles to assault another. How did it come that multiplying this crime by a million,
and adding firearms to bare knuckles, made a legally innocent act? The doctrine was that
one could not be regarded as criminal for committing the usual violent acts in the conduct
of legitimate warfare .... An International Law which operates only on states can be
enforced only by war because the most practicable method of coercing a state is war-
fare.... The only answer to recalcitrance was impotence or war.... Of course, the idea
that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes is a fiction. While it is quite
proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or corporation for the purpose of
imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let such a legalism become the basis
of personal immunity. The Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal acts
may not take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were acts of
states.... The Charter also recognizes a vicarious liability, which responsibility is recog-
nized by most modern systems of law, for acts committed by others in carrying out a
common plan or conspiracy to which a defendant has become a party .... [M]en are
convicted for acts that they did not personally commit but for which they were held
responsible because of membership in illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies.
R. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE AS PRESENTED BY ROBERT H. JACKSON, CHIEF OF
COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES 82-83, 88-89 (1971).
392. The Agreement, an outgrowth of the work of the London Conference, was concluded
at London, August 8, 1945. The Charter, under which the 1945-1946 Nuremberg trials were
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the primacy and exclusivity of domestic laws concerning personal re-
sponsibility, international accountability and criminal liability for war-
time conduct. These principles extended criminal liability to the highest
officials of a state, including the sovereign, imposing severe restrictions
on such defenses as superior orders, act of state, and military neces-
sity.39 3 Above all it paved the way for the affirmation of crimes against
humanity as a supreme offense under international law, treating it as sub-
held, was annexed to the agreement. The Nuremberg principles, which emerged from a series
of decisions associated with these trials, are significant in terms of both precedence and codifi-
cation. In the Judgment for example, it is stated that,
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement and Charter, and the
crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which there shall be individual
responsibility, are set out in Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding
upon the Tribunal. The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legisla-
tive power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and
the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories had been
recognized by the civilized world.
Bassiouni, supra note 113, at 283. This decision is entirely in accord with the 1919 recommen-
dation of the Commission on Responsibilities, cited in supra note 209. The following proce-
dural adaptations spelled out in the Charter are likewise noteworthy:
Art. 3. Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be challenged by the
prosecution, or by the defendants or their counsel.
Art. 18 The Tribunal shall
(a) Confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the
charges.
(b) Take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause unreasonable
delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever.
(c) Deal summarily with any contumacy imposing appropriate punishment, in-
cluding exclusion of any defendant or his counsel from some or all further
proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges.
Art. 19 The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt
and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical proce-
dure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.
Dep't of State Pub. No. 2420, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (Supp. 1945).
393. The legal nuances of these restrictions, treated as a matter of customary international
law, were extensively debated in the wake of World War I by British, French, and German
jurists grappling with the proposed terms of the Versailles Treaty. For a detailed analysis of
the exchanges see 2 J. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 483-501 (pa-
ras. 588-94) (1920); see also Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, LAW Q. REV. 40-
52 (Jan. 1946), reprinted in WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 113, at 550-51. The Nu-
remberg Charter stipulation that crimes against humanity, in order to be prosecuted, have to
be war-related, i.e., "in execution or in connection with the war," was treated in general terms
by the 1919 Turkish Military Tribunal. In its Key Indictment, it scorned the covert goals of
the conspirators in their catapulting Turkey into war by a preemptive strike against Russia.
TAKVIMI VEKAYI, No. 3540, May 5, 1919. In its Key Verdict it reiterated this point by citing
the evidence supplied by one of the members of Ittihad party's Central Committee. TAKVIMI
VEKAYI, No. 3604. The final report of the Commission on Responsibilities likewise under-
scored the fact that the war was "premeditated by the central powers together with their allies,
Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately connected in order to make it
unavoidable." It then linked these premeditated designs with the wartime perpetration of
"barbarous methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elemen-
tary laws of humanity." J. GARNER, supra, at 490.
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sidiary to common and uncommon types of war crimes, and as a source
of the law of nations. 394
The success of Nuremberg, however, should not obscure the ever pres-
ent dangers that led to the failure of international law during the Arme-
nian genocide. Given the nature of genocide, the practical problems
attending the enforcement of legal sanctions are issues which continue to
render questionable the viability of efforts at deterrence. Nor is there any
great likelihood that any future initiatives of retribution will benefit from
the degree of consensus among the participating states as existed at Nu-
remberg. The Nazi crimes were too extensive, the victim categories too
numerous, and the resulting devastation too cataclysmic to permit the
intrusion at Nuremberg of consequential disagreements among the Al-
lies. Most important, the nations partaking in the judicial prosecution of
Nazi crimes were, next to the Jews, the principal victims of Nazi atroci-
ties. It is appropriate to wonder whether Nuremberg might have been
contemplated at all, let alone instituted, if only the Jews and to some
extent the Gypsies (at that time two vulnerable minorities with no par-
ent-state to press for punitive justice) had been the sole victims of the
Nazis. As Holmes articulated, there is no substitute for lived experience
as an animus for law-making.
The history of the Armenian experience epitomizes the dilemmas and
perils of minorities facing dominant groups determined to homogenize
394. The historical roots of this development, with particular reference to the nineteenth-
century Armenian Question, deserve to be emphasized once more. When British Foreign Sec-
retary Grey decided, after some hesitation, to join his French and Russian colleagues in en-
dorsing the May 24, 1915 public warning against Turkey regarding a new wave of Armenian
massacres, he "saw the threat of punishments as a continuation of nineteenth century policies
against Turkish atrocities." J. WILLIS, supra note 12, at 26. Even more significant, Sir Hart-
ley Shawcross, the British Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, singled out the Armenian case as
the basis of the emergence of the Nuremberg law on crimes against humanity. Quoting Gro-
tius to the effect that intervention is justified when atrocities are perpetrated by dictators
against their own subjects, he declared:
The same view was acted upon by the European Powers which in time past intervened in
order to protect the Christian subjects of Turkey against cruel persecution. The fact is
that the right of humanitarian intervention by war is not a novelty in International Law
This argument was preceded by his analysis of the limits of state sovereignty in relation to
international law:
Normally International Law concedes that it is for the-State to decide how it shall treat its
own nationals; it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction .... Yet International Law has in the
past made some claim that there is a limit to the omnipotence of the State and that the
individual human being, the ultimate unit of all law, is not disentitled to the protection of
mankind when the State tramples upon his rights in a manner which outrages the con-
science of mankind.
H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE, SPEECHES OF THE CHIEF PROSECUTORS AT THE CLOSE OF THE
CASE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, 63 Cmd. 6964 (H.M. Attorney-General,
1946).
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their societies forcibly, and if necessary, through mass murder and exter-
mination. As demonstrated in the main body of this study, the opportu-
nities for mustering and executing such resolve are catalyzed during
wars, especially global wars, where previously existing tensions often ex-
plode into domestic, state-sanctioned violence. This intimate association
between war crimes and crimes against humanity was aptly highlighted
at Nuremberg, and is a distinct feature of not only the Armenian and
Jewish holocausts, but is also a recurrent theme in the genocidal killings
in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Kurdistan.
Herein lies the contemporary relevance of the present study, exceeded
only by its significance in the quest for a legally protected universe of
human rights, the ultimate refuge of impotent and vulnerable minorities.
To the extent that wars, regional or otherwise, become inevitable, geno-
cide may prove unpreventable. If this is true, efforts to prevent future
genocides must shift direction to focus on the prevention of wars, partic-
ularly those wars in which the fate of nationalities or minorities may be
at risk.3
9 5
In addition, the effectiveness of efforts to punish perpetrators of geno-
cides will hinge on the outcome of wars. The conditions needed are, as at
Nuremberg, a clear and decisive victory, a concomitant unconditional
surrender, and a firm resolve to prosecute and apply penal sanctions.
Such justice cannot be taken for granted, however, regardless of the
scope and intensity of atrocities perpetrated. It is fair to conclude in this
respect that the Allies' perception and treatment of the Armenians as an
insignificant and inconsequential victim group contributed in no small
way to their eventual consignment of the Armenian case to oblivion.
Likewise, the Allies' greater interest in positioning themselves in postwar
relations than in pressing for justice against those who committed the
genocide is an extremely disturbing yet important lesson for future
generations.
Conclusion
In summarizing the processes and conditions of the Armenian geno-
cide, the shortcomings of the rules of international law incident to defec-
tive treaty clauses and abortive treaty engagements were examined as
major contributing factors. The failure to prevent the genocide, and the
antecedents of that genocide, was related to the absence of a predictable
395. See Dadrian, The Anticipation and Prevention of Genocide in International Conflicts,
18 INT'L J. OF GROUP TENSIONS 205-14 (1988); see also Dadrian, The Convergent Aspects of
the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Reinterpretation of the Concept of Holocaust, 3




pattern of deterrence by the European Powers, and to a resulting increase
in the vulnerability of the targeted Armenian population. The second
half of the study was devoted to the investigation of the post-genocide
judicial proceedings, to establish that while the proceedings sufficiently
documented the fact of the genocide they failed to produce retributive
justice to any significant degree. This double failure to prevent or to pun-
ish is perhaps the most important feature of the Armenian case, needing
to be restated and reemphasized. To the extent that prevention of a
crime is contingent upon the predictability of the punishment of that
crime, retributive justice acquires critical significance in the control of
future outbreaks of genocide. It may, therefore, be appropriate to con-
clude this study with a brief review of the overall ramifications for inter-
national law of the abortiveness of justice in the Armenian genocide.
When a crime such as genocide goes more or less unchallenged while
being committed and unpunished afterwards, the crime becomes conse-
quential in a dual sense. Not only is the victim's quest for justice denied
but even more important, the perpetrator is encouraged to redefine the
offense in non-criminal terms. Such a- proclivity to redefine is almost al-
ways accompanied by a host of rationalizations. The portents of such
denials have not been adequately appreciated by legists or statesmen.
The denials may be pregnant with incentives for potential perpetrators to
consider the initial crime a precedent warranting emulation. The more
grave threat issuing from such denials concerns, however, the surviving
victim population that may be targeted for an even more effective de-
struction. Lacking remorse, and emboldened by an erosion of existing
inhibitions, the perpetrator resorting to denials may have little hesitation
in repeating the crime under comparable circumstances.
It is conceivable that the truculent and persistent denials of the Arme-
nian genocide by the Turks, past and present, may well presage such a
repetition. The recent discovery of an official document, emanating from
the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Kemalist government, ominously
pointed in that direction at least 69 years ago.3 9 6 In virtual replication of
the genocidal designs of the previous Ittihadist regime, the document em-
396. Buried in a 1200-page tome, the document consists of a cipher telegram, dated No-
vember 8, 1920 sent by Ahmet Muhtar, then Ankara's Foreign Affairs Minister, to General
Kfizlm Karabekir. Karabekir was the Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front Army, and
the compiler of a volume documenting the military campaign of the insurgent Kemalist move-
ment. The first phase of that military campaign involved the invasion in September, 1920 of
Armenia which since May, 1918 had acquired the status of a free and independent Republic.
The inexperienced Armenian army, ill-equipped, ill-fed and ill-led, was unable to muster any
substantial resistance. The set of instructions that comprise the blueprint for a new cycle of
genocide were inserted in the cipher telegram sent Karabekir at the start of negotiations for an
327
Yale Journal of International Law
bodied a new blueprint for genocide, directed against the Russian
Armenians of the Transcaucasus.
Here are the essential components of this new conspiracy. 397 First, the
ground was prepared to justify the crime through the following
assertions.
By virtue of the provisions of the S~vres Treaty Armenia will be enabled to
cut off Turkey from the East. Together with Greece she will impede Tur-
key's general growth. Further, being situated in the midst of a great Is-
lamic periphery, she will never voluntarily relinquish her assigned role of a
despotic gendarme, and will never try to integrate her destiny with the gen-
eral conditions of Turkey and Islam.
After the enumeration of these rationales the following decision was
transmitted. "Consequently, it is indispensable that Armenia be elimi-
nated politically and physically [siyaseten ve maddeten ortadan
kaldirmak]." The General was further advised on the requisite methods
to be employed.
Since the attainment of this objective is subject to [the limitations of] our
power and the general political situation, it is necessary to be adaptive in
the implementation of the decision mentioned above [tevfiki icraat]. Our
withdrawal from Armenia as part of a peace settlement is out of the ques-
tion. Rather, you will resort to a modus operandi intended to deceive the
Armenians [Ermenileri i&al] and fool the Europeans by an appearance of
peacelovingness. In reality, however, [fakat hakikatde] the purpose of all
this is to achieve by stages the objective [stated above] .... [I]t is required
that vague and gentle-sounding words [mzfbhem ve mildyim] be employed
both in the framing and in the application of the peace settlement, while
constantly maintaining an appearance of peacelovingness towards the
Armenians.
The cipher ends with the exhortation that "[t]hese instructions reflect the
real intent [makasidi hakikiyesi] of the Cabinet. They are to be treated as
secret, and are meant only for your eyes."
armistice. K. KARABEKIR, ISTIKLAL HARBIMIZ (Our War of Independence) 844-45 (2d ed.
1969). In the 1960 1st ed. the same cipher is at 961.
Precisely why this document was included in the book is unclear. It is conceivable that
Karabekir was simply trying to be meticulous by making his documentary compilation as
complete as possible without paying too much attention to the myriad details. It is most note-
worthy that as far as it is known the document in question appears nowhere else, and that until
now no one seems to have tried to assess its inordinate significance.
397. Previous to the receipt of this cipher Karabekir on November 6 had transmitted to
the Armenians his own set of armistice terms. But Ankara's instructions obliged him to with-
draw these terms, which the Armenians had accepted a day before, substituting new terms that
were deliberately harsh so as to preclude their acceptance. Following the anticipated rejection
of these new terms by the Armenians on November 10, Karabekir resumed his military cam-
paign in a drive to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. K. LAZIAN, HAIASDAN YEv HAl TADU
UsD TASHNAKIRNERU (Armenia and the Armenian Question According to Treaties) 191-202
(1942). See also F0406/44/E15522, Col. Stokes to Curzon.
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The genesis of the document coincides with the defeat of Damad
Ferit's Cabinet which had initiated the prosecution against the authors of
the Armenian genocide. From that period on, the Court Martial pro-
ceedings slackened considerably, gradually disappearing. It was a period
in which retributive justice within domestic law was being undermined
by resurgent nationalism reacting to the devastating consequences of mil-
itary defeat. The passive attitude of the victorious Allies in the face of
this developing judicial fiasco was matched by their reluctance to come
militarily to the rescue of imperiled Armenia. As Kazemzadeh causti-
cally observed, "While Armenia was dying under Turkish blows the
Western Powers who had made so many promises of help and assistance
merely talked about her fate in the First General-Assembly of the League
of Nations [but] the fate of Armenia was sealed by defeat and Sovietiza-
tion... ",398 In fact, the decision to destroy Armenia was made in An-
kara following protracted deliberations which led to the firm conclusion
that neither England nor any other Allied Power was likely to intervene
on behalf of Armenia.
399
Compressed in this single, official document is a succinct portrayal of
the most salient features of the established genocidal legacy that has been
examined throughout the body of this work. The recurrence of the
World War I Ittihadist pattern of genocide is evident, and may be out-
lined as follows.
1. Lethal decisionmaking at the highest executive level of govern-
ment, involving collective deliberations, crystallization of genocidal in-
tent, authorization of exterminatory measures, and standard
rationalizations to lend an appearance of legitimacy to the decision.
2. The opportunities afforded by a war, especially through reliance
on the military machinery as the most convenient instrument of destruc-
tion and as an efficient command and control.system, an optimum mobil-
ization of resources under a plea of national emergency, and the
compelling rationale of "military necessity" as a license for radical
measures.
3. Efforts to conceal the incriminating material evidence of the secret
intent of annihilation. 4° The chief reason for this recourse was the need
398. F. KAZEMZADEH, THE STRUGGLE FOR TRANSCAUCASIA (1917-1921) 292 (1951).
399. K. KARABEKIR, ISTIKLAL HARBIMIZIN ESASLARI (The Essential Components of our
War of Independence) 32, 35 (1951).
400. The Turkish word igfal is a standard term to denote seductive "deception" and was
referred to in the text of this study, see supra notes 75, 79, to describe Grand Vezir Re§id's
own characterization of the nineteenth-century Ottoman pretensions of reformism. These
techniques of deception were used frequently by the Ittihadists during the war. To cite just
one example, in a November 18, 1915 cipher, then Interior Minister Talat advised Aleppo
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to eliminate any basis for post-war accusations of culpability. The docu-
ment advocated use of the classic stratagem, namely trapping of the vic-
tim population, and lulling them into a manufactured sense of security.
Among several such strategies and tactics employed during the war were
two particularly effective ones. One was the conscription of the able-
bodied male population which on the one hand trapped that very popula-
tion, and on the other, reduced the rest of the Armenian population to an
easy prey for destruction. The other involved the issuance of solemn
governmental assurances that the only purpose of the deportations was
temporary, wartime "relocation."
To enhance the level of plausibility, Turkish Foreign Minister Muhtar
repeated the method of two-track orders practiced by Talat during the
World War I enactment of the genocide. He sent on the same day a
parallel cipher telegram to the same commander of the Kemalist forces.
It contained completely opposite instructions which were meant to be
public and to be relayed to the tottering Armenian government as An-
kara's official terms for an armistice. It followed the "Wilsonian princi-
ple of self-determination" by requiring a plebiscite to delineate the
frontiers. But in the secret cipher, General Karabekir was informed that
the condition of a plebiscite, deemed impossible to meet, was inserted
precisely "to prevent the determination of the very frontiers." The pub-
lic cipher also invoked principles of "justice and humanity," insisting
that "[t]he Ankara government harbors profound and genuine senti-
ments [amik ve samimi], consistent with its aspirations to foster the wel-
fare of the Turkish, Armenian and other neighboring peoples alike."
These professions were accompanied by pledges of support for "the com-
plete independence and security" of Armenia, and by promises to dis-
patch "food supplies and other material assistance so that she may be
able to recover economically." 401 '
4. The use of subterfuges highlights another cardinal feature of the
genocidal legacy under review here. Under "the pretext" (vesile) of pro-
tecting the rights of the Azerbaijanis, who are related to the Turks by
ethnic and religious ties, the General was advised to: militarily occupy
the entire territory of Armenia; temporarily arrange the frontiers of Ar-
menia in such a way that "under the pretext of protecting the rights of
Muslim minorities there is ground for constant intervention [on our
governor Abdulhalik to be careful in the handling of "the deportations" lest Europeans, espe-
cially American Consuls, uncover the actual intent to exterminate the Armenians. Talat in-
structed him to "create the conviction among foreigners" (kanaanin tevlidi igin) that the aim
of "deportation" is nothing but "relocation" (tebdili mekdn). See Dadrian, supra note 169, at
355 n.102.




part]" (hukuku muhafaza vesilesiyle daimi mlidahaleye zemin); and dis-
arm the Armenians, at the same time "arming the Turks of the area little
by little, toward the goal of linking up east and west in the area, and
molding Azerbaijan into an independent Turkish government through
the creation of a national force structure.
' 4°2
5. The Treaty of S~vres which the Ottoman government signed on
August 10, 1920 but failed to ratify, was'imentioned in the cipher as a
sore point for Turkey and her future. As with the 1878 Berlin Treaty,
S~vres began as an effort to improve the lot of the Armenians, but ended
up compounding their misfortunes. However long overdue and deserved
its terms might have seemed to the Armenians, its promise of restoring to
the Armenians a large chunk of historic Armenia fueled extravagant Ar-
menian hopes and irredentist aspirations. Placing too much faith in the
resolve of the victorious Allies to make the treaty operational, the Arme-
nian Republic ultimately became a victim again of the vagaries of inter-
national politics, barely two years after the end of the World War I
genocide.
The design of that Turkish government to deliver a final blow to the
rest of the Armenian people was foiled, however, by the last minute in-
tervention of the 1 1th Red Army that was stationed nearby. By precip-
402. Id. at 845. The kinship ties between the Turks and the Azeris, their "cousins" in
Soviet Transcaucasus, are reflected in the transfer of the Turko-Armenian conflict to the do-
main of Armeno-Azeri relations. The current flare-up of hostility between these two peoples
within the Soviet Union, highlighted by the February, 1988 massacre of the Armenians in the
Azerbaijani city of Sumgait, has jolted the Armenians into rediscovering the perils of their geo-
political vulnerabilities. The ferocity and heinous methods employed in the course of the mas-
sacre, and the inability of the Soviet security forces to prevent the carnage, were agonizing
enough to resuscitate in the Armenian psyche the memories of the World War I genocide, and
most particularly, the sense of total abandonment and helplessness. Called "pogroms" by So-
viet Deputy Procuror-General Alexander Katusov, BAKINSKI RABOTCHI (Baku daily), Mar.
12, 1988, the outbreak was exacerbated by the Azeris who "carried posters of Khomeini of
Iran to indicate that they considered the dispute a matter of Islamic pride and solidarity."
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1989. Other demonstrators in Baku carried Turkish flags. Moscow
NEws, Nov. 30, 1988. The painfulness of the episode was described by Times correspondent
Keller as follows:
Like the Israelis, the Armenians are united by a vivid sense of victimization, stemming
from the 1915 Turkish massacre of 1.5 million Armenians. Armenians are brought up on
this story of genocide, and have a feeling of being surrounded ... by the Islamic Azerbai-
jan, Iran and Turkey. This was reinforced in February by an anti-Armenian pogrom in
the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait ....
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, § E, at 3. The linkage of enmity against Armenia to the Turkish
perception of Armenia as a geographical obstruction to Turkey's direct access to other Turkish
peoples in the Caucasus, and Turkey's resort to genocide as a device for removing that obstruc-
tion, were underlined by a noted expert on Russia and Panturkism. "The massacre in 1914-
1916 of one and a half million Armenians was largely conditioned by the desire of the Young
Turks to eliminate the Armenian obstacle which separated Ottoman Turks from the Turks of
Azerbaijan, and to prepare the way for the territorial unification of the 'Oguz,' or southeastern
group." S. ZENKOVSKY, PAN-TURKISM AND ISLAM IN RUSSIA 111 (1967).
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itously sovietizing Armenia in the wake of the Turkish military victory,
the Army averted the Armenian nation's all but certain extinction.
Notwithstanding, Soviet Armenian sources have furnished evidence of a
vast scale of devastation in the area of Alexandrapole (presently Lenina-
kan, the site of the December 7, 1988 Armenian earthquake) which re-
mained under Turkish occupation for five months.
4°3
In assessing the future tasks of national and international law as they
relate to genocide as a crime, the fundamental and universal mission of
law must be underlined. That mission is to restrain human behavior
under a system of sanctions or legal consequences. 4°4 In the absence of
such sanctions, however, the concept of criminal behavior is bound to be
diluted in the minds of offenders. Indeed, when sanctions fail to materi-
alize with any degree of consistency in the case of a series of mass
murders culminating in genocide, for example, the impunity accruing to
403. The dimensions of this miniature genocide are documented in many sources. In a
telegram sent in June, 1921 to K.V. Chicherin, Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister, A] Miass-
nigian, the President of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Armenia, presented the
following list of casualties in the wake of the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces from
Alexandropole and environs.
[T]he total number killed by the Turks reached 60,000, of which 30,000 were men, 15,000
women, 5,000 children, and 10,000 young girls. Of the 38,000 wounded, 20,000 were
men, 10,000 women, 5,000 young girls, and 3,000 children. Some 18,000 men were car-
ried away as prisoners. Only 2,000 have survived; the rest have died either from starva-
tion, exposure to the elements, or by the sword.
E. SARKISIAN & R. SAHAKIAN, VITAL IsSUES IN MODERN ARMENIAN HISTORY (Armenian
Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, Soviet Armenia) 55-56 (E. Chrakian transl. 1965). The refer-
ence to the Soviet ultimatum which ended the five-month Turkish occupation of the city is at
page 70.
In his memoirs Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlinson, a British officer, provided a glimpse of the
fate of these 18,000 men, most of whom were deported to Erzurum in eastern Turkey as mili-
tary prisoners. The Colonel was being held captive in that city as a hostage for the purpose of
trading him for Turks being detained in Malta by the British as war criminals.
On leaving our old quarters we first saw "Armenian prisoners." Those we saw were being
used as labourers (slaves would be the proper word), and accustomed as I had become to
see starvation, misery, and privations of every description, yet the appearance of these
men gave me, even at that time, a shock such as I had never before experienced, and a
memory which will remain with me whilst life lasts. It was then midwinter, the snow
everywhere lying deep, the force and temperature of the arctic wind being beyond descrip-
tion; yet those miserable spectres were clothed, if that word can be applied to their condi-
tion, in the rottenest and filthiest of verminous rags, through which their fieshless bones
protruded in many places, so that it seemed impossible that humanity could be reduced to
such extremities and live.
The Colonel concluded that the ultimate purpose was "to exterminate" the Armenians, which
purpose "is, and has long been a deliberate policy of the Turkish Government." A. RAWLiN-
SON, ADVENTURES IN THE NEAR EAST 1918-1922 307, 335 (1923). See also F0371/7877 at 7
(folio 148) (Feb. 1922). Another source describes the carnage in Kars following its capture
when "for two full weeks the peaceful civil population of that city and the surrounding town
was subjected to massacres." E. SARKISIAN & R. SAHAKIAN, supra,.at 54; see also id. at 55-56.
404. The negative assumption implicit in this view was cogently articulated by Aristotle
some 23 centuries ago: "When separated from law and justice man is the worst of all ani-
mals." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. I, ch. 2, at 6 (B. Jowett & T. Twining trans. 1959).
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the offender group is capable of furnishing it the requisite incentive to
repeat the crime against the same or a new victim. The persistence of
Armenian clamors for justice, rendered impotent for so long by an
equally persistent disinterest in remedial initiatives by the rest of the
world, has the potential to make such an incentive compelling. The pro-
gressive escalation of the level of genocidal killing of the Armenians in
Ottoman Turkey through episodic and recurrent massacres in the eras of
Abdul Hamit and the Young Turk Ittihadists in particular is a para-
mount fact in this respect. In accounting for that fact Toynbee, who
during the war compiled one of the most massive volumes documenting
and detailing the Armenian genocide, recognized in this regard the inti-
mate connections between official denials and more radical subsequent
resorts to mass murder, "under the cloak of legality by cold-blooded gov-
ernmental action." Decades later Toynbee explained the pattern of pro-
gression to more comprehensive and efficient levels of genocidal
killing.4
°5
The core problems of genocide transcend considerations of the fate of
individual victim groups, or the peculiarities of a particular perpetrator-
victim relationship. The mitigation, if not the elimination, of these
problems devolves upon the further development of international law,
the prime matrix of all human rights, including the rights of potential or
actual genocide victims. Addressing the problem of impunity, the
United Nations passed a resolution redefining and indefinitely postpon-
ing the criminal liabilities of the offenders on November 26, 1968-the
Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes Against Humanity.4° 6 Article l(b) includes the crime of geno-
cide, even if it does "not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the
country in which [it was] committed." The Convention implicitly in-
spires hopes for ultimate justice, belying the general maxim that justice
405. When challenging the wartime Turkish protestations of innocence, for example,
Toynbee virtually dismissed the associated charges of treason and rebellion levelled against the
Armenians as fabrications which will not "bear examination," are" easily rebutted," and are
"found to rest on the most frivolous grounds," only to conclude that "it is evident that the
war was merely an opportunity and not a cause." VISCOUNT BRYCE, supra note 132, at 627,
629, 631, 633.
This is what he wrote a half a century later in an autobiographical account:
The massacre of Armenian subjects in the Ottoman Enpire in 1896 ... was amateur
and ineffective compared with the largely successful attempt to exterminate [them] during
the First World War in 1915 .... [This] genocide was carried out under the cloak of
legality by cold-blooded governmental action. These were not mass-murders committed
spontaneously by mobs of private people...
A. TOYNBEE, EXPERIENCES 241, 341 (1969).
406. G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 40, U.N. Doe. A/7218
(1968).
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delayed is justice denied. Counterposed to these hopes, however, is the
specter of political forces whose traditions may continue to thwart the
initiation of effective relief, indefinitely postponing the realization of
these hopes.
